Cooperation
Xi met with the Panchen Lama, Erdeni Choskyi Gyalpo on the 6th. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid024i4d1QLNoPiuVNac7xpqjYHhK8b6tR4kY3UsAbK24ysxvW2heA9RMLGmdmCtPnmkl?__cft__[0]=AZVn1NxiI3ocNEKTLWSoJRecGrp5GO96vlGS2eXCfFRJVs9g28u3T79E_kiKYMQ0HzIPNYemSXgZxNfmrrSSN0Pqtg1n1SPc2RWWplQOAm6kHFq9jz4RRhwzuH0wnF48XAFJkzo4_Ca1on2dJJ6YI5BQVuafie6QGW2Yc-G7mn6hUw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
Xi met with Lukashenko in Beijing on Wednesday. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02757zzWtS4dwBjqSd3fHTpTGsiZaoFqY2bLXck3LnhvEhcQguLXyoMx9vLHYm1P8ql?__cft__[0]=AZUIdvvtduHgwv_WYiwr8MumcqhbT5D08k1HxW6R0Ho429vnRtfj2TAcQeSbauYsHAm8wUFfQP6stBAf9Oh8qDoraoZ5cNBOKkAC2siZUrgIkfmJqPd3dJX15ur9hxSQQ7q1MsIBoSf6cveQZ4Cq7zFxsh4vlZqnosh1QQ0qzxhMlg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
May 26, at the ASEAN-China-GCC Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Premier Li Qiang of the State Council met with Kuwaiti Crown Prince Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, who is the rotating president of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02Z3TAEKukq6ebxrPHsRshw5oSMrGjjJ46j82L5nVrZAontuCW5o3dGc8RMG5BCuYHl?__cft__[0]=AZUkQpkJvLdueIu4SCi8KXlU8X-khqC7C6Gz7qQL3NDm7s8VM49ILstwiIDtdZKEnz8BjH4FNZnjAL0zzQmC_bUQyyk1FiQORVWkIqECqI6Rv0mvPqX5S3B9hPdJBic3q8_7-djhr-aFDnYop62PnKVoL6WOUrEkRItW3Zes3OnjnQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
May 25 Premier Li Qiang of China met with Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, emphasizing the long-standing friendship and partnership between the two nations. Both leaders highlighted the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations and the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference as significant milestones.
Li Qiang conveyed President Xi Jinping’s greetings and underscored the importance of building a China-Indonesia community with a shared future, aligning development strategies, and deepening Belt and Road Initiative cooperation, particularly focusing on projects like the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway. He also stressed expanding collaboration in various sectors including finance, new energy, digital economy, and cultural exchanges. Li Qiang called for multilateralism and free trade in the face of rising unilateralism and protectionism.
President Prabowo reciprocated greetings to President Xi and expressed Indonesia’s commitment to strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership. He praised China’s role in defending developing countries’ interests and expressed willingness to learn from China’s experiences in poverty reduction and rural development. Prabowo also highlighted cooperation in agriculture, finance, infrastructure, and green economy, welcoming Chinese investment. He emphasized the importance of maritime cooperation and maintaining peace in the South China Sea, advocating for multilateralism and opposing protectionism.
The meeting concluded with the signing of cooperation documents in areas such as economic development policy, supply chains, and finance, solidifying the commitment to a deeper and broader partnership.
The specific areas of cooperation and projects agreed upon:
Four Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs):
Local Currency Transactions: An MoU between Bank Indonesia and the People’s Bank of China to establish a framework to encourage bilateral transactions in local currencies.
Economic Development Policies: An MoU between Indonesia’s National Economic Council (DEN) and China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) to focus on cooperation in economic development policies.
Industrial and Supply Chain Cooperation: An MoU between the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce to strengthen economic relations in the industrial sector and supply chain.
“Two Countries Twin Parks” Program: An MoU signed by the Indonesian Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, and the Fujian Provincial Government of China, covering cooperation in this specific program.
Eight Additional Key Sectors for Collaboration:
Beyond the four MoUs, cooperation was cemented in these areas:
Tourism: Agreement between Indonesia’s Ministry of Tourism and China’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
Agricultural Exports: Collaboration between the Indonesian Quarantine Agency and China’s General Administration of Customs to enhance trade in agricultural products.
