October Hoax

10-5-20 ‘I feel better than I did 20 years ago’: Trump announces he’s ready to leave the hospital Monday evening. Want to feel 20 years younger? Get infected.

Trump driving by his supporters outside Walter Reed military hospital. 10-4-20

Trump predicted the October Surprise, and he is well after a couple of days of treatment, what a fake.

10-4-20
MAGA
Trump and Melania tested positive for coronavirus, the President twitted early Friday morning. 10-2-20.
Trump had been taken to Walter Reed on Friday
The sick

Acupuncture/acupressure stroke prevention

《黄帝明堂灸经》保存了不少已散佚的灸法专著内容,其“正人形第四”记载:“凡人未中时,一两月前,或三五月前,非时足脛上忽发酸重頑癖,良久方解,此乃将中风之候也。便須急灸三里穴与绝骨穴,四处各三壮,后用葱、薄荷、桃柳叶 四味煎汤淋洗灸痞,令躯逐风气于痞口内出也。灸若春較秋更灸,秋較春更灸,常令两脚上有灸痞为妙。”这段文字目前可以看作是最早用“瘢痕灸”预防中风的记载,论述較为详细,有先兆症状、施灸穴位、施灸壮数以及施灸后灸掩的保护法,为后世医家采用艾灸预防中风提供了借鉴。

宋代王执中《针灸资生经・卷四・中风》又据中风之中脏和中腑的不同,分别提出预防之法:“灸风中腑……病左灸右,病右灸左,因循失灸废者,灸充春較秋灸,秋較春灸,取尽风气。百会、曲鬂、肩髑、曲池、风市、足三里、绝骨共十三穴。灸风中脏……但依次自上及下各灸五壮,日别灸随年壮。凡遇春秋常灸,以泄风气,素有风人,可保无虞。”张杲《医说》云:“患风疾人,宜灸三里者,五脏六腑之沟渠也,常欲宣通,即无风疾。”

元代罗天益在《卫生宝鉴・卷八・中风灸法》中收集了历代医家灸法之经验,他本人也因中风先兆而体验到灸法对中风的预防作用:“予自五月间,口眼斜,灸百会等三穴,即止。右手足麻无力,灸百会、发际等七穴,得愈。七月气塞,涎上,不能语,
魂魄飞扬,如堅江湖中,顿刻欲绝,灸百会、风池等,左右頬车穴,气遂通,吐涎半碗,又下十余行。伏枕半月,遂平复。自后凡觉神思少异于常,即灸百会、风池等穴,无不立效。”明确肯定了灸法预防中风的疗效。

清代吴亦鼎集历代著名灸家之大成,著成了《神灸经绝指出有中风先兆时可依次灸合谷、风市、昆仑、手三里、关元、丹田等穴。该书还记载了专门用于预防中风的穴位:风池、百会、曲池、合谷、肩髑、风市、足三里、绝骨、环跳

灸治术在日本也頗为盛行。1932年,日本人吉原昭道所著《中风预防名灸》一书专门论述了“中风预防灸”的具体内容,有相关的透应证、禁忌症以及施灸的时间和穴位,其“中风预防灸”的穴位为风池、天柱、肩井、手三里、神门、腰关、风 市、足三里

通过古文献研究,我们发现中风的预防多应用针灸方法,但针刺和艾灸相比,艾灸预防中风的文献内容更为丰富;在具体应用中,针刺多用于中风的既病防变方面,而正常机体的未病先防则多用灸法。是否因为艾灸在预防疾病的发生、病后防 复及强身健体、延年益寿方面具有更好的功效,临床及实验可进一步验证之 、

环跳

绝骨

肩髑

风市

腰关

神门

肩井

陽陵泉

神门

百会

风池、天柱

曲池

手三里
足三里

“10分钟石氏指针法”一共分5步,大家一定要坚持下来,一次做完,这样才能避免中风。
第一步:指针按翳风

翳 (读为:yì )风

位置:耳垂后方凹陷处,按翳风。
预防:中风、精神病、高血压。
时长:按三分钟,直到微微发热。
第二步:指针按风池

风池

取穴:枕骨下方,颈部上方连接处。
预防:中风引发的口歪眼斜。
时长:按三分钟,直到微微发热。
第三步:指针按天柱

天柱

取穴:后头骨正下方凹处。
预防:治疗神经类疾病。
时长:按三分钟,直到微微发热。
第四步:循环按一分钟
做法:依次按压翳风、风池、天柱穴,一分钟。

翳风

第五步:按足三里穴,增强抵抗力
做法:取坐姿,在膝关节“膝眼”往下三横指处,找准左右两腿的足三里穴,用双手大拇指用力按压几分钟。
作用:对于人体提升抵抗力很有用。    

