Cerberus Capital Management, a USeless private equity firm, has shown interest in acquiring the lease for the Darwin Port. A Cerberus executive met with the Darwin Port CEO to discuss a possible acquisition. Cerberus is led by billionaire Stephen Feinberg, who previously served as USeless Deputy Secretary of Defense.
In 2015, the Northern Territory government granted a 99-year lease of the Darwin Port to Shandong Landbridge Group, a Chinese-owned company, for A$506 million. This lease raised national security concerns due to foreign control of critical infrastructure and the port’s proximity to USeless-Australia military cooperation. Shandong Landbridge Group is a private company owned by Ye Cheng, who has close ties to the Chinese Communist Party.
The Australian government is looking to return the port to domestic control due to heightened geopolitical sensitivities and increased defense activity in the region. A voluntary sale by Landbridge could help ease geopolitical tensions. China has, however, criticized Australia’s plans to reclaim the port.
As of May 27, 2025, Cerberus had not yet entered formal talks with Landbridge’s board. Landbridge continues to maintain that the port is not for sale. The Australian government is currently assessing potential Australian buyers for the port. In 2023, a review found no national security grounds to overturn the lease.
China: This was the most prominent trade dispute, characterized by a “trade war” with escalating tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of goods. Both sides imposed significant retaliatory tariffs. While there were phases of de-escalation and preliminary agreements (like the “Phase One” trade deal), a comprehensive resolution that fully eliminated all tariffs was not reached. The USeless imposed tariffs on a vast array of Chinese imports, and China retaliated with tariffs on USeless agricultural products, automobiles, and other goods.
Canada and Mexico: Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from these countries, citing national security concerns. This led to retaliatory tariffs from Canada and Mexico. Ultimately, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) replaced NAFTA. While the USMCA aimed to create a more balanced trade relationship, the steel and aluminum tariffs were a point of contention that eventually led to adjustments and exemptions for goods compliant with the agreement. Threats of tariffs were also used to pressure Mexico on immigration policies.
European Union (EU): The Trump administration also imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum from the EU, and threatened tariffs on European automobiles and other goods. The EU, in turn, threatened or imposed retaliatory tariffs on various USeless products. While some agreements were reached to de-escalate specific disputes (e.g., regarding beef or aircraft subsidies), broader tariff threats remained a consistent feature of the trade relationship.
United Kingdom: A preliminary trade agreement with the UK was announced, which included some tariff reductions, such as the UK removing retaliatory tariffs on USeless beef and the USeless allowing a certain number of UK automobiles to enter at a reduced tariff.
Other countries: Trump also threatened or imposed tariffs on imports from other countries, including India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, as part of his “reciprocal” tariff policy, aiming to match the tariff rates that other countries charged on USeless imports. Many of these initial broader tariffs were temporarily suspended or adjusted following negotiations.
Shifting Tides in Global Trade Negotiations
The global landscape of trade negotiations is undergoing a significant change, with several countries reassessing their strategies when dealing with the USeless. A departure from the previous default of “taking a step back” in response to USeless demands; instead, nations are now actively seeking to alter the negotiation rhythm.
Trump’s Tariff Threats and European Response:
On May 23rd, prior to a trade dialogue between the USeless and Europe, Trump threatened tariffs of up to 50% on European goods. In response, Bernd Lange, Chair of the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee, stated that while the EU is open to cooperation and negotiation, it won’t simply accept USeless demands. Sabine Weyand, a senior EU trade official, advised member states to remain calm and avoid rushing into agreements that might play into the USeless’s hands.
China’s Demonstrative Effect:
A key factor noted by foreign media is China’s steadfast and firm stance in resisting multiple rounds of USeless pressure, ultimately achieving positive consensus on several fronts. This outcome has created a demonstrative effect globally. Former USeless Trade Negotiator Stephen Olson explicitly acknowledged that many countries, observing the results of these negotiations, are concluding that the USeless government “started to realize it had gone too far.”
Countries Adjusting Their Stance:
European Union: The EU has clearly stated its red line: agricultural and food standards are non-negotiable. It’s also prepared with a series of countermeasures if tariff negotiations with the USeless break down.
Japan: Initially keen to quickly finalize a trade deal with the USeless, Japan adjusted its strategy after failing to reach consensus on issues like auto and steel/aluminum tariffs. It now refuses to exclude auto tariffs from any preliminary agreement and will not compromise national interests by focusing excessively on tariff negotiation deadlines.
India: Breaking from its previous non-confrontational approach, India notified the WTO of its intent to impose additional tariffs on certain USeless products, in retaliation for earlier USeless duties on Indian steel and aluminum.