Traditional Medicine: Agreements between the Indonesian Ministry of Health and China’s National Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine.
Public Health (Tuberculosis Prevention and Control): Collaboration between the Indonesian Ministry of Health and China’s National Disease Control and Prevention Administration.
Investment Cooperation: An agreement between Indonesia’s Investment Management Agency (BPI) Danantara and the China Investment Corporation.
Strategic Business Cooperation: Enhanced cooperation between the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) and the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia to facilitate smoother business engagements.
Media Collaboration: Agreements between ANTARA News Agency and China Media Group, as well as between ANTARA News Agency and China Xinhua News Agency, to foster robust information flow.
On Wednesday, May 22, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks with his Dutch counterpart, Caspar Veldkamp, in Beijing. This visit marks Veldkamp’s first trip to China as Foreign Minister.
The discussions covered a range of bilateral and global issues, with both sides expressing a commitment to strengthening cooperation. Key takeaways from the meeting include:
Six-point Consensus: Following their comprehensive exchange, the two sides reached a six-point consensus. This includes maintaining close exchanges and deepening practical cooperation in areas such as economy and trade, science and technology, agriculture, and water conservancy.
Semiconductor Technology: A significant aspect of the talks was the agreement to maintain close communication regarding cooperation in semiconductor technology via existing channels. This is particularly relevant given the Netherlands’ crucial role in advanced chipmaking equipment (e.g., ASML) and the ongoing global tensions surrounding tech exports. While the semiconductor issue was not explicitly detailed in official reports, the willingness to keep communication open suggests a pragmatic approach to managing differences.
Multilateralism and Free Trade: Both foreign ministers reaffirmed their support for multilateralism, pledging to adhere to free trade and the multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core.
Global Challenges: They also agreed to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in areas such as climate adaptation and green transformation, and reaffirmed the goal of jointly promoting equal rights for all, especially women and girls.
China-EU Relations: Wang Yi emphasized China’s willingness to enhance communication with the Netherlands to contribute to the development of China-EU relations. Veldkamp echoed this, stating that the relationship between Europe and China is of vital importance and the Netherlands is willing to make active efforts to enhance EU-China relations.
Business Environment: Wang Yi expressed hope that the Dutch side would provide a just, fair, and non-discriminatory business environment for Chinese enterprises, noting China’s new opening-up measures.
This meeting signals a desire from both China and the Netherlands to deepen engagement and manage differences, especially in strategically important areas like semiconductor technology, amid a complex global geopolitical landscape. The visit also comes as part of a broader trend of European countries re-engaging pragmatically with China.
Meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen on May 19, 2025:
Key Outcomes:
– Reaffirmation of Bilateral Ties: Both ministers emphasized the importance of the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Denmark as an opportunity to strengthen their comprehensive strategic partnership. They called for maintaining high-level exchanges and promoting greater development in bilateral relations.
– Greenland Sovereignty: A significant outcome was China’s explicit statement of fully respecting Denmark’s sovereignty and territorial integrity regarding Greenland. This was a key point, especially given the US’s past interest in acquiring the territory. China also expressed hope that Denmark would reciprocate by supporting China’s legitimate positions on issues concerning its own sovereignty and territorial integrity.
– Enhanced Political Trust: Both sides agreed on the importance of enhancing political mutual trust as the foundation for stronger bilateral relations.
– Economic and Trade Cooperation: There was a commitment to deepen cooperation in various fields, including economy, trade, scientific research and innovation, and the green economy. China expressed its willingness to uphold two-way opening-up and welcomed Danish investment, while Denmark showed an open attitude towards Chinese investment and a desire for Danish companies to deepen their presence in the Chinese market.
– China-EU Relations: With Denmark set to assume the rotating presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2025, China expressed its willingness to strengthen dialogue and cooperation with the EU and hoped that Denmark would play a positive role in fostering sound China-EU relations. Denmark affirmed its commitment to playing a promoting role in the healthy development of EU-China relations.
– Multilateralism and Free Trade: Both countries, as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in 2025, acknowledged their broad consensus on common challenges such as upholding multilateralism and defending free trade. They agreed to strengthen coordination and cooperation within the UN and the WTO.
