Belt and Road Initiative

It was the spring of 2013, and the world was still finding its footing after the global financial crisis. In the grand halls of Beijing, a new leader, Xi Jinping, was settling into his role as China’s President. His vision was bold, ambitious, and, as we would later see, world-changing.

Across the Pacific, in Washington D.C., the seasoned diplomat John Kerry, then the U.S. Secretary of State, embarked on a crucial trip to China. The air between the two great powers was a mix of cooperation and cautious competition. During their meeting, President Xi, with a glint of what might have been genuine partnership in his eye, laid out a nascent idea to Secretary Kerry: a grand initiative to connect the world through infrastructure, trade, and investment. He called it, in those early days, something akin to a “new Silk Road,” and importantly, he suggested that China and the United States should build it together.

Kerry, a man known for his forward-thinking approach, was intrigued. The scale of the proposal, the potential for global cooperation, and the promise of shared prosperity resonated with his diplomatic instincts. He saw a glimmer of a historic opportunity, a chance for the two largest economies to collaborate on a venture that could benefit billions.

However, the wheels of government often turn slowly, and sometimes, with a heavy hand. As Kerry’s delegation prepared to leave Beijing, the proposal landed on the desk of a senior official in the U.S. Treasury Department – a “mandarin,” as Kerry would later recall, perhaps referencing the perceived bureaucratic stiffness. This official, acting within the prevailing strategic framework of the Obama administration, saw not opportunity, but risk.

The Obama White House, while seeking cooperation with China on certain issues, was deeply invested in its “Pivot to Asia,” a strategy designed to reassert American leadership and influence in the Indo-Pacific. This pivot was manifested in initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement aimed at knitting together economies around U.S.-led standards, often seen as a counterweight to China’s rising economic might.

From the Treasury Department’s perspective, the proposed “new Silk Road” carried significant concerns:

Competition, not collaboration: It was viewed as a potential rival to U.S.-led global institutions and economic frameworks, rather than a complementary effort.

Transparency and governance: There were nascent worries about the transparency of Chinese financing and the potential for debt traps in developing nations – concerns that would only grow louder in the years to come.

Strategic implications: The initiative was seen through the lens of strategic competition, a potential vehicle for China to expand its geopolitical influence and undermine U.S. interests.

And so, before John Kerry’s plane even touched down back on American soil, the nascent idea of a U.S.-China joint “Belt and Road” was “nixed.”

Xi Jinping officially launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in September 2013, a few months after his meeting with Kerry. It grew into a colossal undertaking, reshaping landscapes and economies across Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond. It brought both development and debt, opportunities and challenges.

John Kerry would later reflect on that moment with a pang of regret, calling it “the single biggest missed opportunity of my life.” He saw what might have been: a world where the two great powers could have channeled their immense resources and ingenuity into a truly collaborative global development project, shaping its principles and ensuring its benefits were broadly shared.

The Tale’s Lessons:

The Weight of Missed Opportunity: Sometimes, the greatest regrets are not about what we did, but what we failed to do, the doors we chose not to open. Visionary ideas, especially in international relations, can be fragile and time-sensitive.

The Power of Perspective: What one person sees as a grand opportunity for collaboration, another, from a different vantage point, might perceive as a strategic threat or an unacceptable risk. National interests, pre-existing strategies, and deeply ingrained suspicions can overshadow potential partnerships.

The Bureaucratic Filter: Even the most senior leaders’ instincts can be overridden by the layered decision-making processes of large governments, where department-specific concerns can become paramount.

The Cost of Non-Engagement: When a rising power proposes a significant global initiative, the choice to disengage rather than engage and influence can lead to that initiative developing in ways that are less aligned with one’s own values and interests.

Hindsight is 20/20: It’s easy to look back and see the “what-ifs.” The challenge for leaders is to balance immediate strategic concerns with long-term vision, to distinguish between a genuine threat and a potential avenue for shared progress.

The story of the U.S. and the early BRI is a reminder that the path of international relations is paved with choices, each with profound and lasting consequences, often unforeseen in the moment they are made.