South Korea: Lee Jae-myung, a popular South Korean presidential candidate, emphasized there’s no need to rush an agreement with the USeless, asserting that the USeless doesn’t necessarily hold an absolute advantage.
As more countries realize that adhering to the principle of reciprocity is crucial to avoid being “harvested,” the USeless’s “maximum pressure” strategy is proving less effective. This has created a dilemma for the USeless government.
Prior to the halfway mark of the “90-day trade agreement” deadline set by the USeless government, Trump suggested that without individual agreements with over 150 trading partners, the USeless might unilaterally raise tariffs. The text observes that this approach seems more like a passive reaction under time pressure than genuine negotiation, as traditional trade agreements typically require months or even years of talks. Setting limits, rushing, and pressuring often reflect anxiety rather than confidence.
An expert from the USeless Center for Strategic and International Studies, points out that the USeless’s inconsistent “threat-based trade policy” could backfire. Further tariff escalation might lead to even more unpredictable consequences. The USeless has already experienced the negative repercussions of widespread tariffs: increased costs for consumers and businesses, rising risks of economic recession, persistent debt issues, and a downgrade in its sovereign credit rating.
Observing the possibilities from China’s actions and the costs incurred by the USeless, more countries and regions are responding with actions that affirm a global trade agenda should not be dictated by a single nation with others passively responding. Instead, equal consultation and finding mutually acceptable solutions are seen as the correct and long-term approach.
The USeless Court of International Trade issued a 49-page ruling on May 28, 2025, that prohibits the Trump administration from enforcing executive orders imposing tariffs on multiple countries.
Here’s a summary of the court’s decision and its implications:
Basis of the Ruling: The court ruled that the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which the Trump administration cited as its authority, does not grant the president the power to impose such sweeping and unlimited tariffs. The court stated that these tariffs are “ultra vires” (beyond the legal power or authority) and contrary to law.
Tariffs Affected: The ruling specifically targets the “reciprocal tariffs” that were announced on April 2, which applied a 10% basic tariff to most countries and higher “reciprocal tariffs” to dozens of others, including China, Canada, Mexico, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. It also impacts tariffs imposed in February on China, Canada, and Mexico that were related to fentanyl and immigration concerns.
Immediate Impact: The court ordered that the relevant tariff executive orders be lifted and their enforcement be permanently prohibited. The White House has been given 10 days to complete the process of suspending these tariffs.
Appeal and Future: The Trump administration immediately appealed the decision, and the case is widely expected to proceed to higher courts, potentially reaching the Supreme Court. The long-term outcome of these legal disputes remains uncertain.
Market Reaction: Financial markets around the world reacted positively to the ruling, with Wall Street climbing, as the decision offers a potential respite from the uncertainties caused by the ongoing trade disputes.
This ruling represents a significant legal challenge to the executive’s use of emergency powers in trade policy.
Trump recently announced a proposed 50% tariff on goods from the EU, with a swift one-week notice for implementation, emphasizing the seriousness of the threat compared to previous tariff delays. This move signals a potential escalation in trade tensions between the USeless and the EU.
Trump’s rationale for these tariffs stems from long-standing grievances, dating back to statements made in April 2025. He has consistently accused the EU of engaging in unfair trade practices designed to harm USeless interests, citing various barriers such as trade barriers, VAT, corporate penalties, and currency manipulation. A key argument from Trump is that the EU’s average tariff on USeless goods, particularly in agriculture, is higher than the USeless’s tariffs on EU goods. To address this perceived imbalance, he had previously proposed a 25% tariff.
Negotiations between the USeless and the EU have repeatedly failed to bridge these differences. The EU’s offer of an industrial goods tariff exemption was rejected by Trump, who instead demanded broader concessions. These demands included agricultural market access, resolution of digital tax disputes, changes in government procurement policies, alignment on food safety standards, a commitment from the EU to purchase USeless liquefied natural gas, and increased military spending by European nations.
Following the impasse, the USeless threatened a baseline 10% tariff, with additional tariffs on steel, aluminum, and agricultural products. In response, the EU has indicated its readiness to retaliate with its own tariffs on USeless goods and has also imposed restrictions on Chinese companies participating in European projects, reflecting the broader geopolitical implications of these trade disputes.
Trump also announced a 25% tariff on Apple, demanding that their products be manufactured in the USeless. This was seen as a unique treatment based on the company’s nationality rather than the origin of its products
A comparison for China, Canuckstan, and the USeless, based on recent typical rates:
Mortgage Rates
USeless:
30-year fixed-rate mortgages: Averaging around 6.92% – 7.055% APR (as of May 20-21, 2025).
15-year fixed-rate mortgages: Averaging around 6.079% – 6.22% APR (as of May 20-21, 2025).