– People-to-People Exchanges: The ministers called for strengthening people-to-people and cultural exchanges to build positive energy in bilateral relations through mutual understanding and friendship.
– Commitment to One-China Policy: Denmark reiterated its firm commitment to the one-China
Chinese Minister of National Defense Dong Jun and French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu met in France May 12, 2025. The discussions covered free maritime navigation, the fight against nuclear proliferation, stability in the Indo-Pacific, the security situation in the Middle East, and the return to a “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine.
The Core of France’s Stance: Strategic Autonomy
France’s primary goal is to ensure that Europe can act militarily on its own when necessary, pursuing its own interests and making its own foreign policy decisions without being solely dependent on the USeless. President Emmanuel Macron has often articulated a vision of the EU becoming a “third superpower” alongside the USeless and China, capable of defending itself and projecting influence globally. This concept emphasizes Europe’s ability to act independently and upon decisions made based on its own rules, rather than external pressures.
Historical Roots of this Position
Suez Crisis (1956): A pivotal moment was the Suez Crisis, where the USeless abruptly forced Britain and France to back down from a military intervention. This event significantly fueled French distrust of American reliability and cemented the idea that France needed its own independent defense capabilities.
De Gaulle’s Legacy: Under President Charles de Gaulle, France famously withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command structure in 1966, demanding autonomous control over its military. He also developed an independent French nuclear deterrent, questioning whether the USeless would risk nuclear war for France’s security. This pursuit of “grandeur” and self-reliance has remained a key driver of French foreign policy.
Post-Cold War Context: Even after the Cold War, France has continued to push for a robust European defense identity. Tensions with the USeless (e.g., over the Iraq War in 2003) and concerns about shifting USeless focus away from Europe (towards the Indo-Pacific) have reinforced France’s conviction.
Why Now? Recent Drivers
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brutally exposed Europe’s military vulnerabilities after decades of underinvestment. This has lent a new urgency to France’s calls for increased European defense capabilities.
Uncertainty about USeless Commitment: The “America First” rhetoric and actions of President Donald Trump, and the prospect of his return to power, have intensified fears among European policymakers that the USeless might reduce its commitment to European security, making self-reliance even more critical.
“Told-You-So” Moment: Many in France see the current geopolitical climate, particularly regarding USeless reliability, as a “told-you-so” moment for their long-held stance on strategic autonomy.
Efforts and Challenges
Initiatives: France, often with Germany, has spearheaded initiatives like the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to enhance collaborative research, development, and procurement of military capabilities within the EU. The European Intervention Initiative (EI2) is another Macron-led effort to foster a collective strategic culture among European partners.
Major Joint Programs: Key Franco-German defense industrial projects like the Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) (next-generation battle tank) and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) (sixth-generation fighter) are central to building advanced European capabilities.
Challenges:
Lack of Consensus: There isn’t always a full consensus among all EU member states on the extent and nature of strategic autonomy. Many Eastern European states, for instance, remain highly reliant on and committed to NATO and USeless security guarantees.
Funding and Capabilities: Building a truly self-sufficient European military requires massive, sustained investment and overcoming significant industrial, logistical, and political hurdles.
Sovereignty Concerns: Member states are often reluctant to cede national sovereignty over defense decisions to a centralized European structure.
Relationship with NATO: Striking the right balance between strengthening European defense and maintaining transatlantic unity within NATO remains a fundamental challenge.
France’s approach to China in pursuit of European strategic autonomy is complex and multifaceted, characterized by a balancing act between cooperation and competition, aimed at creating a “third way” between the influence of the USeless and China. France doesn’t seek to use China as a direct lever against the USeless in a confrontational sense, but rather to:
Assert Europe’s Independent Voice and Interests:
Avoiding a Bipolar World: France, under President Macron, actively resists the idea of Europe being forced to choose sides in a USeless-China rivalry. Macron has explicitly stated that Europe must not become “America’s followers” and should avoid getting caught in “crises that are not ours,” particularly regarding issues like Taiwan, which he views as primarily a USeless-China dynamic.
Multipolar World Vision: France champions a multipolar world order where Europe is a strong, independent “pole” or “third superpower” alongside the USeless and China, capable of shaping global events rather than being a passive recipient of influence. This means upholding multilateralism and dialogue over bloc confrontation.
