“The New Alliance,”

A significant summit, termed “The New Alliance,” recently took place on May 27, 2025, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This inaugural ASEAN-GCC-China Summit brought together over 20 nations, including the 10 Southeast Asian nations of ASEAN, China, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states.

This alliance represents substantial global economic power, boasting a combined GDP of nearly $25 trillion and a population exceeding 2 billion people. It is also noted that this group accounts for a remarkable 55% of world GDP growth.

The summit concluded with a joint statement outlining five Pillars of Cooperation:

– Stronger Trade Ties: Bolstering economic integration through free trade deals, resilient supply chains, and digital economic growth.

– Infrastructure and Connectivity: Expanding Belt and Road projects, maritime trade routes, and sustainable transportation.

– Energy Cooperation: Collaborating on clean energy and nuclear technology, and supporting climate change actions.

– Tech and Innovation: Building partnerships in AI, fintech, smart cities, and boosting digital skills.

– Cultural Exchange: Promoting tourism, education, and people-to-people ties.

There seems to be a lack of coverage from major Western news outlets like CNN, BBC, or the New York Times. This limited Western media attention has led to suggestions that the summit could signify a pivotal shift in global power dynamics, indicating a future where Western dominance in the world order may diminish. The discussions at the summit focused on strengthening economic resilience and cooperation, and the event has been described as a “significant new step in the global transition towards multipolarity,” emphasizing cooperation over rivalry and trade over tariffs. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1016625910588831/?__cft__[0]=AZUmtrvOZOpJsoaLMF9cedGRgPidFHCqJfeO6NEX5B3DCfbt1hKB2yFx3qqg0x10pybdw-y1z8XaJzIet5f0ypA_W_PKM4kEkT2bPuR8JFaADmX5EPK7zxc5Gmdclf4L0BSOpTLJBw7kWfDsV8k0o4myTt6PEOr4WL4hYEmY_f7zJQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Geopolitical and Economic Significance of the Moo (Kuskino)/Mokuawei Region

Report on the Geopolitical and Economic Significance of the Moo (Kuskino)/Mokuawei Region

Executive Summary

The Moo (Kuskino) region, historically known to China as Mokuawei, located in Russia’s Far East and encompassing Posi Bay (Zaliv Pos’yeta) and Zarubino Port, holds immense, yet largely untapped, geopolitical and economic significance. Despite possessing natural deep-water harbors with potential for all-weather operation, the area remains underdeveloped due to a complex interplay of historical grievances, strategic anxieties, and economic considerations. For China, these ports represent a vital gateway to the Sea of Japan, offering transformative potential for its landlocked northeastern provinces. For Russia, however, the strategic implications of full development and Chinese access present significant challenges to its security and regional control.

Area Overview and Geographic Advantages

The Moo (Kuskino) region is strategically situated in Russia’s Hasan District, remarkably close to the Chinese border city of Hunchun. While a direct border crossing to the region is nearby (approximately 4 km to the general “Moo” area), the crucial connection between Hunchun and Zarubino Port is approximately 50 kilometers.

The area boasts two natural deep-water harbors:

Posi Bay (Залив Посьета): A vast and deep water body capable of accommodating large vessels.

Zarubino Port: Located in close proximity to the Chinese border, offering direct access for trade.

Both ports possess the inherent potential, with the aid of icebreakers, to function as year-round, ice-free ports, a significant advantage in the often-frozen northern latitudes. This makes them exceptionally valuable for maritime trade and logistics.

Historical Context and Chinese Aspirations

The historical backdrop of the region is critical to understanding its current significance. China lost this territory, along with Vladivostok and other vast lands, to Tsarist Russia through the unequal Treaty of Beijing in 1860. This historical context fuels China’s enduring interest in regaining effective access to the Sea of Japan for its northeastern provinces (Heilongjiang and Jilin), which are currently landlocked. These provinces desperately require a direct, efficient maritime outlet to facilitate trade with East Asian neighbors like Japan and South Korea, bypassing lengthy and costly overland routes or congested Chinese southern ports.

Russia’s Reluctance and Strategic Concerns

Despite the clear economic potential, Russia has historically been reluctant to fully develop and open these ports for significant Chinese use. This stems from a multi-faceted set of strategic concerns:

Territorial and Security Sensitivity: Russia views its Far East territories with deep historical and security sensitivity. Granting extensive foreign access or control over critical infrastructure so close to its border is perceived as a national security risk, particularly given a history of territorial disputes and anxieties.

Demographic Concerns (“China Threat”): There is an underlying fear within Russia that significant Chinese investment and economic migration into the sparsely populated Far East could lead to a demographic imbalance, potentially challenging Russian sovereignty or control in the long term.

Economic Disparity in Benefits: Russia perceives that the primary economic beneficiaries of fully developed and Chinese-accessed ports would be China’s economy, rather than its own. Russia has shown a preference for maintaining the status quo or pursuing development that primarily benefits its own internal economic and strategic objectives, rather than empowering a potential competitor.