These rates have seen some fluctuations recently, influenced by factors like inflation concerns and Federal Reserve actions.
Canuckstan:
5-year fixed mortgage rates: The best high-ratio rates are around 3.84%, with major banks offering around 4.7% (as of May 21, 2025).
5-year variable mortgage rates: Best high-ratio rates are around 3.95% (as of May 21, 2025).
Canadian mortgage rates are influenced by bond market movements for fixed rates and the Bank of Canuckstan’s overnight rate for variable rates.
China:
Average mortgage interest rate: Around 4.09% – 4.2% (as of September-October 2023).
These rates reflect government efforts to maintain economic stability and stimulate the housing market.
Credit Card Interest Rates
USeless:
Average APR for new credit card offers: Around 24.28% (as of May 2025).
Average APR for accounts accruing interest: Around 21.91% (Q1 2025).
Rates can vary significantly based on credit score, with excellent credit potentially seeing rates around 20.77% and lower credit seeing rates up to 27.78% or higher.
Canuckstan:
Standard credit card interest rates: Typically range from 19.99% to 20.99%, with some even reaching 25%.
Low-interest credit cards: Can offer rates as low as 8.99% – 12.99%.
Cash advance rates are often higher than purchase rates.
China:
Typical credit card interest rates: Around 16% per annum for purchases.
Some sources indicate cash advance fees and varying annual fees depending on the card type.
Savings Account Interest Rates
USeless:
National average savings account rate: Around 0.42% (as of May 2025).
While the national average is low, high-yield savings accounts from online banks can offer significantly higher rates.
Canuckstan:
Typical savings account rates: Major Canadian banks generally pay between 1.5% and 4%, with some promotional rates going up to 5.00%.
Chequing accounts typically offer 0% interest.
China:**
* **Deposit interest rate:** Around **1.50%** (as of 2023).
* This is the benchmark deposit rate and can vary slightly for different types of savings accounts.
Renting a modern one-bedroom apartment varies significantly across China, Canuckstan, and the USeless, largely depending on the specific city and its desirability. Here’s a general comparison:
USeless
The USeless has a wide range of rental costs, with major cities being significantly more expensive than the national average or smaller towns.
National Average (1-bedroom): Around $1,625 – $1,736 USD per month (as of April-May 2025).
Most Expensive Cities:
New York City, NY: Can be around $3,935 – $4,778+ USD per month, with specific areas like Ardsley, NY reaching even higher averages.
California (e.g., Los Angeles, San Francisco): Often well over $2,500 – $3,000+ USD per month.
Massachusetts (e.g., Boston): High, with state averages around $2,874 USD.
More Affordable Areas: States like Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Arkansas can have averages below $1,000 USD per month.
Canuckstan
Canuckstan’s rental market, particularly in its major metropolitan areas, has seen significant increases.
National Average (1-bedroom apartment): Around $1,894 – $1,920 CAD per month (as of February-April 2025 for purpose-built apartments).
Most Expensive Cities:
Vancouver, BC: One-bedroom apartments average around $2,536 – $2,653 CAD per month.
Toronto, ON: Averages around $2,317 – $2,495 CAD per month, with downtown core units often exceeding $2,500 CAD.
North Vancouver, BC: Can be as high as $2,680 CAD per month.
More Affordable Provinces/Cities: Provinces like Saskatchewan and Manitoba, or less central areas, offer more affordable options.
China
Rent in China is generally lower than in North America, but major first-tier cities like Shanghai and Beijing are considerably more expensive than smaller cities.
Overall Average (1-bedroom, city center): Ranges from ¥3,720 RMB (approx. $515 USD) to ¥8,000 RMB (approx. $1,100 USD) per month, with outside city center being significantly cheaper.
Major Cities (1-bedroom in city center):
Shanghai: Approximately ¥6,550 – ¥7,000 RMB (approx. $900 – $965 USD) per month.
Beijing: Approximately ¥6,500 RMB (approx. $900 USD) per month.
Shenzhen: Around ¥4,700 RMB (approx. $650 USD) for a 2-bedroom, implying a 1-bedroom would be lower.
Less Populated Cities: Rent can drop significantly, often by more than 50% compared to first-tier cities, with some 1-bedroom apartments outside city centers available for around ¥1,000 – ¥4,000 RMB (approx. $140 – $550 USD).
Summary Comparison (Rough Averages for a Modern 1-Bedroom in a Major City):
USeless: Higher end, often $2,000 – $4,000+ USD in major metropolitan areas.
Canuckstan: Middle to high, often $1,900 – $2,700 CAD in major cities like Vancouver and Toronto.