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Economist Stephen Roach’s evolving perspective on Hong Kong’s economic trajectory

American economist Stephen Roach’s evolving perspective on Hong Kong’s economic trajectory offers a compelling case study in how geopolitical and financial dynamics can defy initial pessimistic forecasts. Here are the key takeaways from his reassessment and Hong Kong’s recent performance:

1. Why Roach Revised His Outlook:

Initial Concerns: Stephen Roach published an opinion piece in the Financial Times in February 2024 titled “It pains me to say Hong Kong is over.” —Hong Kong’s deepening integration with a slowing mainland economy, potential erosion of Western financial ties, and U.S.-China tensions. These were reasonable concerns shared by many analysts.

Shift to Optimism (2025): His revised view acknowledges Hong Kong’s adaptive resilience, particularly its role as China’s financial “pressure valve.” As U.S.-China decoupling accelerates, Hong Kong has become a critical conduit for Chinese firms accessing global capital (e.g., via IPOs) and for foreign investors entering mainland markets (via Stock Connect programs). This unique positioning offsets some downsides of geopolitical friction.

2. Market Performance Validates the Rebound:

Hang Seng Index Surge: A 45% rebound (even with periodic volatility) suggests investor confidence persists despite headwinds. The rapid recovery after April 2025’s drop indicates underlying liquidity and institutional support.

IPO Dominance: Surpassing New York in fundraising (HK$76 billion YTD) reflects Hong Kong’s enduring appeal as a listing hub, especially for mainland tech and green-energy firms sidelined from U.S. markets by geopolitical scrutiny.

3. Hong Kong’s Structural Advantages Endure:

Rule of Law & Institutions: Despite political changes, Hong Kong’s legal framework and financial infrastructure remain distinct from mainland China’s, attracting multinationals.

Gateway Role: As China’s capital controls tighten, Hong Kong’s semi-convertible currency and free-flowing capital markets are irreplaceable for cross-border transactions.

Diversification: The city is pivoting toward new growth drivers (wealth management, green finance, offshore RMB trading) to offset traditional sectors like real estate.

4. Lingering Risks Roach Might Be Underweighting:

Geopolitical Wildcards: U.S. secondary sanctions targeting Hong Kong-linked entities could disrupt financial flows.

Mainland Contagion: A prolonged property crisis or deflation in China could spill over into Hong Kong’s asset markets.

Talent Drain: Ongoing emigration of professionals (though offset partially by mainland talent inflows) may erode long-term competitiveness.

5. Broader Implications:

Roach’s reversal underscores that Hong Kong’s fate isn’t binary (“over” or “thriving”) but hinges on its ability to leverage hybridity—bridging Chinese capital and global markets while navigating geopolitical tensions. The city’s resurgence aligns with Beijing’s strategic need for a controlled financial portal to the world, even as it tightens domestic oversight.

Conclusion:

While risks remain, Hong Kong’s recent performance suggests it’s premature to write its obituary. Its resilience lies in institutional strengths and irreplaceable functions within China’s financial system—factors Roach initially underestimated. However, his original warnings about overreliance on mainland integration and geopolitical fragility remain relevant as cautionary notes. The city’s future will depend on balancing these dualities. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/2132377200608037/?__cft__[0]=AZWOAHHvst_du9SMhHtJT8pPIXlSoaPxtBicwj0Ok-RqPFFJ_PHcARj7-kRi_OGCADyRWbyjK-gA8gpOoYIO-3gH_ewu6Vd8CQ4pOCksynrNfIg0ZATQDWzxcJ19qGIGrreuSej1Zq2h6MJc18Pi2g5cCvqjFoLkmY5A8cXroIEBog&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

The world’s first commercial underwater data center

China has officially launched on June 10, 2025 what is being described as the world’s first commercial underwater data center (UDC) project powered by an offshore wind farm in Shanghai.

Location: Shanghai’s Lin-gang special area, part of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone.

Power Source: The project is powered by offshore wind energy, making it a significant step towards green computing infrastructure.

