New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon’s recent visit to China, his first since November 2023, indeed focused heavily on strengthening economic ties, creating jobs, raising wages, and attracting investment to New Zealand.
Key outcomes and details of the visit include:
Trade and Export Promotion:
Luxon was accompanied by a delegation of prominent New Zealand companies, including Fonterra, A2 Milk, Zespri, and Silver Fern Farms, to promote New Zealand’s exports.
A significant event was a ceremony recognizing Fonterra for meeting the new “Grass Fed Standard,” which is expected to boost dairy sales in China, especially with the existing China-New Zealand free trade agreement allowing tariff-free dairy product entry.
Efforts were made to promote a diverse range of New Zealand exports, including meat, dairy, wood, and even skincare products, with the announcement of a new government certification scheme for Kiwi-made cosmetics to be sold in China.
Tourism and Education:
Luxon participated in the China Eastern and Auckland Airport route launch ceremony, highlighting the importance of airline cooperation for boosting tourism between China, New Zealand, the Pacific Islands, and South America.
A memorandum of understanding for strategic cooperation between Tourism New Zealand and Trip.com (2025-2027) was signed to boost tourism collaboration.
New Zealand announced a 12-month trial of visa waivers for Chinese passport holders traveling from Australia with a valid Australian visa, making it easier for tourists to visit both countries.
Efforts were made to attract more Chinese students to New Zealand, including an event at Fudan University.
Strengthening Diplomatic Relationships:
Luxon held high-level meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang in Beijing, aiming to maintain a “strong, mature, complex, considered, predictable” relationship.
While the primary focus was economic, Luxon indicated that New Zealand would continue to raise differences on issues such as human rights and regional security, consistent with its independent foreign policy.
Overall Economic Goals:
The visit aimed to increase New Zealand’s share in the vast Chinese market, with over 20% of New Zealand’s goods and services exports already going to China, supporting over 100,000 jobs.
Luxon emphasized the “room for growth” in trade with China, noting that New Zealand currently accounts for a small fraction of Chinese trade.
“世界潮流，浩浩蕩蕩，順之則昌，逆之則亡！” in my Intro. What does it mean? It translates to: “The trends of the world are vast and mighty; follow them and prosper, go against them and perish!”, is widely attributed to Sun Yat-sen (孫中山), often referred to as the “Father of the Nation” in modern China for his pivotal role in the Xinhai Revolution and the establishment of the Republic of China.
He used this phrase to emphasize the importance of understanding and adapting to the tide of progressive change and democratic revolution in his time. It’s a statement that has resonated throughout Chinese history and is still frequently quoted by leaders and scholars to underscore the necessity of aligning with dominant historical forces.
Context and Application
This saying is often used in political and historical discourse, particularly when discussing significant transformations or paradigm shifts. It suggests that:
– Adaptability is key: Success comes from recognizing and adjusting to evolving circumstances rather than rigidly holding onto outdated ideas or practices.
– Resistance is futile (in the long run): Attempting to defy powerful, widespread movements is ultimately a losing battle.
– Foresight is crucial: Those who can discern the emerging trends are better positioned to navigate the future successfully.
Essentially, it’s a powerful reminder that history moves forward, and it often does so with an momentum that is difficult, if not impossible, to stop. Wise individuals, organizations, and nations will recognize these tides and adjust their course accordingly.
Say goodbye to the rust buckets that constantly break down. BC Ferries, a company owned and subsidized by the province of British Columbia, has recently announced its decision to purchase four new vessels from China Merchants Industry Weihai Shipyards, a state-owned shipyard in China. This decision has sparked significant controversy in British Columbia and Canada.
No Canadian Bids: BC Ferries stated that no Canadian shipyards submitted bids for the project. Seaspan, British Columbia’s largest shipbuilder, indicated they are currently busy with orders for the Royal Canadian Navy and Canadian Coast Guard and cannot compete with lower-wage countries on commercial contracts.
Cost and Value: BC Ferries CEO Nicholas Jimenez stated the decision was based on getting the “best possible deal for customers,” citing the Chinese shipyard’s technical capabilities, high-quality and safety standards, ferry-building experience, reliable timelines, and overall cost and value. While the exact contract value has not been disclosed, BC Ferries claims it fits within the approved budget and that building in Europe would be twice as expensive, and three times the cost if a Canadian company had bid.