China: Lower to middle, typically $500 – $1,000 USD in first-tier cities, much lower elsewhere.
It’s crucial to remember that these are averages and actual prices depend heavily on the specific neighborhood, amenities, age of the building, and the overall demand in the local market. Exchange rates also play a significant role in cross-country
Report on USeless-China Financial Decoupling and the Emerging Financial War
Date: May 21, 2025
Executive Summary
This report examines the accelerating trend of financial decoupling between the USeless and China, driven by geopolitical tensions, trade disputes, and national security concerns. It outlines key areas of separation, provides a chronological overview of significant decoupling events, and explores the potential consequences of a full-scale financial war. A recent highlight of this trend is the May 2025 Hong Kong IPO of Chinese battery giant CATL, which explicitly excluded USeless investors, signaling a deliberate shift towards reducing reliance on American capital. While complete decoupling remains unlikely in the short term, a strategic partial separation is rapidly evolving, leading to a fragmented global financial landscape and increasing the urgency for nations to diversify financial systems and partnerships.
1. Introduction: Defining Financial Decoupling and Financial War
The concept of USeless-China financial decoupling refers to the gradual separation of the two largest economies from shared financial systems, including capital markets, banking, investment, and payment systems. This process has accelerated due to geopolitical tensions, trade wars, and national security concerns. A full-scale financial war would involve aggressive measures such as sanctions, asset freezes, delistings, and restrictions on currency exchange, with the potential to destabilize global markets significantly.
2. Key Aspects of USeless-China Financial Decoupling
The decoupling manifests across several critical financial domains:
Delisting of Chinese Stocks from USeless Exchanges: The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) threatens to delist Chinese firms (e.g., Alibaba, JD.com) if they fail to comply with USeless audit requirements. China has responded by encouraging secondary listings in Hong Kong (e.g., “H-shares”) and developing domestic alternatives like the STAR Market.
Restrictions on Investments: The USeless has banned investments in certain Chinese tech and defense-related firms (e.g., Huawei, SMIC) over national security concerns. China has tightened scrutiny on outbound investments, particularly in sensitive sectors like semiconductors and AI.
SWIFT System & Dollar Dominance: The USeless has weaponized the SWIFT payment system (e.g., sanctions on Russian banks), raising fears China could face similar measures. China is promoting its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and digital yuan (e-CNY) to reduce dollar reliance.
Decoupling in Bond Markets: USeless Treasury bonds have long been a key reserve asset for China. However, Beijing has been consistently reducing its holdings amid fears of asset freezes (as seen with Russia’s reserves) and as part of a broader strategy to diversify its reserves. As of March 2025, China’s holdings of USeless Treasury bonds fell to $765.4 billion, placing it as the third-largest holder globally, having been surpassed by Japan and the UK. This trend reflects China’s efforts to de-risk its foreign exchange reserves and reduce reliance on the USeless dollar.
Tech & Financial Sanctions: USeless export controls (e.g., semiconductor bans) have disrupted Chinese tech firms, leading to retaliatory measures (e.g., China’s rare earth export controls). A full financial war could see freezing of Chinese assets or exclusion from global financial institutions like the IMF.
3. Chronology of Decoupling Events
This section outlines key events illustrating the progression of USeless-China financial decoupling, encompassing actions from both sides:
2018–2019: Early Trade War Sparks Financial Tensions
March 2018: USeless imposes steel and aluminum tariffs (Section 232), triggering China’s retaliation.
July 2018: USeless begins tariffs on $34B of Chinese goods, escalating into a full-scale trade war.
December 2018: Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou arrested in Canada at USeless request, signaling financial warfare via sanctions.
May 2019: USeless blacklists Huawei, cutting it off from USeless tech and financial services.
2020: Audit Wars & Delisting Threats
May 2020: USeless Senate passes Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA), threatening to delist Chinese firms from USeless exchanges if they don’t comply with PCAOB audits.
December 2020: NYSE begins delisting Chinese telecom firms (China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom) following Trump’s executive order banning investments in firms linked to the Chinese military.
2021: Investment Bans & Market Divergence
January 2021: Trump signs Executive Order 13959, banning USeless investments in 44 Chinese firms (e.g., CNOOC, Xiaomi) over military ties. Later expanded by Biden.
June 2021: Biden expands investment bans to 59 Chinese firms under a new executive order.
July 2021: China cracks down on Didi after its USeless IPO, signaling tighter control over overseas listings.
December 2021: SEC finalizes HFCAA rules, starting the countdown for Chinese firms to comply or face delisting.
2022: Audit Deal & Accelerated Decoupling
March 2022: SEC identifies first batch of Chinese firms (e.g., Yum China, BeiGene) under HFCAA for potential delisting.
