China has built a comprehensive and increasingly self-reliant uranium enrichment and supply chain to fuel its ambitious nuclear power expansion, leveraging both domestic resources and strategic international partnerships and acquisitions.
Uranium Enrichment Technology:
– Centrifuge Technology: China primarily employs gas centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment. While its initial advancements in this area benefited from technology transfer from Russia, China has successfully indigenized and commercialized its own centrifuge technology. This includes the development and operation of new-generation centrifuges with independent intellectual property rights, achieving international advanced levels in overall technical performance and economics.
– Operating Plants: China operates multiple uranium enrichment plants, including the Lanzhou uranium enrichment plant (Plant 504), Hanzhong uranium enrichment plant (Plant 405), and facilities at Plant 814 (Jinkouhe and Emeishan).
Capacity: China’s estimated enrichment capacity is substantial, with figures around 9 million Separative Work Units (SWU) per year. This includes capacity from both Russian-supplied centrifuges and its indigenous technology. China has aimed for “self-sufficiency” in enriched uranium supply to meet its growing domestic demand.
High-Temperature Gas-Cooled and Molten Salt Reactors: China is also investing significantly in R&D for advanced nuclear technologies, including high-temperature gas-cooled and molten salt-cooled reactors, which may have different fuel cycle requirements.
Uranium Supply Chain:
China employs a “four-pillar” strategy to secure its uranium supply:
– Domestic Mining: China is increasing its domestic uranium exploration and production, including the development of promising in-situ leaching (ISL) deposits. While historically reliant on imports, recent discoveries suggest a boost in domestic resources.
– Overseas Equity and Joint Ventures: Chinese state-owned companies, such as China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN), have invested heavily in acquiring stakes in foreign uranium mines. Notable examples include investments in Kazakhstan (the world’s largest uranium producer) and Namibia (e.g., Rössing and Husab mines).
– International Purchases: China actively purchases uranium on the open market from various suppliers. Kazakhstan is a major source for natural uranium imports, often accounting for a significant portion of China’s foreign-sourced material. Other suppliers have included Australia and Uzbekistan.
– Strategic Reserves: China maintains strategic reserves of uranium to ensure supply security.
Key Aspects of China’s Supply Chain:
Self-Sufficiency Goal: China’s national policy emphasizes achieving self-sufficiency across most aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium mining and conversion to enrichment and fuel fabrication.
Russian Influence: While China has indigenized its enrichment technology, historical agreements with Russia played a role in the development of its centrifuge facilities. Furthermore, China continues to import enriched uranium from Russia, including highly enriched uranium for its fast breeder reactors, for reasons that could include economic efficiency and strategic resource management.
Global Market Player: China is a significant player in the global nuclear market, not only as a consumer but also as an increasingly capable supplier of nuclear technology and fuel cycle services.
Infrastructure Development: China is continuously developing its nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure, including transportation routes. For example, there are plans to equip the Alashankou railway station in Xinjiang with a special hangar to handle uranium imports from Kazakhstan.
China is a dominant global player in the nuclear sector due to its vast import requirements and growing domestic capacity, its role as an exporter of uranium (especially raw ore) is minor. However, it does export significant quantities of enriched uranium, with the United States and Kazakhstan being notable destinations in 2023.
For Uranium and Thorium Ore (HS4 26.12):
2023: China exported a total of $612 in Uranium and Thorium Ore.
Main destinations were:
– Germany ($338)
– Indonesia ($197)
– Spain ($77)
2022-2023 Growth: The fastest-growing export markets for China in this category were Germany (+$276, a 445% increase) and Indonesia (+$197).
For Enriched Uranium and Plutonium and their compounds (HS4 28.44.20):
2023: China exported $444,911.82K (approximately $445 million) worth of enriched uranium and related compounds, totaling 367,706 Kg.
Main destinations were:
– United States ($314,549.94K) (approximately $314.5 million)
– Kazakhstan ($130,361.78K) (approximately $130.3 million)
– Austria ($0.10K)
2024: Monthly data for “Uranium Enriched U235; Plutonium Compounds; Their Alloys, Dispersions, Ceramic Products and Mixtures” (HS8) shows varying amounts. For instance, in May 2024, exports reached a high of 3,165.317 RMB million. Specific destinations for 2024 are not as clearly detailed in the provided snippets as for 2023, but the trend indicates ongoing exports.
Important Considerations:
HS Codes: The Harmonized System (HS) codes define categories of goods. “Uranium and Thorium Ore” (26.12) refers to raw or unprocessed uranium, while “Enriched uranium and plutonium and their compounds” (28.44.20) refers to processed forms. It’s crucial to distinguish between these when looking at trade data.
Small Export Volume (Ore): The export value for raw uranium ore is very small ($612 in 2023), indicating that China primarily imports raw uranium to meet its domestic needs for enrichment and fuel fabrication.