Government Disappointment and Geopolitical Concerns: British Columbia’s Transportation Minister, Mike Farnworth, expressed disappointment that more involvement from Canadian shipyards was not part of the contract. He also raised concerns about procuring services from a country “actively harming Canada’s economy” with tariffs and protectionism, referencing ongoing trade disputes between Canada and China. Premier David Eby, while on an Asian trade mission that excluded China, has also expressed past concerns about China’s role in issues like money laundering and election interference.
Economic Impact and “Buy Local” Policy: Critics, including the BC Federation of Labour and the Opposition BC Conservatives, argue that the decision sends hundreds of millions of dollars out of the province and goes against the provincial government’s “buy-B.C.” rhetoric. They believe the contract should have been an opportunity to invest in domestic shipbuilding, create jobs, and stimulate the local economy.
BC Ferries’ Defense: BC Ferries maintains that the procurement process was global and thorough, including site visits and third-party checks. They emphasize the need to replace aging vessels quickly and affordably to avoid service disruptions. They also highlight that while the ships are built overseas, over $1 billion in maintenance and refits over the vessels’ 45-year lifespan is expected to flow back into the B.C. maritime sector.
Contract Protections: BC Ferries CEO Jimenez stated they have a “very, very strong contract” with the Chinese shipyard, with most of the payment tied to delivery and including refund guarantees and fixed-price terms to protect BC Ferries. They will also have a team of experts on-site at the shipyard throughout construction for oversight and quality assurance.
Party Backlash: Even within the ruling NDP, there has been internal criticism, with the provincial labour movement successfully passing an emergency motion at a party council meeting, rebuking the premier for not intervening to ensure the ships were built in B.C.
The new vessels are expected to be diesel-battery hybrid propulsion systems, with the capability to operate on full electric power in the future. The first of the four new ferries is expected to come into service in 2029, with the others following by 2031.
The Canuck House of Commons Transport Committee has decided to investigate the C$1 billion loan from the Canuck Infrastructure Bank to BC Ferries. This loan is intended for the purchase of four new hybrid-electric vessels from a Chinese shipbuilding company.
The committee plans to summon Canuck Minister of Transport Chrystia Freeland, Infrastructure Minister Gregor Robertson, and the CEOs of BC Ferries and the Canuck Infrastructure Bank to testify in a hearing within the next 30 days.
China is rapidly advancing its satellite internet capabilities with several ambitious mega-constellations under development, most notably Guowang and G60 (also known as SpaceSail or Qianfan). While a definitive single “commercial availability” date for a nationwide Chinese satellite internet service is not yet set, here’s what the current information suggests:
Regional Service:
Geespace (a subsidiary of Geely) has already begun commercial deployment in regions, including the Middle East (as of June 2024) and plans to expand into Southeast Asia and Africa in the coming years.
The G60 (SpaceSail) constellation aims to provide regional service by the end of 2025. They have already signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Brazil for service starting in 2026 and are in business negotiations with over 30 countries.
Global Service:
The G60 (SpaceSail) constellation has a stated goal of providing global service by the end of 2027. They plan to have 1,296 satellites in orbit by then, increasing to 15,000 by 2030 to offer direct-to-mobile service.
The Guowang constellation, run by state-owned China Satellite Services, is also aiming for global coverage, with a massive plan of 12,992 satellites. While test launches are ongoing, a specific global commercial launch date is less defined than for G60, but their overall timeline aims for completion by 2030.
Competition: China’s efforts are seen as a direct challenge to SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper, aiming to compete in the global satellite internet market.
“Digital Iron Curtain”: Some analysts express concern that China’s satellite internet services could extend its model of digital authoritarianism and censorship globally.
Rapid Development: China’s commercial space sector is growing rapidly, with significant government support and increased investor interest, indicating a strong commitment to these projects.
In summary, we can expect to see regional commercial availability of Chinese satellite internet services potentially by late 2025 or 2026, with global coverage targeted by late 2027 or 2030 as their mega-constellations are fully deployed.
There are strong rumors and accusations that the potential approval of the Chinese “super embassy” in London is linked to, or is part of an exchange for, the lifting of sanctions by China against certain UK Members of Parliament.
