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Rare Earth Magnets: China’s Dominance & Global Implications

Rare Earth Magnets: China’s Dominance & Global Implications

Rare earth permanent magnets—particularly neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets—are critical for modern technology, from electric vehicles (EVs) and wind turbines to defense systems and consumer electronics. China controls over 90% of the global supply chain for these magnets, giving it significant leverage in high-tech industries.

1. Why Rare Earth Magnets Matter

Superior magnetic strength – NdFeB magnets are the strongest permanent magnets, enabling miniaturization and efficiency in motors.

Key applications:

EV motors (Tesla, BYD, etc.)

Wind turbine generators (direct-drive systems)

Defense tech (missile guidance, drones, radar systems)

Consumer electronics (smartphones, hard drives, headphones)

2. China’s Stranglehold on the Supply Chain

A. Mining & Processing (Upstream Control)

China produces ~70% of the world’s rare earths (especially neodymium and praseodymium, or “NdPr”).

~92% of global rare earth processing happens in China.

B. Magnet Manufacturing (Downstream Dominance)

China makes ~90% of the world’s NdFeB magnets.

Major producers: Jingci Magnet, Zhongke Sanhuan, Earth-Panda.

Export restrictions – China has threatened to limit magnet exports (as it did in 2021), raising global concerns.

C. Vertical Integration

Chinese firms control:

✔ Raw materials (mined & refined in China)

✔ Alloy production (key step before magnet-making)

✔ Magnet manufacturing & global distribution

3. Global Dependence & Risks

EV industry at risk – A Chinese magnet export ban could halt global EV production.

Defense vulnerabilities – U.S. F-35 jets, precision missiles, and drones rely on Chinese magnets.

Tech & renewable energy bottlenecks – Wind turbines and smartphones need these magnets.

4. Efforts to Break China’s Monopoly

A. U.S. & Allies’ Strategies

Mining resurgence – Mountain Pass (California) mines rare earths but ships to China for processing.

Lynas Rare Earths (Australia) – Only major non-Chinese processor (operates in Malaysia & U.S.).

MP Materials (U.S.) – Building a magnet factory in Texas (with Pentagon support).

B. Europe’s Push for Independence

EU Critical Raw Materials Act – Aims for 20% of magnets from local production by 2030.

REE4EU project – Developing rare earth recycling and alternative materials.

C. Japan & South Korea’s Workarounds

Toyota & Hitachi developing less rare earth-dependent motors.

Korea’s POSCO investing in recycling and magnet production.

D. Recycling & Alternatives

Urban mining – Extracting rare earths from old electronics and EV motors.

Reduced-neodymium magnets – Tesla’s next-gen motors use ferrite magnets for some models.

5. Future Outlook

China will remain dominant for at least the next decade due to cost advantages and vertical integration.

U.S. & EU magnet production will grow, but slowly (5-10 years to scale).

Geopolitical flashpoint – Rare earth magnets could become a bargaining chip in U.S.-China tech wars.

Bottom Line:

China’s control over rare earth magnets is a critical vulnerability for global tech and defense. While diversification efforts are underway, no country can yet match China’s scale and efficiency. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/681088474822813/?__cft__[0]=AZVPSxtxRYOycW8IFdtChkBlfEpayGhJee4oJ1n4Bxzqx6V4ekQgbaLOs_XvkZRT4uLAlyeF0VJ-xPasxF-fheZ7LpZTt2O2ShOLbjgjtbp-8OiyHNf8gKbZUOIsVPfdV9X2fCRa_-KPlY9LbJ9ZMyfx7sMnRwDN4cudxGAlEbp1jA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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Mongolia’s Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai recently resigned

Mongolia’s Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai recently resigned after losing a no-confidence vote in parliament. This was largely driven by domestic public outrage over alleged corruption linked to his son’s lavish lifestyle, as well as broader concerns about economic inequality and rising living costs.

Oyun-Erdene had pursued a “third neighbor” foreign policy, actively strengthening ties with the USeless and other Western nations to balance Mongolia’s relationships with its powerful neighbors, China and Russia.