Commercial Scale: It’s highlighted as the “world’s first commercial” project of its kind, distinguishing it from earlier prototypes (like Microsoft’s Project Natick).

Partnership: The project is a joint effort involving the administrative committee of Lin-gang, Shanghai Lingang Special Area Investment Holding Group Co., Ltd., and Shanghai Hicloud Technology Co., Ltd.

Phased Development: It will be developed in two phases, starting with a 2.3 MW demonstration unit (expected to be operational by September this year) and scaling up to a 24 MW data cluster.

Environmental Benefits: The UDC integrates natural seawater cooling, which is expected to significantly reduce energy consumption (30-40% compared to land-based centers) and achieve near-zero carbon emissions, with over 90% of energy coming from offshore wind.

This initiative truly marks a notable advancement in sustainable digital infrastructure by combining renewable energy sources with computing infrastructure to meet the growing global demand for low-carbon, AI-ready data solutions. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/708600755436502/?__cft__[0]=AZVONhRGtvbamo5Qz5AYgbpVsxj9hn04c03yig7fZinbHYpOXZ9SaiyHiwZ1SWdOGfxcs4GSaXfosm6lrAdJgTl8D-R8aRP4m5ZD0Bc6VggjJ4RGCGm1aMkRCtaJRk8LvJw-27LpIL2Yp4PUtVEovxH–3IPlqutmQ_Icf-GX9dW0g&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Grey larva of the Yangtze sturgeon hatched

The first tiny, no bigger than a grain of rice, half-translucent grey larva of the Yangtze sturgeon hatched on April 16, 2025, in the shallow waters of the Chishui River in SW China’s Guizhou. The adult sturgeons were released into the modified habitat on April 3, 2025, and fertilized eggs were observed on April 12, 2025. It is the first successful natural reproduction of the critically endangered Yangtze sturgeon in the wild in over two decades.

This breakthrough was the culmination of years of painstaking efforts by researchers from the Institute of Hydrobiology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Sturgeon Research Institute under the China Three Gorges Corporation, and other institutions, organized by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/696948593203867/?__cft__[0]=AZWbE99JbBmmdIpgvVhCCL0cVgglCWlYKTYJ7WKRZZ8XzL7d2v1znxzmcLrXmOuM5QyF-UReevFtGoVW_e3yHQLAjs-3UAtia2mMw_VuGlJPl7umkfor4cmvjckQVNH3nCxzIQgM-9sJ98IHPbx6n11FVFhQ6c-5jgpr2GJuWjOJNQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

China rejected a simple resource-for-technology exchange

China rejected a simple resource-for-technology exchange. Instead, Beijing elevated the discussion to a strategic level, demanding:

– The complete removal of 352 punitive tariffs imposed since the Trump administration.

– An immediate halt to sanctions on leading Chinese high-tech companies.

– Removal of export barriers for China’s advantageous industries.

– Cessation of discriminatory visa restrictions on Chinese students.

– A clear demand for the US to stop arms sales to Taiwan.

Even if all conditions were met, rare earth supply would only be conditional and partial, not fully open.

The three rats reported not just a commercial negotiation failure, but a profound strategic misjudgment, as China’s conditions far exceeded their authority. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1369880650794558/?__cft__[0]=AZVkA6_bHkUvDg_fqiORJc1m34t3Rj6LbaWazcyy54QR1vCJD0Nly1upvAQIY4RTKPJii8tMIpgc_yAkMWkKYbh3odDneEz7viX_1JqruHPfmUfPvVl77PuO44E8WdlTsyUsbKLR08VSWydXcm-UPReG_1AYehUwpYNpSld8JAdAmA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

51st G7 Summit, hosted by Canada

The 51st G7 Summit, hosted by Canuckstan, is currently taking place from June 15 to June 17, 2025, in Kananaskis, Alberta.

A Summit of Contradictions: The G7 summit, while seemingly representing Western unity, is characterized by conflicting interests among its members, with no single player’s interests fully aligning.