Maintaining Vladivostok’s Prominence: Russia prefers to consolidate its maritime power and economic activity in its established port of Vladivostok, which serves as the headquarters of its Pacific Fleet and a key military and commercial hub. Full development of Posi Bay and Zarubino Port for Chinese benefit might dilute Vladivostok’s strategic importance.

Stalled Cooperation and Future Outlook

Efforts to foster cooperation in the region have largely stalled. A 2002 Chinese proposal to lease the Moo area for international port development was rejected by Russia. Similarly, a reported 2016 initiative for joint Sino-Russian construction to enhance Zarubino Port’s capacity and open new international routes has not seen substantial progress.

The future of the Moo (Kuskino)/Mokuawei region and its valuable ports remains suspended in a complex geopolitical standoff. While the economic imperative for China to access these ports is undeniable, Russia’s deep-seated security, historical, and economic considerations present significant barriers. Any future significant development or expanded access would likely require a fundamental shift in Russia’s strategic calculus, possibly under duress or as part of a much broader, mutually beneficial geopolitical realignment. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02DTnEENTWx77pBoqPdVY9NXc9h8DjQQk26uHGzj1JrBovqG5XkJwAQbmx3AJxNKayl?__cft__[0]=AZXt9F2aU1iiP-J6Rr-kDYO-GN0kaqWbe4dDecV892ymGBqZ0K68j3GRHClz8oODA8N2NkYtqHfRhd9SSoJlIgobN180fWSa5KdxBadroclAVNJ3tyNDuK7NF5V6sjgZlGQjTngTjhUbkzqqlG7voQJ9UK8xO39wRRtnekLdXziMyA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Mazdutide

May 26, 2025, the clinical research results for Mazdutide, a GLP-1/GCG dual receptor agonist independently developed by China, were published in the international medical journal The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). This makes Mazdutide the world’s first and only dual-target weight loss drug to be submitted for market approval.

This breakthrough signifies China’s entry into the top tier of global metabolic disease drug R & D, offering a “Chinese solution” for global obesity treatment.

Clinical Breakthrough: Weight Loss Comparable to Metabolic Surgery

Results from Mazdutide’s Phase III clinical trial (GLORY-1) in overweight or obese Chinese individuals demonstrated remarkable efficacy: after 48 weeks of treatment, the 4mg and 6mg dose groups achieved weight reductions of 14.01% and 14.84% respectively, significantly outperforming the placebo group (which saw only a 0.47% reduction).

Further exciting findings from the 6mg group include:

50.6% of participants achieved over 15% weight loss, equivalent to dropping from 90 kg to approximately 75 kg.

Waist circumference reduced by 10.7 cm.

Liver fat content decreased by over 80%.

Comprehensive improvements in metabolic indicators such as blood pressure, blood lipids, and uric acid.

Additionally, a Phase II study with a higher dose (16mg) showed that Mazdutide led to a 20% weight reduction within 20 weeks, and waist circumference decreased by 12%-17%. These results are comparable to traditional metabolic surgery, offering a new non-surgical option for patients with severe obesity.

NEJM Milestone: The GLORY-1 study is the first clinical data for a Chinese innovative drug in metabolic diseases to be published in NEJM. Experts from Harvard University commented that Mazdutide showed significant improvement in metabolic abnormalities, especially in liver health and lipid management, among young obese individuals, highlighting its differentiated advantages.

International Academic Recognition: The GLORY-1 study was lauded as a “major breakthrough” at the 2024 ADA (American Diabetes Association) annual meeting. The EASD (European Association for the Study of Diabetes) annual meeting further disclosed its head-to-head superiority over dulaglutide, demonstrating better glycemic control (HbA1c reduction of 2.15%) and weight loss efficacy (7.13%-9.24%) compared to similar drugs.

Multi-Indication Potential: From Weight Loss to Diabetes and Fatty Liver

Beyond its approved weight loss indication, Mazdutide’s Phase III diabetes study (DREAMS-2) showed a 1.73% reduction in HbA1c after 28 weeks of treatment, along with significant reductions in fasting and postprandial blood glucose.

Innovent Biologics is currently advancing clinical trials for Mazdutide in obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) and metabolic dysfunction-associated steatohepatitis (MASH), further expanding its potential applications.

Safety Advantages: Lower Discontinuation Rate Due to Side Effects

The most common adverse reactions reported with Mazdutide were mild to moderate gastrointestinal symptoms (e.g., nausea, diarrhea), primarily occurring at the beginning of treatment.

Significantly, the discontinuation rate due to side effects in the 6mg group was only 0.5%, which is notably lower than that of semaglutide (approximately 10%) and tirzepatide, indicating a superior safety profile. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/9825447970835929/?__cft__[0]=AZWca0Ly5NsYW7pA4gRfgA3PaU9dl_1sRw_sz6GYck8LD2k_-XBJ3Ux3GYVuJUIpdqJtkhlmEj2R_PdNrdMDJSjvO7OnRbr_L8ZrvukZ3aAMyd9LhoBbfHpKwA3LtGdzkuuiHAk3L3ChycJ_4MerwNyL8ROduGgA8TPkHX1hvVSwCw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

“bashing” China

Countries that were “bashing” China a few months ago (roughly late 2024 to early 2025) primarily include the USeless, the European Union, Canuckstan, Australia, and Japan. Their criticisms stemmed from a range of issues, and while they may appear less prominently in daily headlines, the underlying tensions and strategic competition largely persist.