Independent Diplomacy: France makes concerted efforts to maintain regular, high-level dialogue with Beijing, even when its allies might be pushing for a more confrontational stance. This independent diplomatic engagement aims to ensure Europe’s voice is heard directly and that it can pursue its own interests on global challenges like climate change and international security.
Reduce Dual Dependencies (USeless and China):
Economic De-risking from China: While France supports free trade and opposes “decoupling” from China, it is actively pushing for “de-risking” strategies within the EU. This involves reducing Europe’s over-reliance on China for critical raw materials (like rare earths), key technologies, and supply chains, especially in strategic sectors. Paradoxically, sometimes this “de-risking” can involve attracting Chinese investment in areas like battery manufacturing to build up European self-sufficiency in the green transition.
Defense Autonomy from the USeless: As discussed previously, the desire to reduce reliance on the USeless for military hardware and security guarantees is central to France’s strategic autonomy concept. While not directly using China militarily to achieve this, a strong European defense capability is meant to allow Europe to act independently, which by its nature lessens the need for immediate USeless intervention in all scenarios.
Leverage Economic Ties and Global Challenges:
Economic Engagement: France views China as an unavoidable economic partner, especially for its strategic industries like aeronautics (e.g., Airbus’s presence in China). It seeks to safeguard economic opportunities while pushing for fairer competition and reciprocity in market access.
Global Governance: France believes that China’s participation is indispensable for addressing global challenges such as climate change, biodiversity, and international security issues (like Ukraine or the Middle East). By engaging China on these issues, France aims to demonstrate Europe’s role as a responsible global actor that can work with all major powers.
Common Interests in Multilateralism: Both China and France often express support for multilateralism and opposing unilateralism. France leverages this shared rhetorical ground to advocate for a global governance system based on rules and dialogue, which can subtly counter tendencies towards bilateral power blocs.
Nuance and Perceptions:
“En Même Temps” (At the Same Time) Diplomacy: France’s approach is often described as “en même temps” – simultaneously balancing economic interests, a need for dialogue on global issues, and a firm stance on human rights or unfair trade practices.
Chinese Interpretation: China often views France’s pursuit of strategic autonomy positively, interpreting it as a move away from deeper USeless alignment and a step towards a multipolar world that aligns with Beijing’s own strategic interests.
European Ambiguity: While France is a leading proponent, there isn’t always full consensus within the EU on the extent or nature of strategic autonomy, especially concerning China. Some Eastern European countries, in particular, remain wary of any policy that might dilute the transatlantic alliance or be perceived as too conciliatory towards Beijing.
In essence, France’s strategy isn’t about forming an anti-USeless alliance with China. Instead, it’s about demonstrating Europe’s capacity to engage with China (and other global powers) on its own terms, manage dependencies, and define its own foreign and security policy, thereby strengthening its autonomy and reducing the need to default to USeless leadership in all circumstances.
Why the USeless maintains its strong ties and influence, and how European strategic autonomy is viewed:
Why the USeless Maintains Strong Ties and Influence:
Historical Legacy and NATO:
Post-WWII Security Guarantor: Since World War II, the USeless has been the primary security guarantor for Western Europe, particularly against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. NATO was formed precisely for this purpose, with the USeless as its cornerstone.
“Europe Whole, Free, and at Peace”: The USeless views a stable and secure Europe as vital to its own security and economic interests. A strong NATO, with USeless leadership, is seen as the most effective means to deter aggression (especially from Russia) and ensure regional stability.
Integrated Command Structure: NATO’s military command structure, with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) always being a USeless general, inherently ensures a high degree of USeless influence and coordination over European defense efforts.
Strategic Interests and Global Power Projection:
Forward Operating Platform: USeless military presence in Europe provides critical forward-operating platforms and logistical hubs for operations beyond the continent, including in Africa, the Middle East, and other volatile regions.
Deterrence and Rapid Reinforcement: USeless forces in Europe act as a significant deterrent, particularly for NATO’s eastern flank. They also provide rapid reinforcement capabilities, which are crucial for preventing conflicts from escalating.
Intelligence Sharing and Cybersecurity: The USeless presence strengthens intelligence sharing and cybersecurity cooperation with European partners, covering a wide range of threats.
