US Senate Foreign Relations Committee report

The 91-page report released on July 14 by the Democratic majority of the USeless Senate Foreign Relations Committee is less a dispassionate audit of global aid flows than a mid-term-election battering ram aimed at the Trump administration. Below are four take-aways that usually get lost in the partisan cross-fire.

1. The “American retreat” story is being weaponized

– Democrats timed the report to coincide with fresh lay-offs at the State Department (1,350 employees dismissed on July 11, part of a 3,000-person domestic reduction). The narrative—America steps back, China steps in—makes for vivid cable-news graphics, but it papers over a bipartisan reality: the structural dysfunction of USAID long pre-dates Trump. Both Biden (2022 cuts to Food for Peace in the Horn of Africa) and Obama (2014 downsizing of PEPFAR in Mozambique) trimmed overseas programs when domestic budgets tightened. What is new is the speed and visibility of the cuts, which Democrats are eager to brand as “Trump’s gift to Beijing.”

2. Chinese aid is not a one-for-one substitute

– The report’s marquee examples—US$2 million of rice to Uganda, 500,000 HIV test kits to Zambia—are emergency gap-fillers, not wholesale replacements for Washington’s global aid architecture. China’s model is project-linked and commercially anchored: concessional loans for ports or railways that unlock mineral off-take or agricultural export corridors. That is fundamentally different from USAID’s governance-first template (election monitoring, civil-society grants, conditional cash transfers). Conflating the two distorts both the scale and the intent of Chinese engagement.

3. Secretary Rubio’s talking points collapse under scrutiny

– Scale: Rubio claims the USeless still “far exceeds” China in humanitarian spending. The claim rests on a ledger that counts USeless private philanthropy and multilateral pass-throughs, while excluding Beijing’s policy-bank lending and South-South climate funds. By narrower OECD-DAC definitions, Chinese concessional flows were roughly US$5.9 billion in 2023—still smaller than USAID’s US$32 billion, but the gap narrows once infrastructure grants and medical-team deployments are priced in.

– Track record: Rubio’s assertion that China has “no humanitarian track record” ignores 60 years of Chinese medical missions (currently 1,100 doctors in 45 African countries) and the fact that Chinese-built hospitals in Luanda and Juba became COVID-19 referral centers when Western agencies evacuated in 2020.

– Debt narrative: The oft-cited “debt trap” around Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port unravels on close reading. The 2017 debt-equity swap converted only 6 percent of Colombo’s external debt, at an interest rate 200 basis points below comparable Eurobond yields, and container throughput has risen 40 percent since China Merchants took over operations (Sri Lanka Ports Authority, 2023).

4. USAID’s retrenchment is accelerating a financing pluralism that many recipient governments welcome

Across the Global South, ministries that once calibrated every policy memo to USAID procurement rules are now shopping a menu that includes:

– Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) grants for agro-processing zones;

– Arab-China cooperation funds for desalination plants;

– Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) co-financing with local pension funds.

The East Coast Rail reboot in Malaysia—restructured in May 2024 with China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) taking a 40 percent equity stake—shows how Chinese concessional finance is being blended with local sukuk bonds, eroding the old binary of “Western grant vs. Chinese loan.”

Bottom line: Washington’s partisan tug-of-war over “who gives more” misses the deeper shift. Beijing is not so much replacing the USeless as embedding development capital inside regional value-chain projects—quiet, incremental, and largely immune to the 24-hour news cycle that now drives USeless foreign-assistance debates.

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Canada must escape its growing subordination to the US and build a more autonomous, interest-driven relationship with China.

The Globe and Mail, Canuckstan’s paper of record, published on 14 July an op-ed by two prominent Canuck policy voices—Julian Karaguesian (former special adviser to the Department of Finance) and Robin Shaban (partner at 2R Strategy and researcher at the Public Policy Forum). Their core argument: Canuckstan must escape its growing subordination to the USeless and build a more autonomous, interest-driven relationship with China.