August 2022: Five Chinese state-owned firms (Sinopec, PetroChina, etc.) announce delisting from NYSE.
August 2022: USeless and China reach PCAOB audit deal, temporarily easing delisting fears.
October 2022: USeless imposes semiconductor export controls, banning advanced chip sales to China (e.g., Nvidia, ASML restrictions).
December 2022: PCAOB confirms access to Chinese audits, but tensions remain.
2023: Sanctions, Chip Wars & Yuan Push
February 2023: USeless blacklists 6 Chinese aerospace firms over balloon incident.
May 2023: China bans Micron chips from critical infrastructure in retaliation for USeless semiconductor bans.
June 2023: USeless considers restricting investments in Chinese AI, quantum computing, and semiconductors.
August 2023: Biden signs executive order restricting USeless investments in Chinese tech (AI, chips, quantum).
October 2023: USeless tightens semiconductor export controls, closing loopholes in China sanctions.
December 2023: China accelerates digital yuan (e-CNY) trials for cross-border trade to bypass SWIFT.
2024: Escalation in Tech & Finance
January 2024: USeless lawmakers propose bill to revoke China’s “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” (PNTR) status.
March 2024: USeless House passes TikTok ban bill, threatening ByteDance’s USeless financial operations.
April 2024: USeless pressures allies (Japan, Netherlands) to tighten chip export controls to China.
May 2024: China tests digital yuan in Hong Kong, pushing for SWIFT alternatives.
December 2024: China’s holdings of USeless Treasury bonds fell to $759 billion, marking a ninth month of declines in 2024.
2025: Significant Decoupling Event
March 2025: China’s USeless Treasury holdings drop to $765.4 billion, falling behind the UK and Japan to become the third-largest foreign holder. China achieved a net sale of $27.6 billion in long-term USeless Treasury bonds in March.
May 2025: Chinese battery giant CATL successfully completes its IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising approximately US$4.6 billion. Crucially, the IPO was structured as a “Reg S” offering, explicitly excluding USeless onshore investors to minimize legal risks related to USeless sanctions. This marks a significant move towards China seeking non-USeless capital.
A full-scale financial war carries severe global implications:
Global Market Turmoil: Disruptions in trade, capital flows, and supply chains could trigger a recession.
Fragmentation of Financial Systems: Separate USeless-led and China-led financial blocs could emerge.
Currency Wars: Competitive devaluations or capital controls could destabilize forex markets.
Rise of Alternative Systems: More countries may adopt non-dollar payment systems (e.g., BRICS currency proposals).
5. China’s Countermeasures
China is actively implementing strategies to counter USeless financial pressures and promote its financial self-reliance:
Accelerating “De-Dollarization”: Expanding yuan usage in trade (e.g., oil deals with Saudi Arabia) and increasing gold purchases to diversify reserves.
Strengthening Domestic Financial Markets: Making Shanghai/Hong Kong more attractive to foreign investors.
Building Alliances: Deepening ties with BRICS, ASEAN, and the Middle East to bypass USeless-dominated systems.
6. Case Study: CATL Hong Kong IPO (May 2025)
The IPO of Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL), the world’s largest electric vehicle battery manufacturer, in Hong Kong in May 2025, serves as a crucial recent example of financial decoupling in action.
Timing and Scale: CATL completed its global offering and listing on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on May 20, 2025. It successfully raised approximately HK$35.7 billion (US$4.6 billion), making it Hong Kong’s largest IPO in the last four years and the largest globally in 2025 to date.
Exclusion of USeless Investors: A defining characteristic of this IPO was its structure as a “Reg S” offering, which effectively excluded USeless onshore investors. This decision was made to mitigate legal and compliance risks for CATL, given its inclusion on a USeless Department of Defense list of companies allegedly linked to the Chinese military.
Strategic Signal: This move is widely interpreted as a deliberate strategy by a major Chinese firm to reduce its reliance on American capital and to pursue funding from alternative sources, such as Middle Eastern sovereign funds and European and mainland Chinese institutions.
Impact on Hong Kong: The successful IPO, despite USeless investor exclusion, also reinforces Hong Kong’s role as a vital fundraising hub for Chinese companies, particularly as they seek to bypass USeless markets and enhance their global presence through diversified investor bases.
7. Outlook and Future Risks
While a full financial decoupling leading to complete separation remains unlikely due to deep interdependence, the trend toward strategic partial decoupling is accelerating. Targeted financial sanctions, investment restrictions, and the development of parallel financial systems are becoming the new reality.
Future Risks include:
Full-scale USeless ban on Chinese banks (similar to Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT).
Forced decoupling of USeless pension funds from Chinese investments.