World’s First Commercial Diesel Engine with Brake Thermal Efficiency Above 50% Launched by Weichai

9-16-20 was a historical day in the development of internal combustion engines as China-based automaker Weichai Group 潍柴动力 officially launched the world’s first commercial vehicle diesel engine with a brake thermal efficiency (BTE) above 50%.

During a launch ceremony held in China earlier today, Germany’s TÜV SÜD and the China Automotive Technology and Research Center—the country’s national internal combustion engine testing organization—awarded Weichai certificates for BTE of 50.26%. The engine was jointly unveiled by Ling Wen, vice governor of Shandong Province and academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering; and Tan Xuguang, chairman of Shandong Heavy Industry Group and Weichai Group.

Since the development of the first diesel engine in 1897, the engine’s brake thermal efficiency increased from 26% to 46%, where it remained until now, according to Weichai. To further improve the diesel engine BTE, Weichai drew on its 70 years of experience in the internal combustion engine R&D. For the past 10 years, the company invested $4.4 billion USD in diesel engine development.

Since 2015, Weichai’s special technical research team has conducted a large number of simulations and bench tests to improve the efficiency of its engines, eventually leading to this historic breakthrough, the company said. Weichai credits the high brake thermal efficiency rate to five proprietary technologies: advanced fields synergy combustion technology, harmonious design technology, exhaust energy distribution technology, subzone lubrication technology, and WISE control technology:

Weichai’s fields synergy combustion technology optimizes the design of the air passage, fuel injection, combustion chamber profile and other systems to make the relationship between the velocity field and concentration field in the combustion chamber more harmonious, increasing combustion speed by 30%.
Harmonious design technology enables the diesel engine body’s to withstand high peak firing pressure (PFP), which greatly limits combustion improvement, by about 60%. The technology also strengthens the engine’s overall structure.
The company’s exhaust energy distribution technology, developed in response to the increased difficulty of emission control caused by improved combustion, pioneered reconstruction of the exhaust system design. The technology adapts to the demand for exhaust gas recirculation while ensuring the efficiency of turbines, meeting regulations and standards, and achieving 1% increase in brake thermal efficiency.
Subzone lubrication technology, developed based on the different characteristics of the friction pairs of the system, uses several friction reduction technologies to reduce the overall friction by 20%.
WISE control technology takes advantage of Weichai’s self-developed ECU by developing a series of more precise control predictive models, making every part of the diesel engine more efficient.
Weichai’s achievement is a historical moment in the development of internal combustion engines, the company said. Several diesel engine experts including Bosch, AVL, FEV, SAE, China Machinery Industry Federation, China Internal Combustion Engine Industry Association, and China-SAE congratulated Weichai on this breakthrough and praised the company for setting a new benchmark for the diesel engine BTE.

The Weichai 50% BTE engine has a 13 L displacement, is rated at 560 hp at 1900 rpm, and utilizes a 2500 bar fuel injection system. The engine meets China VI/Euro VI emission requirements. Increasing brake thermal efficiency from 46 to 50% reduces diesel fuel consumption and CO2 emissions by 8%.

Weichai said it has received strong support from Bosch Group and other global suppliers and R&D consulting firms in the development of this program. Weichai’s future plans include partnering with more global companies to move toward a goal of 55% thermal efficiency, Chairman Tan Xuguang announced during today’s ceremony.

Until now, a 50% BTE has been only commercially available in large, low-speed, two-stroke marine diesel engines.

Hong Kong is China, by Regina Ip

No amount of outcry, condemnation or sanctions over the Chinese government’s purported encroachment in Hong Kong’s affairs will alter the fact that Hong Kong is part of China and that its destiny is intertwined with the mainland’s.