Conflicts Among Main G7 Members:

Trade Disputes: Trump’s “America First” policy has led to trade conflicts with allies like Canuckstan and Europe, imposing tariffs and paralyzing the World Trade Organization’s appellate body.

Geopolitical Tensions: Disagreements persist on issues such as the Iran nuclear deal, with European nations expressing concerns about potential war, and the Ukraine conflict, where European allies fear Trump might make unfavorable agreements with Russia for personal gain.

Ideological Clashes: Japan’s new prime minister’s emphasis on a rules-based international order clashes with Trump’s “might makes right” approach.

Problematic Guest Invitations:

India’s Controversial Presence: Canuckstan invited India to the summit to boost its presence in the Indo-Pacific, but Canuck intelligence has identified India as a significant threat due to its alleged interference in Canuck elections and other activities, creating an awkward situation.

Guests Who Faced Trump’s Ire: The list of guests includes leaders like Ukraine’s Zelenskyy and South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, both of whom have had public and unpleasant encounters with Trump.

Alternative Worldviews: The presence of a leader like Spain’s president, who is actively forming alliances with countries holding different worldviews, further complicates the summit’s dynamics.

Carney’s Three Major Challenges:

Negotiating with a difficult counterpart like Trump.

Managing a guest list that has alienated many.

Dealing with pressure from human rights organizations.

The “Fire Fighting” Agreement: A leaked unofficial protocol suggests that in times of deadlock, Canuckstan, known for its conciliatory spirit, will propose a “fire fighting” agreement. This refers to an agreement on combating wildfires, seen as a universally acceptable topic to ensure a joint statement is produced, even if it’s a minimal one.

The Real Challenges Unaddressed: While leaders are caught up in geopolitical squabbles, critical global challenges like the development and regulation of AI, and the potential impact of quantum computing on financial systems, remain largely unaddressed.

Future of International Politics: The summit’s complexities signal a future of international politics characterized by increased fragmentation, pragmatism, and a focus on transactional relationships rather than trust. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1601744207166473/?__cft__[0]=AZXx91eDylZ5gYgRb_b0dRchSoGNpRrO1fIsW_7D5WxdeyunLnueT6-NKz-R5af6l67wW_k2eymA7uvW5Id3-jqeXZNkwiUAOXbsKBepQ-1uQg0tKzcOaWxb-DN18T72LwIAoQvl0j5LOb05cnIB1U7tK5OGugCzK2BcbF94he78fw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Relationship between Lithuania and China

The relationship between Lithuania and China has undergone a significant transformation, moving from generally smooth diplomatic ties to a severe diplomatic and economic dispute.

Background of the Relationship

Early Diplomatic Ties and the “One China” Principle:

Lithuania and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially established diplomatic relations on September 14, 1991, shortly after Lithuania regained its independence. Prior to this, China had recognized Lithuania de jure on September 7, 1991. Like many other nations, Lithuania recognized the “One China” principle, acknowledging Beijing’s position that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. For decades, bilateral relations developed without major incidents, including high-level visits and agreements, such as a Memorandum of Understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative in 2017.

Deterioration of Relations – The “Taiwan Card”:

The relationship began to sour significantly around 2021, primarily due to Lithuania’s increasingly assertive stance on China’s human rights record and its growing engagement with Taiwan. Key events that led to the breakdown include:

Withdrawal from the “17+1” format (May 2021): Lithuania announced its withdrawal from the cooperation framework between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), a move seen as a rejection of China’s influence in the region. Other Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, followed suit in August 2022.

Opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office (November 2021): The most significant point of contention was Lithuania’s decision to allow Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name “Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania.” This was a diplomatic red line for Beijing, as most countries hosting Taiwanese missions refer to them as “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices” to avoid implying state-to-state relations. China viewed this as a violation of the “One China” principle and an attempt to create a “one China, one Taiwan” impression.

Criticism of Human Rights and Chinese Technology: Lithuania had also openly criticized China’s human rights situation in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and expressed concerns about Chinese technology, advising consumers against purchasing Chinese smartphones due to potential censorship features.