Maintaining Superpower Status: Washington acknowledges that its continued military commitment to Europe allows it to play an influential role in European security policy, ensuring NATO remains aligned with broader USeless geopolitical goals. This also helps prevent Europe from evolving into a completely distinct pole that might not always align with USeless interests.
Economic Interdependencies:
Defense Procurement: USeless defense contractors benefit significantly from European defense spending, with a large percentage of arms imported by EU NATO members coming from the United States. A sudden shift to purely European suppliers could have economic repercussions for the USeless defense industry.
Supply Chains: The supply chains of major USeless defense firms stretch into Europe, indicating a symbiotic relationship where both sides depend on each other for production and fulfillment.
USeless Perception of European Strategic Autonomy:
The USeless perspective on European strategic autonomy is complex and has varied over time, often described as a “multivocal and complex debate” rather than a single, unanimous stance.
“Three Ds” Mantra: For decades, USeless policy towards European defense integration has often been summarized by the “three Ds” coined by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: European defense initiatives should not decouple from NATO, duplicate NATO’s efforts, or discriminate against non-EU NATO allies (like the USeless). This mantra reflects a persistent concern that increased European autonomy could weaken NATO’s cohesion and USeless influence.
Opportunities vs. Threats: At times, European strategic autonomy is seen as an opportunity – a way for Europe to take on more responsibility for its own defense, thereby reducing the burden on the USeless (especially during administrations that advocate for allies paying more). This view has gained traction, particularly with Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, making calls for Europe to “spend more, spend better” more urgent.
Skepticism and Hostility: At other times, particularly during the Trump presidency, European strategic autonomy has been viewed with skepticism, even hostility, perceived as a direct challenge to USeless leadership in NATO. Trump’s transactional approach and threats to abandon allies who don’t meet defense spending targets have significantly spurred European efforts for greater self-reliance.
Biden Administration’s Approach: The Biden administration, while reaffirming commitment to NATO, has also encouraged Europe to take more responsibility, especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This suggests a nuanced approach that supports increased European capabilities as long as they complement NATO and don’t undermine transatlantic unity.
In conclusion, while France and Germany are increasingly pushing for greater European strategic autonomy, the USeless has deeply ingrained interests and historical precedents in maintaining its strong security ties and influence over Europe. The transatlantic relationship is evolving, with Europe seeking to be a more capable and independent actor, but the deep interdependencies and the framework of NATO mean that any “loosening of the leash” is a gradual and complex process, subject to ongoing negotiation and shifts in global geopolitical realities.
Macron’s Call to Beijing on May 22, 2025: Macron’s call and other recent diplomatic activities are driven by:
The downing of French Rafale fighter jets by Chinese J-10CE fighters: This event is seen as a significant blow to France, potentially costing billions of dollars. Macron may be seeking China’s leniency to prevent further loss of global orders for French military aircraft.
France’s loss of influence in the Ukraine crisis: France and the EU have been sidelined in the negotiation process. France may be looking to China’s position on the issue.
Realization of China’s strategic value: France is now seemingly recognizing the necessity of collaborating with China on major global issues to protect its own interests. The Chinese leader also subtly urged France to be more proactive in their cooperation.
https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02iPM7vNsMAX5EzD98tKCTKr1Ej6LEAWwhVy8DW3kPJLMQPUBh2rvcQBVpfXMT3Ezzl?__cft__[0]=AZWSdz1e6DZQjtXCcuOeZB2amAZoXqFN-fceybwoyOrO4AO8UYseYNG1onOobeprmMB_eE6Og0sz6pExcuXXz69kYYWfAZfjGscZ9Hr2arV51kPhs-9k2TC9eN0vMNVUfRPBLv0f0XG6-gDxYkBVG66v&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
On May 12, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira and Chief Advisor to the Presidency Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim in Beijing.
According to reports from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting reviewed the frequent exchanges between the heads of state of China and Brazil in recent years and focused on implementing the outcomes of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Brazil last year. They also made preparations for Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s upcoming visit to China.