Hong Kong has been rocked by a series of crises after the eruption of protests last year over a proposed bill (long since withdrawn) that would have allowed the extradition of some suspects in criminal cases to mainland China.

Hong Kongers who wanted the city promptly to return to peace thought the authorities’ handling of the situation, which dragged on for months and grew more and more violent, was incompetent. For other locals, many outsiders and apparently much of the global media, a people’s legitimate quest for more democracy was being suppressed.
Something had to be done, and the Chinese authorities did it. The scale and frequency of antigovernment protests has now subsided — thanks to a national security law for Hong Kong promulgated in Beijing on June 30.

Several prominent democracy advocates have since announced their retirement from politics, disbanded their parties or fled the city.
The West tends to glorify these people as defenders of Hong Kong’s freedoms, but they have done great harm to the city by going against its constitutional order and stirring up chaos and disaffection toward our motherland.

Last year’s prolonged unrest dented Hong Kong’s reputation as one of the best places in the world in which to do business. In March, the Heritage Foundation downgraded the city to second place in its Economic Freedom Index for 2020, citing “ongoing political and social turmoil”; Hong Kong had ranked first since 1995.
The Fraser Institute, an independent think tank in Canada, rated Hong Kong as the world’s freest economy in its latest report, but it warned that Beijing’s recent “interventions” would likely hurt the next assessment.

And the Trump administration has imposed sanctions on the city’s chief executive, Carrie Lam, and other senior officials here and on the mainland, and it has revoked Hong Kong’s special trade status with the United States.

Some pundits have already declared the death of “one country, two systems,” the formal arrangement under which Hong Kong is governed by Beijing, though with “a high degree of autonomy” and a commitment to civil rights not available on the mainland.
At the same time, the democratic movement in Hong Kong is in great danger of being hijacked by its more radical faction. In mid-July, ahead of the election for the Legislative Council (LegCo) scheduled for early September, the pro-democracy camp held an informal primary to gauge the public’s support for its various candidates. The ones who advocated uncompromising positions or blanket opposition to the government scored well.

At the end of July, in the midst of an upsurge of coronavirus infections, Mrs. Lam announced that the LegCo election would be postponed for a year because it couldn’t safely be held during the pandemic.
The Hong Kong Bar Association immediately issued a statement challenging the basis, in fact and in law, for the government’s decision, also chiding the administration for inviting Beijing to weigh in, in violation of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, the city’s mini-constitution.

The authorities in Beijing then signaled, by way of a laconic decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, that sitting legislators could simply continue doing their work.

But this announcement, too, has proved controversial. At least two of the 24 pro-democracy legislators in LegCo announced this week that they would quit, on grounds that a term extension would breach the Basic Law. Nearly all of the others appear to be keeping their posts, after respondents in an opinion poll favored, by a thin margin, the legislators’ staying over their leaving.
Yet deferring the election, and for a full year, simply was a sound decision.

Another wave of coronavirus infections (which would be Hong Kong’s fourth) could strike later this fall or in the winter, and, say, a six-month deferral might have required another six months’ delay — a move that would confuse the public and no doubt be decried as a lack of foresight on the Hong Kong government’s part.

Some have asked why special arrangements couldn’t be made to hold the election on schedule, when at just the time that the voting was supposed to take place, the government managed to conduct a citywide coronavirus-testing program. The plain answer is that the Electoral Affairs Commission, an independent body, made no recommendations for minimizing health risks to the nearly 4.5 million voters expected to cast ballots on a single day, despite various suggestions from pro-establishment parties to allow for early voting, mail-in voting and voting outside Hong Kong, and to extend voting hours.
Then the coronavirus-detection program itself came under attack.

By the end of the two-week testing drive, on Sept. 14, 1.78 million residents had been screened, about 24 percent of the city’s population. Was this a high level of participation? Or was it low — as some critics claimed, citing that as yet more proof of the community’s lack of trust in the authorities?

Mass testing was the responsible thing to do.