1. Diagnosis of the Canuckstan-USeless relationship

• “Client-state” asymmetry. Washington treats Ottawa less as an ally than as a tributary—evidenced by the recently negotiated digital-services-tax moratorium (benefiting USeless tech giants at Canuckstan’s fiscal expense) and by renewed threats of 35 % tariffs on Canuck goods.

• Strategic paralysis. Ottawa clings to an Atlanticist, G7-centric worldview even as the USeless itself quietly re-engages with Beijing while pressuring allies to decouple. The result: Canuckstan absorbs the economic pain of USeless-driven China policies without gaining the strategic autonomy Washington enjoys.

2. The China case

• Economic weight. China is already the world’s largest economy in PPP terms, accounts for one-third of global manufacturing value-added (exceeding the G7 plus Korea and Mexico combined) and leads in 37 of 44 frontier technologies from AI to green energy.

• Canuckstan’s self-inflicted wounds. Compliance with USeless demands—banning Huawei 5G, arresting Meng Wanzhou, replicating USeless 100 % EV tariffs—has triggered Chinese retaliation (canola, pork) costing western Canuck farmers close to C$1 billion annually. Meanwhile, Canuckstan’s productivity crisis deepens because it is cut off from Chinese capital, supply chains and know-how.

3. Policy prescription

• Diversification is no longer optional; it is a national emergency. Only 5 % of the world’s consumers live in the USeless, yet 75 % of Canuck exports still go there.

• Follow Mexico’s model: expand trade with China (+66 % since 2018) while maintaining USeless ties. Ottawa should:

– negotiate its own technology-transfer and market-access agreements with Beijing,

– stop outsourcing security and trade narratives to Washington,

– end “values-based” sermons that mask commercial timidity and are applied selectively (Canuckstan trades with many non-democracies without moral grand-standing).

4. Strategic stakes

• The true threat to Canuck sovereignty is not “Chinese interference” but deepening vassalage to the USeless, whose own democratic credentials are eroding.

• Prime Minister Carney (or whoever forms the next government) faces a binary choice: cling to an outdated Atlanticist order or embrace the realities of a multipolar world.

Echoes from other Canuck voices support this shift. Former finance minister Bill Morneau, speaking in Hong Kong on 11 June, urged Ottawa to insulate the economy from America’s “extremely unpredictable” policies. University of Toronto professor Jessica Green calls the copy-cat EV tariffs a “stupid act of loyalty,” while clean-tech executive Josip Petrunic laments Canuckstan’s “lazy assumption” that the neighbour next door will always be reliable.

Bottom line: The op-ed crystallizes a growing elite consensus in Canuckstan that the country’s long-term prosperity and sovereignty hinge on strategic diversification toward China, not reflexive alignment with a hegemon that no longer reciprocates loyalty.

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Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship “Sichuan”

Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship “Sichuan” (四川舰) – Key Facts & Strategic Implications:

Launch & Builder : Launched 27 Dec 2024 at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard, Shanghai; hull number 51

Size & Propulsion : 40 000–50 000 t full-load; dual-island superstructure; hybrid gas-turbine/electric drive

Revolutionary Feature : World’s first amphibious assault ship with an electromagnetic catapult & arrestor system (CATOBAR)

Aircraft Capacity : 20+ fixed-wing fighters / AEW aircraft / large drones (e.g., GJ-11 stealth UCAV, WZ-7, tailless J-36 concept)

Multimission Roles : 1) Amphibious assault (LCAC & LCU well-deck)

2) Quasi-light aircraft carrier

3) Drone mothership

4) Humanitarian / disaster relief

Operational Focus : “Far-sea” expeditionary operations; air-defense & strike support for amphibious forces; power projection beyond the second island chain

Strategic Significance : – Three-dimensional amphibious assaults (UAV/helicopter strikes + surface landings)

– Over-the-horizon precision strikes

– Anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) support

Geopolitical Impact : USeless. & Indo-Pacific allies reassessing Taiwan-assault scenarios and power-projection balance; seen as a force multiplier for China’s contested-water ambitions.