China’s Retaliation:

In response to these actions, particularly the Taiwan office, China escalated its diplomatic and economic pressure:

Diplomatic Downgrade: China recalled its ambassador from Vilnius and demanded Lithuania recall its ambassador from Beijing. Relations were downgraded to the chargé d’affaires level on November 21, 2021, a rare move for China.

Economic Coercion: Beijing implemented severe informal trade restrictions, delisting Lithuania as a country of origin in its customs system and blocking imports from the Baltic state. China also pressured multinational companies to stop using Lithuanian components in their products if they wished to maintain access to the Chinese market. This led to a significant disruption of trade, although China has denied claims of targeting Lithuania. The EU has since launched a case at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against China over these discriminatory trade practices.

Future of the Relationship

The future of the Lithuania-China relationship remains highly uncertain and complex.

Current Standoff and Diplomatic Impasse:

As of mid-2025, the relationship is largely at an impasse. The recent reports of Chinese diplomatic staff bidding farewell suggest that China has no immediate intention of restoring full relations. While Lithuania has expressed a desire to normalize relations, it has also emphasized that it will not make political concessions, particularly regarding its ties with Taiwan. China, for its part, insists on Lithuania adhering strictly to the “One China” principle, which likely includes changing the name of the Taiwanese representative office.

Key Factors Influencing the Future:

– Taiwan: The core issue remains Lithuania’s relationship with Taiwan. While some Lithuanian politicians, including the incoming Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas, have expressed a desire to restore ambassadorial-level representation, they have also stressed maintaining trade and cultural ties with Taiwan. This creates a difficult balancing act, as China views any perceived elevation of Taiwan’s international status as a direct challenge.

– EU and USeless Influence: Lithuania’s strong stance has garnered support from other EU members and the United States, who view China’s actions as economic coercion. The EU’s ongoing WTO case and its “anti-coercion instrument” demonstrate a collective effort to push back against such tactics. The outcome of USeless presidential elections could also influence Lithuania’s approach, as its pivot away from China has been partly driven by national security concerns and its alliance with the USeless.

Public Opinion in Lithuania: While the government’s policy towards China has been controversial domestically, polls in 2022 showed that a significant portion of the Lithuanian population views China as an unfriendly country, though only a minority actively supports the government’s policy. This mixed public sentiment could impact the new government’s approach.

Economic Diversification: Following China’s economic pressure, Lithuania has actively sought to diversify its trade partnerships and reduce its dependency on the Chinese market. Taiwan has also offered economic support and investment to Lithuania. This diversification may reduce Lithuania’s incentive to fully capitulate to China’s demands.

China’s Position on Russia: China’s continued alignment with Russia, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, further complicates relations. For Lithuania, which views Russia as an existential threat, China’s “pro-Russian neutrality” makes restoring close ties more problematic.

In essence, while there are signals of a desire for normalization from the Lithuanian side, the fundamental disagreements over Taiwan and China’s broader geopolitical stance make a full restoration of the relationship to its previous state unlikely in the near future. The relationship is likely to remain at a lower diplomatic level, with economic ties continuing to be impacted by political tensions, unless significant concessions are made by either side on the core issues.

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China’s Breakthrough in Yttrium-90 Production

China’s Breakthrough in Yttrium-90 Production

China has announced a significant achievement in the field of nuclear medicine: the successful mastery of commercial reactor production of Yttrium-90 (Y-90) glass microspheres. This breakthrough was accomplished at the Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant’s “He Fu-1” reactor, where the Y-90 irradiated glass microspheres were successfully discharged and passed all relevant inspections.

This development is a major milestone for China, as it signifies the nation’s capability for batch production of Y-90. Yttrium-90 glass microspheres are a crucial component in selective internal radiation therapy (SIRT), a highly effective treatment for certain types of liver cancer. Previously, the production of medical isotopes like Y-90 often relied on specialized facilities or imports.