Hong Kong, despite being densely populated and an international business and travel hub, has managed relatively well in fighting Covid-19, without ever mandating a complete lockdown. As of Oct. 1, a total of 5,088 confirmed or probable cases of infection and 105 deaths had been reported, in a city of 7.5 million people.
Yet pro-democracy activists seized on the testing program, too, claiming that the privacy of test-takers’ DNA was at risk, especially since some medical teams administering or analyzing the tests were brought in from the mainland.

The Hong Kong government has not been able to resolve in recent years any of the city’s main challenges, let alone restore public trust or win back hearts and minds. But these problems are not entirely the doing of Mrs. Lam’s government: Previous administrations failed to deal with them in any meaningful way.

This wariness is one reason that the doubts and fears being expressed today about the impact of China’s recent national security law in Hong Kong can only diminish over time, as the new law is tested in court.
For now, despite all the jitters, about 28 people have been arrested under the law. And only one person has been charged — for secession and terrorism: a 23-year-old man accused of driving a motorbike into police officers and displaying a banner that read “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times.” His case is being dealt with in accordance with due process and our criminal laws.

Another story that has garnered much worried attention recently concerns a group of 12 people from Hong Kong who in late August were intercepted by marine police from mainland China for illegally crossing the border while they appeared to be fleeing the city on a speedboat in the direction of Taiwan. At least one of them had been arrested in Hong Kong under the national security law.

All have been in detention on the mainland since — raising concerns among human rights defenders and democracy activists that the fugitives are being held without charge, have been denied bail and refused access to lawyers, and are about to be subjected to the mainland’s legal system, which has fewer protections for defendants than does Hong Kong’s.

But the Hong Kong government has no power to ask any other jurisdiction not to deal with Hong Kong residents in accordance with its own laws simply because those people are from Hong Kong.

To some, the new national security law is especially chilling because it seems simultaneously vague and very severe. But many laws are vague, constructively so. And this one only seems severe precisely because it fills longstanding loopholes — about subversion, secession, local terrorism, collusion with external forces. One person’s “severe” is someone else’s intended effect.

I see little chance of any compromise being reached between the authorities in Beijing and the democratic camp in Hong Kong, be it about the right to elect directly the chief executive or any other major matter. From Beijing’s point of view, democratic development in Hong Kong has brought about nothing but chaos, polarization and anti-China sentiment.

What’s more, Beijing isn’t actually encroaching on Hong Kong’s semi-autonomy by taking measures to proscribe subversive activities in the city. Bear in mind that back in the late 1970s, China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, put forward the “one country, two systems” formula with a view to bringing Hong Kong, Macau and eventually Taiwan back into the fold. National unity has always been the ultimate objective.
Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong is a special administrative region that enjoys a “high degree of autonomy” — which, by definition, means not complete autonomy, a point I labor to explain to foreign officials and politicians. Any attempt to alter Hong Kong’s formal political status and turn the city into a de facto independent political entity, or to otherwise free it of Beijing’s control, is a fundamental challenge to China’s sovereignty.

Can a few young people clamoring that Hong Kong is its own “nation” really do that much harm? Does simply chanting some feisty slogans or waving a banner that says “independence” — or holding up a blank sheet of paper in its place — really threaten China’s national unity? Maybe, if those statements and gestures indicate a broader engagement in the organizing, planning, participating or committing of actual separatism. Such activities and situations tend to be dynamic, and their effects can quickly metastasize.

Like it or not, Hong Kong is part of China. And given the two’s vast disparity in size and Hong Kong’s growing economic dependence on the mainland, the city’s progressive integration with China is unavoidable.

A realistic goal for Hong Kong ought to be remaining the freest and most international city in China and retaining its unique international status, thanks to the city’s many bilateral agreements with foreign countries and its membership in numerous international organizations.

Foreign governments should not benchmark what happens in Hong Kong against standards that prevail in Western countries; those are governed by a political system entirely different from China’s. Instead, they should benchmark Hong Kong against the rest of China, and measure how the city can maintain its unique characteristics — openness, a commitment to personal rights and freedoms, respect for the rule of law and the ability to reinvent itself economically. Beijing’s national security law is saving “one country, two systems” by ensuring that Hong Kong does not become a danger to China.

Regina Ip is a member of the Executive Council and the Legislative Council of Hong Kong.

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