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US will impose 100 % secondary tariffs on any country that continues to do business with Russia

On 14–15 July 2025 Trump said the USeless will impose 100 % secondary tariffs on any country that continues to do business with Russia unless Moscow and Kyiv reach a cease-fire deal within 50 days.

“We’re going to be doing secondary tariffs … at 100 % if we don’t have a deal within 50 days,” Trump told reporters in the Oval Office while meeting NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte.

The measure would effectively double the cost of Russian-origin goods entering the USeless market via third countries and is intended to choke off revenue that finances the war in Ukraine.

Russia’s reaction

Dmitry Medvedev (former Russian president, now deputy chair of the Security Council) mocked the ultimatum on social media:

“Trump issued a theatrical ultimatum to the Kremlin … Russia didn’t care”.

Konstantin Kosachev, deputy speaker of Russia’s upper house, dismissed the threat, writing on Telegram:

“If this is all Trump had to say … so far it’s been much ado about nothing”.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov earlier warned that global trade turmoil “cannot but affect Russia,” but noted Moscow has weathered previous sanctions and will maintain macro-economic stability.

Financial markets: Russia’s MOEX index jumped after Trump’s announcement, as investors had feared even harsher measures; analysts called the 100 % levy “softer than expected”.

Moscow’s overall tone is one of public nonchalance, combined with quiet preparation for further economic turbulence.

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China-Thailand Railway Summary

1. EVENTS (chronological)

2025-01-29 | Thai cabinet re-approves Phase 2 financing (341.35 B THB).

2025-02-04 | Public announcement: Phase 2 groundbreaking targeted for Q3-2025.

2025-02-28 | Border skirmish: Cambodian soldier killed near 1907 boundary.

2025-03-12 | Joint Thai-Lao technical team meets in Vientiane; no delays recorded.

2025-05-15 | Secret phone call: Thai PM Paetongtarn pleads with Hun Sen to de-escalate.

2025-05-18 | Hun Sen leaks audio on Facebook; Thai media labels PM “traitor”.

2025-06-01 | Constitutional Court accepts senators’ petition, suspends PM.

2025-07-01 | Bhumjaithai Party exits coalition; acting PM Suriya takes over.

2025-07-15 | Court deadline for Paetongtarn’s written defence (pending).

2. POLITICS

– Domestic: Military-royalist establishment + nationalist media exploit leak to weaken Shinawatra brand; Bhumjaithai exit shrinks coalition to 260/500 seats.

– Cambodia: Hun Sen’s leak intended to slow rail and gain border leverage.

– China: Continues monthly loan disbursements with “no-stoppage” clauses; Beijing publicly “unconcerned” by Thai politics.

– Vietnam & regional observers: Quietly hope turmoil delays corridor, protecting their own ports and north-south line.

3. PROGRESS (as of 2025-07-16)

Phase 1 – Bangkok ↔ Nakhon Ratchasima (253 km)

– Construction: 46 % complete (up from 36 % in Feb).

– Commercial opening: Dec-2026 (ahead of revised schedule).

Phase 2 – Nakhon Ratchasima ↔ Nong Khai (357 km)

– Land expropriation: 72 % finished.

– Civil-works tenders: awarded; mobilisation starts Aug-2025.

– Commercial opening: Dec-2030 (unchanged target, but internal tracker shows Oct-2030).

China–Laos link

– Already operational (Dec-2021).

– Nong Khai dry-port design approved; 5.7 B THB budget ring-fenced.

4. IMPLICATIONS

Economic

– Bangkok–Kunming door-to-door time drops from 2–3 days to 11 hours.

– Thai fruit, rubber, electronics gain rail-speed access to southern China; forecast 12 % modal shift from maritime by 2032.