Enriched Uranium Exports: The significantly higher value of enriched uranium exports, particularly to the United States and Kazakhstan, highlights China’s role as a supplier in specific niches of the nuclear fuel cycle. This could be due to factors like:
Specific contractual agreements.
Technological capabilities for certain types of enrichment.
Re-exporting of enriched uranium sourced from other countries (as the first search result suggests this is a concern, specifically regarding re-selling Russian uranium).
China is actively developing advanced and proprietary technologies for recycling nuclear reactor waste materials, driven by its domestic energy security needs and environmental goals. Given its ambitious “go global” strategy for nuclear technology and its comprehensive “one-stop” offerings, it is very probable that China will seek to export its waste recycling solutions as part of its broader nuclear export packages to interested countries.
China’s Proprietary Technology in Nuclear Waste Recycling:
– Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle: China’s policy is to develop a fully closed nuclear fuel cycle. This involves reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to extract valuable fissile materials (like uranium and plutonium) for reuse as fresh fuel, thereby reducing the volume and long-term radioactivity of high-level waste.
– Reprocessing Plants: China has been developing and operating pilot and demonstration reprocessing plants.
A pilot civilian reprocessing plant began testing around 2010.
They are constructing demonstration reprocessing facilities, with the first 200 tHM/yr (tonnes of heavy metal per year) plant expected to be operational around 2025 and a second one by around 2030.
These facilities aim to recover uranium and plutonium from spent fuel.
– High-Level Waste Disposal (Vitrification): China has made breakthroughs in high-level radioactive liquid waste disposal, specifically mastering the technique of vitrification. This involves mixing and melting liquid waste with glass materials at high temperatures (1,100 C or higher) to form a stable glass product that effectively and stably contains radioactive elements for thousands of years. This technology has been put into use in Guangyuan, Sichuan Province, making China one of the few countries to have acquired such a technique.
– Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS): China is investing heavily in the China Initiative Accelerator-Driven System (CiADS) technology. This prototype system is designed to get more life out of used nuclear fuel by bombarding it with a particle beam to create fissile heavy isotopes that can be used as fresh fuel. This technology also aims to reduce the volume and radiotoxicity of long-lived nuclear waste.
– Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) and Thorium Reactors: China is at the forefront of developing thorium-fueled molten salt reactors. These reactors are considered safer, produce significantly less nuclear waste than conventional uranium reactors, and can even consume waste from solid-fuel uranium reactors as fuel. China recently announced a breakthrough in refueling a thorium reactor on the fly for the first time, demonstrating its lead in this innovative area.
– Research and Development: China is allocating significant budgets to research in advanced reactor technologies (Generation IV reactors like Fast Neutron Reactors and SMRs) and the back end of the fuel cycle.
It is highly likely that China will export its nuclear waste recycling and related nuclear fuel cycle technologies, as part of its broader nuclear export strategy.
– “Go Global” Policy: China has a clear “go global” policy for its nuclear technology, aiming to become a leading exporter of nuclear power, fuel, and related services. This is a high-level political initiative backed by the government.
Comprehensive Solutions: China offers a “one-stop” solution for nuclear power, from financing and construction to fuel supply, maintenance, and the handling/reprocessing of spent fuel. This comprehensive package is highly attractive to countries looking to develop nuclear energy, especially those with limited domestic capabilities or facing challenges in managing their own nuclear waste.
– Strategic Influence: Exporting nuclear technology, including waste management solutions, is a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its broader geopolitical strategy. It allows China to deepen its influence and establish long-term dependencies with client states.
– Economic Advantage: China’s state-owned nuclear enterprises often offer competitive pricing for their nuclear technologies and services due to massive state support and economies of scale from their extensive domestic building program.
Addressing Proliferation Concerns: While reprocessing technology inherently carries proliferation risks (due to the separation of plutonium), offering to take back spent fuel or provide integrated fuel cycle services can be presented as a non-proliferation benefit, as it centralizes sensitive materials under the control of a recognized nuclear-weapon state.
Past Export Precedent: China has already exported its nuclear reactor technology (e.g., Hualong One reactors to Pakistan) and has shown a willingness to engage in international nuclear cooperation.
China’s known nuclear reactor exports:
Pakistan: China has exported a total of six operational nuclear power reactors to Pakistan.
Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (CNPP): China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has exported four CNP-300 pressurized water reactors to Pakistan for the Chashma Nuclear Power Plant (Chashma-1, Chashma-2, Chashma-3, and Chashma-4). These were earlier generation Chinese designs.
Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP): China has also exported two Hualong One (HPR1000) reactors to Pakistan for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (K-2 and K-3). The Hualong One is China’s domestically developed third-generation reactor design, representing a significant advancement in their export capabilities.
Beyond these operational units, China has also signed agreements and expressed intentions to export its nuclear technology, particularly the Hualong One, to other countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative, with plans to build as many as thirty nuclear power reactors in various countries by 2030.