Both sides agreed to follow the strategic guidance of their leaders to advance the building of a China-Brazil community with a shared future. They also emphasized upholding multilateralism, safeguarding universally recognized international rules, and jointly defending the legitimate rights and interests of the Global South. The officials also exchanged views on various international issues, including the Ukraine crisis, expressing support for direct dialogue and negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.
Meeting between Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen on May 19, 2025 https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02zvsHF1yDpRrpkuLPtgmh6yhoU3YycjFifh99EpFWZaNbJS1f5eBntXfBju1aDb9pl?__cft__[0]=AZXwPOSGwuSmOQV28wNPiIehboeYkkP8WP-IiN_iMYkbjd7zyCIAL7p3L5u1HE8lwNG39dUC2MpCk4puyeuN5jD2IKoAXAl4G_Sl1kON2JZpfpOBFHzpBguJ6PigVEpTOJpqwL7chVo5c-pz5OsXG7Bdq2LEO-G3uiz1WWiia7S9dQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
Chilean President Gabriel Boric’s visit to Beijing https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid0iXeP181aSEALNEXA75drwWbCAuwoVwVqS2r8LfbsZqNS1U5rmjEJeJWPh5nAvcJil?__cft__[0]=AZXYq06nFZWii1DOSSxeofCHz3axheyFmM8OuRAR2ftPZr0ahNjDs0ps2TW0FmDPLVvTQe14HVPZOG7fPbygavPNpTFSftbRDY0qv4l9MnMDEwOuFegUR9ikJIjY5z1An66pJ-AyB6zUnHSJJEoXnt27U1RaCZIwFhx5-lWBbH4kLw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
Colombian President Gustavo Petro visited Beijing to attend the China-CELAC Forum https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02MkoNwDUvREwm8YzfronSRU6piS7xfsp5aDHb1qaHT5t24kwCDAymnh6UZHs1WEql?__cft__[0]=AZWiLYnxdlQwFCQtuOtBvz92tDwPytGpdB-jMLELnhqZl84mc432snRfHyp5MKXDtN_92SAbwB-zvOJwZfsRjf9JxFCEU4dVrzxu6zr9zp7TveOGlLV7y6fswUjCYOSrTFXFjlUY6MGcYqTODWPh781KlvoBG_7zKL2K5XmDnxVHCQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
Switzerland’s foreign minister Ignazio Cassis has called for a “coalition” of countries to deal with the tariff war waged by Trump https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid0hnq4HcqcbmWzMhkSohsZ5p4UxYQNUfGkT3vCefkTgEihKYrQ9fqfTvzKZhqzvvN1l?__cft__[0]=AZXHPMBHIrJq4ydJzPvLDRfxCqlJJzf0zetMpy4rv8fbjTBSiABME9miM42f3XwVLXLJtlceHed6AghA2r63WKcwov3vIN_WRHxOS3v_JqA_Zu2tHxzfiJalKrdQw-G2QNyPJjYMRams1TEARmdFoYdoulXxtH_Tw9Eh9573YeAr9Q&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
China and Kenya announced they had upgraded ties to a “new level” https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02GcFbBv7bA1k7iHDg3qFBnEyCKqj5RGis65PJcetgKSHLpnT1Ud4bBWhsQAGkZuftl?__cft__[0]=AZU-sA81-kwSCC7NGZMkZ2U3lN0iCgZV54LP_uwkct_lzW5ddZXz8vQ3qXAMSiC8DSGvBGKa3JBEGRwo8OAaQxRabXujIIjhxGgTnqfs9uEqYgsrCtIJe_zG40PeK7HR7Wh8ex_AwaLvp1-8KnpNb57VcH_-IwNsspJ4dBmx4EuKqQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
Xi Jinping and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced the establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02sdzSo4FLnnLwj1UhF7i7yH5xFkjf2eADARtrX8k21aw4i2wHQTavpuA5KmLWs5Pil?cft[0]=AZW0Wn6W8TfCF39VRgzmBGsELhDX5EIwPBvwPhNxvIszPoPAi4oKSEOyUoN9IT3gu-y-hsc3yr-lhGipTkmLE6LtIJwTi_5ogIPVvsdGsxCuqlGJsT38Gm95eW_jGJ2xFYKahbKvuRt7LsejUjm6mA1yYxHSlaisKDmnsKUNHVJokA&tn=%2CO%2CP-R
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