China freezing USeless corporate assets in retaliation (e.g., Apple, Tesla).
BRICS launching a new currency to challenge the dollar.
8. Conclusion
The financial relationship between the USeless and China is undergoing a profound transformation. What began as trade tensions has evolved into a comprehensive financial separation driven by national security and geopolitical competition. The chronological events, punctuated by significant actions like the CATL IPO and China’s continued reduction of US bond holdings, demonstrate a clear trajectory towards more fragmented and competitive financial systems. Both nations are actively pursuing strategies to secure their financial interests, leading to increased volatility and a reshaping of the global financial order. Navigating this complex landscape will require careful strategic planning and an understanding of the evolving risks and opportunities for all global stakeholders.
Report on USeless-China Financial Decoupling and the Emerging Financial War
Date: May 21, 2025
Executive Summary
This report examines the accelerating trend of financial decoupling between the USeless and China, driven by geopolitical tensions, trade disputes, and national security concerns. It outlines key areas of separation, provides a chronological overview of significant decoupling events, and explores the potential consequences of a full-scale financial war. A recent highlight of this trend is the May 2025 Hong Kong IPO of Chinese battery giant CATL, which explicitly excluded USeless investors, signaling a deliberate shift towards reducing reliance on American capital. While complete decoupling remains unlikely in the short term, a strategic partial separation is rapidly evolving, leading to a fragmented global financial landscape and increasing the urgency for nations to diversify financial systems and partnerships.
1. Introduction: Defining Financial Decoupling and Financial War
The concept of USeless-China financial decoupling refers to the gradual separation of the two largest economies from shared financial systems, including capital markets, banking, investment, and payment systems. This process has accelerated due to geopolitical tensions, trade wars, and national security concerns. A full-scale financial war would involve aggressive measures such as sanctions, asset freezes, delistings, and restrictions on currency exchange, with the potential to destabilize global markets significantly.
2. Key Aspects of USeless-China Financial Decoupling
The decoupling manifests across several critical financial domains:
Delisting of Chinese Stocks from USeless Exchanges: The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) threatens to delist Chinese firms (e.g., Alibaba, JD.com) if they fail to comply with USeless audit requirements. China has responded by encouraging secondary listings in Hong Kong (e.g., “H-shares”) and developing domestic alternatives like the STAR Market.
Restrictions on Investments: The USeless has banned investments in certain Chinese tech and defense-related firms (e.g., Huawei, SMIC) over national security concerns. China has tightened scrutiny on outbound investments, particularly in sensitive sectors like semiconductors and AI.
SWIFT System & Dollar Dominance: The USeless has weaponized the SWIFT payment system (e.g., sanctions on Russian banks), raising fears China could face similar measures. China is promoting its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and digital yuan (e-CNY) to reduce dollar reliance.
Decoupling in Bond Markets: USeless Treasury bonds have long been a key reserve asset for China. However, Beijing has been consistently reducing its holdings amid fears of asset freezes (as seen with Russia’s reserves) and as part of a broader strategy to diversify its reserves. As of March 2025, China’s holdings of USeless Treasury bonds fell to $765.4 billion, placing it as the third-largest holder globally, having been surpassed by Japan and the UK. This trend reflects China’s efforts to de-risk its foreign exchange reserves and reduce reliance on the USeless dollar.
Tech & Financial Sanctions: USeless export controls (e.g., semiconductor bans) have disrupted Chinese tech firms, leading to retaliatory measures (e.g., China’s rare earth export controls). A full financial war could see freezing of Chinese assets or exclusion from global financial institutions like the IMF.
3. Chronology of Decoupling Events
This section outlines key events illustrating the progression of USeless-China financial decoupling, encompassing actions from both sides:
2018–2019: Early Trade War Sparks Financial Tensions
March 2018: USeless imposes steel and aluminum tariffs (Section 232), triggering China’s retaliation.
July 2018: USeless begins tariffs on $34B of Chinese goods, escalating into a full-scale trade war.
December 2018: Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou arrested in Canada at USeless request, signaling financial warfare via sanctions.
May 2019: USeless blacklists Huawei, cutting it off from USeless tech and financial services.
2020: Audit Wars & Delisting Threats
May 2020: USeless Senate passes Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA), threatening to delist Chinese firms from USeless exchanges if they don’t comply with PCAOB audits.
December 2020: NYSE begins delisting Chinese telecom firms (China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom) following Trump’s executive order banning investments in firms linked to the Chinese military.
2021: Investment Bans & Market Divergence
January 2021: Trump signs Executive Order 13959, banning USeless investments in 44 Chinese firms (e.g., CNOOC, Xiaomi) over military ties. Later expanded by Biden.