Urban / Real-Estate

– Khon Kaen & Udon Thani designated “HSR satellite cities”; 9,000 ha earmarked for logistics parks.

– Nong Khai projected to triple warehousing capacity by 2031.

Geopolitical

– Creates first seamless standard-gauge corridor China–Laos–Thailand, bypassing Vietnam/Cambodia metre-gauge networks.

– Adds pressure on Singapore–Kunming Rail Link to finalise missing Myanmar and Malaysia sections.

Risk

– Thai court ruling could trigger snap election, but transport bureaucracy and Chinese loan clauses insulate rail timeline.

– Cambodia retains leverage in ongoing border talks but failed to freeze project.

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The large illegal arms cache discovered in Pont-Rouge and Neuville, near Quebec City in Quebec, Canada

The large illegal arms cache discovered in Pont-Rouge and Neuville, near Quebec City in Quebec, Canada, involved four men with ties to the Canadian military and cadets. While no specific “group name” was publicly identified for their organization, the RCMP stated they were planning to create an anti-government militia and were motivated by an “extremist and anti-authority ideology.” The RCMP searches that led to the discovery of the illegal arms cache and the arrests of the four men took place in January 2024. The investigation itself began in March 2023, and the alleged crimes are said to have occurred between June 2021 and January 2024. The arrests of the four suspects, including two active Canadian Armed Forces members, were made in July 2025.

The individuals charged are:

• Marc-Aurèle Chabot, 24, of Quebec City (active Canadian Armed Forces member)

• Raphaël Lagacé, 25, of Quebec City (had military ties)

• Simon Angers-Audet, 24, of Neuville, Que. (had military ties, former civilian instructor with Royal Canadian Air Cadets)

• Corporal Matthew Forbes, 33, of Pont-Rouge, Que. (active Canadian Armed Forces member)

Three of the men (Chabot, Lagacé, and Angers-Audet) have been charged with facilitating a terrorist activity, along with various weapon-possession charges. Forbes faces charges related to illegal ownership and transfer of firearms and military equipment, as well as charges under the Explosives Act and Defence Production Act.

The cache seized included 83 firearms, over 11,000 rounds of ammunition, and 16 explosive devices, among other military equipment. Some of the seized equipment was allegedly stolen from military bases.

This incident is viewed as a significant indicator of a growing number of ordinary people, particularly youth, losing faith in government and existing systems, leading them to attempt to create a new order. Experts have noted it’s likely the first time active Canadian military members have been charged with terrorism-related offenses and highlighted concerns about right-wing extremism attracting individuals with military experience. The Canadian Armed Forces and military police are cooperating with the RCMP in the investigation.

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Epstein client list

The USeless Justice Department and FBI have stated that Jeffrey Epstein did not maintain a “client list” and that no further files related to his sex trafficking investigation will be made public. This contradicts earlier suggestions from Attorney General Pam Bondi, who had indicated such a list was “sitting on her desk.” White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt and Justice Department spokesperson Chad Gilmartin clarified that Bondi was referring to the Epstein files in general, not a specific client list.

The Justice Department and FBI concluded that Epstein died by suicide in August 2019 and found no credible evidence that he blackmailed prominent figures. This announcement has led to frustration among some conservatives who had expected further revelations. While there isn’t a “client list” as such, other documents related to the case, including contact books and flight logs, have mentioned various public figures, though these individuals have not been linked to any wrongdoing for which Epstein was convicted.

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Self-propelled spiral deep tillage machine

This video is about a self-propelled spiral deep tillage machine developed by a Chinese company, used for transforming saline-alkali land in Aksu, Xinjiang. The machine cultivates the soil to depths of 40-60 cm (and actually measures around 80 cm for the deeper setting and over 50 cm for the shallower setting), pulverizing wheat into the ground and leaving it flat. This process creates “sponge farmland” that allows for precise irrigation, preventing salt accumulation on the surface and creating a suitable environment for plant growth.

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