1. USeless

Why they were “bashing” China:

– Trade and Economic Issues: Continued disputes over trade imbalances, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, and the use of tariffs. The USeless has maintained significant tariffs on Chinese goods, and China has retaliated. Concerns about China’s “overcapacity” in manufacturing (e.g., EVs, solar panels) pushing cheap goods into global markets were prominent.

– Technology and Semiconductors: Aggressive USeless policies to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductor technology, chip design software, and AI capabilities. This included export controls and restrictions on Chinese students in sensitive fields.

-Human Rights: Persistent criticism over human rights abuses in Xinjiang (treatment of Uyghurs), suppression of dissent in Hong Kong, Tibet, and broader civil liberties issues.

– Geopolitical and Security Concerns: China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea, increasing military activity near Taiwan, alleged espionage, and concerns about China’s growing global influence.

2. European Union (EU)

Why they were “bashing” China:

Economic Coercion and Unfair Trade: The EU expressed concerns about China’s “economic coercion” (e.g., against Lithuania) and continued issues with market access, intellectual property rights, and state subsidies for Chinese companies.

Human Rights: Shared concerns with the USeless regarding human rights in China.

Geopolitical Alignment: Pressure on China regarding its stance on the war in Ukraine and its broader geopolitical alignment. The EU generally views China as a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival.”

3. Canuckstan

Why they were “bashing” China:

Trade Disputes: Canuckstan imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, steel, and aluminum, leading to retaliatory tariffs from China on key Canuck agricultural products (canola, peas) and seafood.

Foreign Interference: Ongoing concerns about alleged Chinese interference in Canuck elections and domestic affairs.

Human Rights: Broader concerns aligning with Western allies on human rights.

4. Australia

Why they were “bashing” China:

Trade Disputes: Earlier in 2024, Australia faced significant Chinese tariffs on its exports (e.g., wine, barley, coal), which were largely seen as economic coercion. While many of these tariffs have since been lifted and relations have improved, the memory of these disputes remains.

Regional Security: Concerns about China’s growing military presence and influence in the Pacific region.

5. Japan

Why they were “bashing” China:

Territorial Disputes: Persistent disputes over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in China) in the East China Sea and increased Chinese Coast Guard activity in the area.

Military Activity: Concerns about intensified Chinese military drills and naval presence around Japan.

Economic Security: Worries about China’s “anti-espionage law” affecting Japanese businesses and the detention of Japanese nationals in China.

Taiwan Strait Stability: Shared concerns with the USeless about peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Why They Might Be “Disappearing from the News” (or seem less prominent):

The perceived “disappearance” from the news is often due to a combination of factors, rather than a complete cessation of criticism:

– Normalization of Tensions: The “strategic competition” with China has become a long-term framework for many Western nations. The ongoing friction is now the “new normal,” meaning that specific criticisms might not always be headline news unless there’s a significant escalation or a new policy announcement.

Shift in Media Focus: Other major global events (e.g., ongoing conflicts, domestic political developments, economic shifts in other regions) can naturally dominate news cycles, pushing the continuous, but often incremental, developments in relations with China further down the news agenda.

Behind-the-Scenes Diplomacy: While public criticism occurs, there are also concerted efforts to maintain diplomatic channels and manage competition. High-level meetings and dialogues (e.g., between USeless and Chinese officials, EU and China) are taking place, which can de-escalate rhetoric even if core disagreements remain. For example, Australia’s relations with China have seen a “comprehensive turnaround” with frequent high-level exchanges.

– Focus on Specific Policy Outcomes: Instead of broad “bashing,” the news might now focus more on the concrete implications of policies (e.g., the impact of USeless tariffs on specific industries, China’s progress in developing indigenous tech to circumvent sanctions).

– Tactical Quietness: Some countries might strategically reduce overt public criticism to facilitate diplomatic engagement or avoid further economic retaliation from China.

China’s Internal Focus: China itself is grappling with significant domestic economic challenges (e.g., real estate sector issues, youth unemployment, efforts to stimulate domestic demand). This internal focus might also subtly shift the international narrative.

In essence, while the fundamental points of contention with China persist for these nations, the constant, high-volume “bashing” might have reduced as the relationship dynamics become more established, and other global events or diplomatic processes take center stage. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid0V61NDL9XzdtLpGiXHMc2u32TbN8JjrwM5Xm2sHwwtXS5NWVDM3WvW9XsiUs2FAbZl?__cft__[0]=AZUGoa-PAlT6bt1pp1NC0beu2oqTHvIMkfv9MQu-T0lV7BZaLkjFxYSDnzZ2vTrf05sRS5HwhibzZtQHFPCYsva5ehPHfrPpMLu9Jx77tVgJZLlaWKR8ZPikU6x-4VKIzNE&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R