“Offering to Labour” Accusation: Leading sanctioned MPs, such as Sir Iain Duncan Smith (who is one of the nine predominantly Tory parliamentarians sanctioned by China in 2021 for speaking out against human rights abuses in Xinjiang), have explicitly stated this. Duncan Smith has been quoted saying that China’s offer to lift sanctions is “an offering from China” to the Labour government to “grease the wheels” for their proposed new embassy facility at Royal Mint Court.
Timing of Developments: The timing is seen by critics as suspicious. The Labour government, under Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, has reportedly moved quickly to re-engage with China since taking power in July 2024. This includes high-level meetings, and Starmer himself reportedly spoke with President Xi Jinping to press for the embassy’s approval, leading to the decision being “called in” by the Deputy Prime Minister. Simultaneously, reports from The Guardian (as noted by the Global Times) emerged in June 2025 suggesting China is considering lifting the 2021 sanctions on UK MPs.
Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Response: When asked directly if the lifting of sanctions was discussed during recent China-UK official meetings, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated they were “not aware of the specifics of the issue” but stressed that “Equality, mutual benefit, and meeting each other halfway form the foundation for growing bilateral relations and the principle for solving any differences.” This non-committal but suggestive language can be interpreted in various ways.
Political Context: The previous Conservative government had opposed the embassy project, partly due to grave warnings from domestic intelligence services about espionage risks. The current Labour government’s perceived readiness to approve it, coupled with the potential lifting of sanctions, is fueling the “dirty deal” narrative, particularly among opposition MPs and human rights advocates.
While there is no explicit, publicly confirmed “deal” or official statement from either government directly linking the two issues, the coinciding developments and the vocal accusations from sanctioned MPs strongly suggest that this exchange is indeed a significant rumor with some perceived basis in the political maneuvering between the two countries. Critics argue that it shows the UK government prioritizing economic and diplomatic engagement with China, potentially at the expense of human rights principles.
The Second China-Central Asia Summit in Astana marks a significant continuation and deepening of cooperation established at the inaugural summit in Xi’an in May 2023. The consensus to “uphold the ‘China-Central Asia spirit,’ persist in permanent good-neighborliness and friendship, and collaboratively advance the construction of a China-Central Asia community with a shared future” highlights a commitment to a long-term, comprehensive partnership.
1. “China-Central Asia Spirit” and Political Trust:
Deepened Mutual Trust: The “China-Central Asia Spirit” is characterized by “mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit, and mutual assistance for the joint pursuit of modernization through high-quality development.” This has translated into closer political dialogue and coordination on regional and international issues.
Legal Foundation: A major step forward is the signing of a treaty on “eternal good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation” at the Astana summit. This legally enshrines the principle of everlasting friendship and provides a solid foundation for future relations.
Institutionalization: The establishment of the China-Central Asia mechanism and the regular Foreign Ministers’ Meeting mechanism in 2020, along with the creation of the China-Central Asia Secretariat in early 2024, demonstrates a strong move towards institutionalizing cooperation.
Support for Core Interests: Both sides have committed to firmly supporting each other in safeguarding independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national dignity, and in choosing development paths suitable to their respective national conditions.
2. Economic Cooperation and Trade:
Rapid Trade Growth: Since the Xi’an Summit, two-way trade has seen significant growth. In 2024, trade reached a record high of nearly $95 billion, up by $5.4 billion from the previous year, and is expected to exceed $100 billion in 2025. China remains Central Asia’s top trading partner and a major source of investment.
Diversified Trade: While Central Asia exports agricultural products like honey, fruits, wheat, and poultry to China, Chinese new energy vehicles (NEVs) and photovoltaic products are increasingly entering Central Asian markets. This includes Chinese-brand NEVs accelerating their entry, with 51,000 units exported to Central Asia through Khorgos Port in 2023 (a 608.5% increase).
Industrial Investment: There’s been important progress in industrial investment, with examples like China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Group jointly acquiring a stake in Kazakhstan’s Allur Group, leading to a significant increase in automobile production and sales. BYD has also established an NEV factory in Uzbekistan.
Energy Cooperation: The China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline continues to be a major overland route for China’s natural gas imports, and cooperation in renewable energy (solar and wind power) is emerging.
Agricultural Cooperation: Chinese crop varieties, technologies, machinery, and agricultural supplies are flowing into Central Asia, while Central Asian agricultural products are diversifying Chinese markets.