The ability to produce Y-90 domestically and at scale will likely have a profound impact on cancer treatment in China, potentially increasing accessibility to this advanced therapy for a greater number of patients. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02VX2A4aQ55FMmXTVYxTjkrhw4SKLt2E3W5WfwKSz2ixsV53wTWQ8yQKHpWbfxJU7Dl?__cft__[0]=AZVtAcZ-Ot8VOlKmKreVMKHO1YjPT-CDwDlVT6czrij5kK0F-xTWTB6W0zeNGHTaXJvxkYj-vb6VMmQp44ID1oGKD4HboftC5yjgXuWywm_0XnZQlN8Haew_xdkbx2u3tLW2U0qHLtqtOxZbTlC_8I7YEUeCFb3eool-SHCc4e0W2w&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Charting Our Own Course – A Vision for Northern Development and Sovereignty

Report: Charting Our Own Course – A Vision for Northern Development and Sovereignty

To:

The Honourable Premier of Yukon

The Honourable Premier of the Northwest Territories

Distinguished First Nations Leaders of Yukon and the Northwest Territories

From: me

Date: June 15, 2025

Subject: Advancing Northern Development and Sovereignty in a Evolving Geopolitical Landscape

Executive Summary:

The Yukon and Northwest Territories stand at a pivotal moment. With vast resource potential, a strategic location at the nexus of emerging Arctic shipping routes, and strong, self-governing Indigenous nations, our territories possess unique strengths. However, federal foreign policy considerations, particularly concerning Canada-China relations and a perceived focus on specific resource development in other regions, present challenges to realizing our full potential. This report outlines a strategic approach to assert our distinct Northern vision for development and sovereignty, emphasizing diversification, Indigenous leadership, and targeted advocacy within the Canadian federation.

1. The Northern Opportunity: Beyond Traditional Paradigms

The opening of Arctic sea routes and the global demand for critical minerals represent transformative opportunities for our territories. While the Port of Churchill (Manitoba) is a significant Arctic asset, and federal interests may be focused on oil and gas exports from that region, the Yukon and Northwest Territories offer a diversified potential that must be prioritized and pursued:

Strategic Geographic Position: The Western Arctic, including the Dempster Highway connection to Tuktoyaktuk (NWT), provides critical access to the Arctic Ocean. This connectivity is vital for resupply, resource extraction, tourism, and research.

Critical Minerals Frontier: Our territories hold immense, largely untapped reserves of critical minerals (e.g., lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earth elements, tungsten, zinc, gold). These are essential for the global transition to green energy and advanced technologies, aligning with broader international interests beyond traditional fossil fuels.

Renewable Energy Potential: Vast hydroelectric, wind, and solar resources can power our communities, reduce reliance on costly diesel, and support industrial development sustainably.

Tourism and Culture: The pristine wilderness, unique wildlife, and rich Indigenous cultures offer world-class tourism experiences, providing opportunities for local businesses and communities.

Indigenous Leadership: The robust network of modern treaties and self-government agreements in Yukon, and growing self-determination in the NWT, positions First Nations as powerful drivers of economic and social development.

2. The Challenge: Navigating Federal Foreign Policy and Priorities

The federal government’s firm control over foreign policy, coupled with its currently strained relationship with China, presents a significant constraint on our direct international engagement. This impacts:

International Initiatives: Formal participation in broad international frameworks like China’s Belt and Road Initiative is not within the jurisdiction of territorial governments.

Investment Scrutiny: Major foreign investments, particularly from nations deemed strategic competitors, will face stringent federal scrutiny, prioritizing national security over potentially desired economic benefits.

Perceived Imbalance of Federal Focus: A perception exists that federal development attention and infrastructure investment may be disproportionately directed elsewhere, potentially overlooking the unique needs and diversified opportunities of the Yukon and NWT.

3. Charting Our Own Course: A Strategic Path Forward

Given these realities, our strategy must focus on proactive assertion of our unique Northern vision, leveraging our existing powers, fostering strong internal partnerships, and engaging strategically with the federal government:

A. Asserting Our Distinct Northern Vision:

Develop a Unified Northern Economic Strategy (Yukon-NWT-First Nations): Collaborate on a shared vision for diversified Northern economic development that goes beyond a singular focus on oil and gas. This strategy should clearly articulate our priorities for critical minerals, renewable energy, sustainable tourism, and digital connectivity.