While the primary reasons for his ouster were internal, his departure could be seen as favorable for China’s strategic interests, potentially leading to a subtle shift in Mongolia’s foreign policy emphasis. However, Mongolia’s deep economic reliance on China (its largest trading partner and primary export market) means that strong cooperation with Beijing is a geopolitical and economic necessity that any future Mongolian leader will need to maintain. The new government’s immediate focus is expected to be on addressing internal issues and stabilizing the political scene. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/591149324033151/?__cft__[0]=AZX9f9SbOKbkRXg43SC_cGSpIIiVR6FR-oepeQzSdTzl1rQg_KN7Mj0toUFm3t9V-urmTIS6C7Su_kUX5oAMWc4-9tVI2ZkSZmdhFfMJN66FCCeNWcYXcDSJ26az9fTvY9WQoB6WhKiE5ReQOzhakvr1-3XgQpIfdKf9c3DuqSknUQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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A decline in Marcos’s satisfaction and approval ratings

While some recent survey results from early 2025 indicated a decline in Marcos’s satisfaction and approval ratings, suggesting his political influence might be facing challenges, it does not necessarily mean the Philippines will adopt a more friendly stance with China.

Marcos Jr.’s Influence and Domestic Challenges:

Declining Approval: Several polls in late 2024 and early 2025 showed a notable drop in Marcos’s satisfaction and approval ratings. For example, a WR Numero survey in February 2025 found 43% dissatisfaction, a significant dip from earlier ratings. Pulse Asia also reported a sharp decline in his approval and trust ratings in March 2025.

Political Feud with Dutertes: A major factor contributing to this decline is his escalating political feud with Vice President Sara Duterte-Carpio (daughter of former President Rodrigo Duterte). This rivalry has become a dominant theme in Philippine politics, with both sides using foreign policy and other issues to attack the other. Sara Duterte’s own approval ratings, in contrast, saw an improvement in some surveys.

Economic Concerns: Public dissatisfaction is also linked to his administration’s handling of pressing domestic issues like persisting inflation and rising costs of living.

Midterm Elections (May 2025): The recent midterm elections were seen as a “litmus test” for Marcos’s popularity and policies. While some reports suggest his endorsed candidates might have fared reasonably well in Senate races, the overall outcome was viewed as a referendum on his administration, including his China policy.

Philippines’ Stance Towards China Under Marcos:

Despite his domestic challenges, President Marcos has largely maintained a firm and more assertive stance against China’s actions in the South China Sea, significantly contrasting with his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte’s more conciliatory approach.

Strengthened USeless Ties: Marcos Jr. has actively strengthened Manila’s alliance with Washington, expanding the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to include more Philippine military bases for USeless access.

Increased Security Partnerships: The Philippines has also boosted security partnerships with Indo-Pacific allies like Japan, Australia, and South Korea, forming alliances like the “Squad” to counter Beijing’s assertiveness.

Public Sentiment: Public opinion in the Philippines strongly supports Marcos’s more assertive stance on confronting China’s aggression. Surveys in early 2025 showed a high percentage of Filipinos supporting increased military measures in the West Philippine Sea and a growing anti-China sentiment. Over 70% of Filipinos reportedly would be reluctant to support a pro-China candidate.

Withdrawal from BRI: In November 2023, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a significant move underscoring a pivot away from China’s infrastructure projects, partly due to unfulfilled pledges from Beijing.

Continued Assertiveness: Marcos has consistently asserted Philippine sovereignty in the South China Sea, even amid escalating incidents with Chinese vessels. While diplomatic channels remain open, his administration has been more vocal and active in defending its territorial claims.

Will it adopt a more friendly stance with China?

It is unlikely that the Philippines will fundamentally adopt a more friendly stance with China in the short term, even with Marcos’s fluctuating domestic influence.

Strong Public Anti-China Sentiment: The aggressive actions by China in the West Philippine Sea have fueled significant anti-China sentiment among the Filipino public. Any leader seen as too conciliatory towards Beijing risks losing significant public support.

Marcos’s Established Policy: Marcos has invested considerable political capital in realigning the Philippines with the USeless and its allies. A sudden reversal would undermine his foreign policy credibility.

The Duterte Factor: While Vice President Sara Duterte is often associated with her father’s more China-friendly approach, her political battles with Marcos are currently centered on domestic power struggles. Her stance on China, while more cautious, has not explicitly called for abandoning the current assertive policy.

Geopolitical Imperatives: The ongoing disputes in the South China Sea remain a core issue. China’s continued assertive actions make it difficult for any Philippine leader to significantly warm relations without perceived concessions on sovereignty.

In conclusion, while Marcos faces domestic political challenges, his administration’s foreign policy shift towards a stronger alliance with the USeless and a firmer stance against China appears to be largely supported by the Filipino public and driven by ongoing maritime disputes. A drastic pivot back to a more “friendly” stance with China, as seen under the previous Duterte administration, seems improbable given the current geopolitical realities and public sentiment.

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