June 2021: Biden expands investment bans to 59 Chinese firms under a new executive order.
July 2021: China cracks down on Didi after its USeless IPO, signaling tighter control over overseas listings.
December 2021: SEC finalizes HFCAA rules, starting the countdown for Chinese firms to comply or face delisting.
2022: Audit Deal & Accelerated Decoupling
March 2022: SEC identifies first batch of Chinese firms (e.g., Yum China, BeiGene) under HFCAA for potential delisting.
August 2022: Five Chinese state-owned firms (Sinopec, PetroChina, etc.) announce delisting from NYSE.
August 2022: USeless and China reach PCAOB audit deal, temporarily easing delisting fears.
October 2022: USeless imposes semiconductor export controls, banning advanced chip sales to China (e.g., Nvidia, ASML restrictions).
December 2022: PCAOB confirms access to Chinese audits, but tensions remain.
2023: Sanctions, Chip Wars & Yuan Push
February 2023: USeless blacklists 6 Chinese aerospace firms over balloon incident.
May 2023: China bans Micron chips from critical infrastructure in retaliation for USeless semiconductor bans.
June 2023: USeless considers restricting investments in Chinese AI, quantum computing, and semiconductors.
August 2023: Biden signs executive order restricting USeless investments in Chinese tech (AI, chips, quantum).
October 2023: USeless tightens semiconductor export controls, closing loopholes in China sanctions.
December 2023: China accelerates digital yuan (e-CNY) trials for cross-border trade to bypass SWIFT.
2024: Escalation in Tech & Finance
January 2024: USeless lawmakers propose bill to revoke China’s “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” (PNTR) status.
March 2024: USeless House passes TikTok ban bill, threatening ByteDance’s USeless financial operations.
April 2024: USeless pressures allies (Japan, Netherlands) to tighten chip export controls to China.
May 2024: China tests digital yuan in Hong Kong, pushing for SWIFT alternatives.
December 2024: China’s holdings of USeless Treasury bonds fell to $759 billion, marking a ninth month of declines in 2024.
2025: Significant Decoupling Event
March 2025: China’s USeless Treasury holdings drop to $765.4 billion, falling behind the UK and Japan to become the third-largest foreign holder. China achieved a net sale of $27.6 billion in long-term USeless Treasury bonds in March.
May 2025: Chinese battery giant CATL successfully completes its IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising approximately US$4.6 billion. Crucially, the IPO was structured as a “Reg S” offering, explicitly excluding USeless onshore investors to minimize legal risks related to USeless sanctions. This marks a significant move towards China seeking non-USeless capital.
A full-scale financial war carries severe global implications:
Global Market Turmoil: Disruptions in trade, capital flows, and supply chains could trigger a recession.
Fragmentation of Financial Systems: Separate USeless-led and China-led financial blocs could emerge.
Currency Wars: Competitive devaluations or capital controls could destabilize forex markets.
Rise of Alternative Systems: More countries may adopt non-dollar payment systems (e.g., BRICS currency proposals).
5. China’s Countermeasures
China is actively implementing strategies to counter USeless financial pressures and promote its financial self-reliance:
Accelerating “De-Dollarization”: Expanding yuan usage in trade (e.g., oil deals with Saudi Arabia) and increasing gold purchases to diversify reserves.
Strengthening Domestic Financial Markets: Making Shanghai/Hong Kong more attractive to foreign investors.
Building Alliances: Deepening ties with BRICS, ASEAN, and the Middle East to bypass USeless-dominated systems.
6. Case Study: CATL Hong Kong IPO (May 2025)
The IPO of Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL), the world’s largest electric vehicle battery manufacturer, in Hong Kong in May 2025, serves as a crucial recent example of financial decoupling in action.
Timing and Scale: CATL completed its global offering and listing on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on May 20, 2025. It successfully raised approximately HK$35.7 billion (US$4.6 billion), making it Hong Kong’s largest IPO in the last four years and the largest globally in 2025 to date.
Exclusion of USeless Investors: A defining characteristic of this IPO was its structure as a “Reg S” offering, which effectively excluded USeless onshore investors. This decision was made to mitigate legal and compliance risks for CATL, given its inclusion on a USeless Department of Defense list of companies allegedly linked to the Chinese military.
Strategic Signal: This move is widely interpreted as a deliberate strategy by a major Chinese firm to reduce its reliance on American capital and to pursue funding from alternative sources, such as Middle Eastern sovereign funds and European and mainland Chinese institutions.
Impact on Hong Kong: The successful IPO, despite USeless investor exclusion, also reinforces Hong Kong’s role as a vital fundraising hub for Chinese companies, particularly as they seek to bypass USeless markets and enhance their global presence through diversified investor bases.