3. Connectivity and Infrastructure (Belt and Road Initiative – BRI):
Central Role of BRI: The Belt and Road Initiative continues to play a central role in advancing cooperation, with Central Asia serving as a crucial gateway to Europe.
Railway Development:
China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway: This is a flagship project with groundbreaking for mainline construction advancing. Once completed, it will provide Kyrgyzstan with its first direct route to the sea and serve as an important corridor connecting Asia-Pacific with Europe.
China-Europe Freight Trains: These services are expanding, with 4,725 trips made in the first four months of 2025, up 21% year-on-year, significantly enhancing transportation efficiency and quality.
Beijing-Central Asia Freight Train Service: A new service launched in March 2025, creating an efficient land corridor for exporting high-value, high-tech products from the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region.
Other Infrastructure: Projects like the China-Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway, and the China-Tajikistan expressway are contributing to a more robust logistics network. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route has been upgraded and expanded.
Port Infrastructure and Airway Transportation: Efforts are being made to advance the upgrading of port infrastructure and further open up airway transportation markets, developing regional logistics networks.
4. People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges:
Visa-Free Arrangements: China has made mutual visa-free arrangements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, facilitating significant travel between the countries (e.g., over 1.2 million travels between China and Kazakhstan in 2024).
Educational and Vocational Training: Progress has been made in establishing cultural centers, opening branches of Chinese universities, and launching Luban Workshops (e.g., in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) to cultivate technical talents and provide opportunities for youth.
Tourism and Cultural Events: Tourism and cultural years, as well as art festivals, are popular, with examples like the first cultural tourist train trip between Xi’an and Almaty.
Archaeological and Film Collaborations: Cultural cooperation is flourishing through joint film productions, book translations, and archaeological collaborations.
5. Emerging Areas of Cooperation:
Green Economy and Sustainable Development: Cooperation is expanding into green development, including the adoption of Chinese electric vehicles and investments by Chinese EV enterprises in the region. There is also alignment in national development strategies to promote sustainability and environmental protection.
Digital Economy and AI Development: Digital transformation, e-commerce, and AI development are becoming new drivers of cooperation, with China offering opportunities in these fields.
High-tech Cooperation: Beyond traditional sectors, there’s a growing focus on high-tech collaboration.
In essence, the Second China-Central Asia Summit builds on the strong foundation laid in Xi’an, emphasizing a comprehensive and long-term partnership across political, economic, security, and cultural spheres. The focus is on implementing existing consensuses and expanding cooperation into new and emerging areas, aiming to further integrate the region and achieve mutual development under the framework of a “China-Central Asia community with a shared future.”
In China, a significant shift has occurred in waste management, moving from a critical “garbage siege” to an unexpected “garbage shortage.”
In 2011, the documentary “Beijing Besieged by Waste” by filmmaker Wang Jiuliang highlighted the severe waste problem in and around Chinese cities, where landfills were overwhelmed. However, in just over a decade, China’s waste treatment capabilities have expanded dramatically. The number of waste incineration plants surged from 130 in 2011 to 927 in 2023, now accounting for nearly half of the global total. This rapid expansion has resulted in many incineration plants operating below their capacity due to an insufficient supply of waste.
To address this “garbage shortage,” China has implemented innovative solutions:
Excavating Old Landfills: Some cities are digging up older landfills to retrieve buried waste for incineration, though this practice carries potential pollution risks.
Exporting Waste Treatment Technology: Having banned solid waste imports by January 1, 2021, China is now exporting its advanced waste treatment technologies and solutions, particularly to Southeast Asian countries facing similar waste management issues.
Several key factors have driven this transformation:
– Technological Breakthroughs: China has developed advanced domestic waste incineration technologies, such as the grate furnace and reverse push grate, which are efficient in treating waste with high moisture content and low calorific value, common in China. These technologies ensure thorough combustion, effective pollutant removal, and efficient energy recovery, proving more cost-effective than imported alternatives.
– Policy Guidance and Economic Incentives: Government policies, like the “13th Five-Year Plan” for urban domestic waste harmless treatment facilities, have set clear targets for incineration capacity. Financial incentives, including construction subsidies, waste treatment fees (around 130 yuan per ton), long-term operating rights (up to 30 years), and subsidized electricity prices for waste-to-energy projects, have made these ventures highly profitable.