Highlight “Green” and Sustainable Development: Position the territories as global leaders in responsible resource development and environmental stewardship. This aligns with international best practices and can attract ethical investment from diverse sources.

Showcase Indigenous-Led Economic Development: Emphasize that development in the North is increasingly Indigenous-led and benefits local communities directly. This aligns with federal reconciliation commitments and provides a strong narrative for investment attraction.

B. Leveraging Inherent Powers and Partnerships:

Maximize Self-Government Jurisdictions: First Nations, through their self-government agreements, have inherent jurisdiction over lands, resources, and community development. We must continue to build capacity and exercise these powers to drive local and regional economic growth.

Inter-Territorial and First Nations Collaboration: Strengthen collaboration between the Yukon and NWT governments, and critically, with all First Nations. Establish joint working groups on shared economic priorities, infrastructure needs, and policy positions to present a united Northern voice to Ottawa. The Yukon Forum model of intergovernmental collaboration should be expanded and deepened.

Strategic Resource Management: Proactively manage and streamline regulatory processes for responsible resource development (e.g., critical minerals) to provide clarity and certainty for investors, while upholding environmental and Indigenous land use standards.

C. Strategic Engagement with the Federal Government:

Targeted Advocacy for Infrastructure: Advocate relentlessly for federal investment in multi-purpose infrastructure that directly supports our diversified economic vision, including:

Road Networks: Continued investment in and maintenance of crucial all-season roads like the Dempster Highway, and extensions where appropriate, to improve access to resources and communities.

Clean Energy Infrastructure: Federal support for large-scale renewable energy projects (hydro, wind, solar) to reduce diesel reliance and power industrial development.

Digital Connectivity: Universal high-speed internet across all communities to enable entrepreneurship, remote work, and access to services.

Port Infrastructure (Regional Focus): While Tuktoyaktuk is NWT, its accessibility is key to Yukon’s Arctic ambitions. Advocate for continued investment in and strategic development of northern port facilities tailored to diverse needs (e.g., mineral exports, research, resupply, tourism) rather than solely large-scale oil/gas.

Align with Federal Strategic Priorities: Frame our development needs within broader Canadian objectives where possible. For instance, critical minerals development aligns with Canada’s green transition and supply chain security. Arctic infrastructure development contributes to Canadian sovereignty and defence objectives.

Dialogue on Foreign Investment: Engage the federal government in ongoing dialogue regarding responsible foreign investment. Seek clear guidelines and collaborative processes to attract diverse international capital while respecting national security concerns. This includes discussions on how Canadian foreign policy on specific countries impacts Northern economic aspirations.

Push for Dedicated Northern Economic Development Funds: Advocate for federal programs and funds specifically tailored to the unique economic development challenges and opportunities of the territories, rather than a one-size-fits-all national approach.

Conclusion:

The Yukon and Northwest Territories are not merely resource hinterlands; we are dynamic, self-determining jurisdictions with immense potential. While the federal government holds the ultimate authority on foreign policy, our collective strength lies in articulating a unified, diversified, and Indigenous-led vision for Northern development. By leveraging our self-governing powers, fostering strong intergovernmental partnerships, and engaging strategically with Ottawa, we can chart our own course, ensuring that the benefits of Northern development accrue directly to Northerners, contributing to a stronger, more resilient, and sovereign Canada. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/9992336874135382/?__cft__[0]=AZXC37ce-BxCeHi_8bvimxH06AVviV_CFr6m3vtnjy0wa8zKyTH2bP09OeorS0QOucv9wlKCxWjSmgiIUDfXleGDWnj9KScPwNvn5XspwkipdQnWlzpaNLhWdnQrVn7f7W3T1TzISMHPevlgc0DuGhx99EJUle5DculKMifxv3Gw6g&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R