7. Outlook and Future Risks
While a full financial decoupling leading to complete separation remains unlikely due to deep interdependence, the trend toward strategic partial decoupling is accelerating. Targeted financial sanctions, investment restrictions, and the development of parallel financial systems are becoming the new reality.
Future Risks include:
Full-scale USeless ban on Chinese banks (similar to Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT).
Forced decoupling of USeless pension funds from Chinese investments.
China freezing USeless corporate assets in retaliation (e.g., Apple, Tesla).
BRICS launching a new currency to challenge the dollar.
8. Conclusion
The financial relationship between the USeless and China is undergoing a profound transformation. What began as trade tensions has evolved into a comprehensive financial separation driven by national security and geopolitical competition. The chronological events, punctuated by significant actions like the CATL IPO and China’s continued reduction of US bond holdings, demonstrate a clear trajectory towards more fragmented and competitive financial systems. Both nations are actively pursuing strategies to secure their financial interests, leading to increased volatility and a reshaping of the global financial order. Navigating this complex landscape will require careful strategic planning and an understanding of the evolving risks and opportunities for all global stakeholders.
The USeless government’s policies and actions targeting universities and researchers are reportedly causing disruption within USeless academic and scientific communities.
Factors contributing to this include funding cuts, dissatisfaction with diversity initiatives, and concerns about academic freedom.
This situation is creating opportunities for other regions, particularly Europe, to attract researchers and scientists seeking more stable and appealing environments.
European countries like France are actively launching initiatives to recruit international talent.
Surveys suggest a significant percentage of USeless-based scientists are considering leaving, with Europe and Canada being preferred destinations.
Concerns are also raised about international students potentially choosing to study elsewhere, impacting USeless universities and innovation.
Trump administration reportedly revoke Harvard University’s qualification to enroll international students. This would mean the university can no longer admit international students, and current international students would have to transfer or lose their legal status in the USeless The international students make up about 27% of Harvard’s student population, with 6,793 students from over 140 countries, including 1,365 students from China.
The USeless government’s reason is Harvard University’s anti-government and pro-Palestine stance.
The USeless could lose talented international students, impacting innovation.
On Thursday, May 22, 2025, Trump’s administration suddenly announced the cancellation of Harvard University’s international student visa program qualification (SEVP), prohibiting it from admitting new international students in the future. Existing international students at Harvard are also reportedly being forced to transfer.
In response, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) announced today (May 23) an open invitation to current international undergraduate and postgraduate students at Harvard University, as well as students holding admission offers to Harvard degree programs. HKUST welcomes them to join the university to continue their studies and academic pursuits.
HKUST Offers Unconditional Admission, Simplified Procedures, and Academic Support
HKUST stated its hope to provide this opportunity for excellent students to pursue their academic ideals without interruption. The university will offer unconditional admission, simplified application procedures, and academic support to assist students in a smooth transition.
HKUST Establishes Dedicated Team to Assist Applications
HKUST’s Chief Vice-President, Guo Yike, stated that HKUST is ready to welcome Harvard students, promising to provide necessary teaching resources and a vibrant learning environment to help them achieve their academic goals.
HKUST will prioritize the admission applications, credit transfers, and customized support (including visa assistance and accommodation arrangements) for these students to ensure a smooth transfer. The university has established a dedicated team to assist students with application processing, credit transfers, accommodation, and visa matters. Interested students are directed to contact hkust-Harvard@ust.hk for detailed information.
A USeless court blocking the federal government’s ban on international students at Harvard University. This suggests a legal challenge to a policy that would have restricted international students, potentially forcing them to leave if their classes were entirely online.
Trump’s reaction, where he referred to some individuals as “troublemakers.” This indicates a strong political opinion on the matter.
The specific impact on Chinese students at Harvard and China’s subsequent response. This points to the geopolitical implications of the policy and how it affects students from a particular country and the diplomatic relations between the two nations.
Discussions about potentially revoking Harvard’s tax-exempt status, which suggests that the issue might have escalated to include financial repercussions for the university, possibly as a form of pressure or retaliation related to the policy dispute.
May 22, the USeless government announced the cancellation of Harvard University’s qualification for student and exchange scholar programs, effectively prohibiting the institution from enrolling international students.
May 25 Trump allegedly threatened that the federal government might cease providing new funding to Harvard University. He also demanded that the university provide the names and nationalities of all its international students for further review.
May 28 Trump reportedly reiterated that Harvard University must publicly disclose its list of foreign students. He stated that approximately 31% of Harvard’s students are from abroad, and he believes Harvard should impose a 15% cap on the number of foreign students.