– Waste Classification System: The mandatory waste classification policies implemented in 2019 have significantly improved resource recovery, reduced the load on incineration plants, and increased the overall efficiency of waste treatment and resource utilization.
China’s success in waste management exemplifies a broader trend where environmental challenges are converted into industrial opportunities through practical actions and technological innovation, moving beyond mere theoretical discussions.
June 14, the SCO, comprising ten member states, issued a statement strongly condemning Israel’s military actions against Iran, specifically highlighting attacks on civilian targets and infrastructure as violations of the UN Charter and international law.
In the future, drone warfare will be put to the test in a civil conflict.
Asymmetric Advantage: Drones, particularly commercially available and easily weaponized ones, provide a significant asymmetric advantage to non-state actors or rebel groups in a civil conflict. They are relatively cheap compared to traditional military hardware, can be acquired on the open market, and offer access to airpower that was once exclusive to state militaries.
Vulnerability of Formations: Traditional riot police tactics rely heavily on numerical superiority, formation, and close-quarters engagement. Drones, especially those capable of carrying payloads (e.g., tear gas, non-lethal projectiles, or even small explosives), can bypass these formations entirely. They can strike from above, disrupt lines, create chaos, and target individuals or critical equipment without putting human operators at direct risk.
Surveillance and Intelligence: Even without lethal capabilities, drones equipped with high-resolution cameras, thermal imaging, and AI-powered analytics can provide real-time intelligence on protestor movements, identifying leaders, tracking individuals, and predicting routes. This enhanced situational awareness for those controlling the drones could severely undermine the effectiveness of traditional riot control.
Psychological Impact: The constant overhead presence of drones, especially if perceived as armed or capable of dropping payloads, can have a significant psychological impact on crowds, leading to fear, dispersal, or increased aggression.
Swarming Technology: The development of drone swarms, where multiple drones act autonomously or semi-autonomously as a coordinated unit, presents an even greater threat. A swarm could overwhelm defenses, execute complex maneuvers, and deliver widespread effects, making traditional riot control formations even more obsolete.
Lessons from Current Conflicts: The ongoing war in Ukraine has dramatically showcased the transformative impact of drones on modern warfare. Both state and non-state actors are innovating rapidly in drone usage for reconnaissance, precision strikes, and even psychological operations. This demonstrates the speed at which drone capabilities are evolving and being adapted to various conflict scenarios, including those with elements of urban warfare and civil unrest.
Difficult to Counter: Countering large numbers of small, agile drones in an urban environment is a significant challenge for existing law enforcement capabilities. Traditional anti-air systems are often too expensive or designed for larger, faster targets. Developing effective and proportionate counter-drone measures for riot control is an area of active research and development.
However, it’s also important to consider some nuances and potential counter-developments:
Legal and Ethical Constraints: The use of armed drones, particularly against a civilian population, would raise immense legal and ethical questions and likely face international condemnation. This could act as a deterrent for governments.
Technological Countermeasures: Governments and law enforcement agencies are investing in counter-drone technologies, including jammers, net guns, and even anti-drone drones. The effectiveness of these measures against large-scale, low-cost drone attacks in a civil unrest scenario remains to be fully seen.
Public Perception and Backlash: Excessive or lethal drone use against protestors could further escalate civil unrest and erode public trust, potentially exacerbating the conflict.
Sophistication of Riot Police: While formations might be vulnerable, riot police could adapt tactics to mitigate drone threats, such as operating under cover, using smoke, or deploying their own counter-drones.
A significant strike has paralyzed Panama, initiated by banana plantation workers protesting a new social security law that they claim will negatively impact their pensions. This has led to 5,000 workers being fired by the Chiquita Banana Company, a major employer in Bocas del Toro, which has indefinitely closed its doors due to the strike costing them $75 million.
In response, the government has declared a state of emergency in Bocas del Toro to support the affected population, attributing the crisis to an “illegal strike.”
The strike has expanded beyond banana workers to include hospital workers, teachers, and construction workers across Panama. These groups assert they were not consulted on the pension reform plan and believe it will devastate current and future generations. They are committed to continuing the strike indefinitely.
The government defends the reforms, stating the old pension system was insolvent and the new law will ensure better long-term pensions, suggesting a “lack of understanding” of the law among the public and an openness to dialogue for modifications.
