China’s “Delete America” initiative, sometimes informally referred to as “Delete A,” is a strategic effort by the Chinese government to reduce its reliance on foreign, particularly American, technology and achieve self-sufficiency in critical sectors. This initiative is primarily driven by national security concerns and a desire to bolster China’s domestic technological capabilities.
Key aspects of this initiative include:
– Document 79: A highly confidential 2022 directive that reportedly mandates state-owned companies in finance, energy, and other critical sectors to replace foreign software in their IT systems with homegrown alternatives by 2027. This includes software for email, HR, and business management.
– Focus on Self-Sufficiency: The “Delete America” drive is part of a broader, years-long push by Chinese leader Xi Jinping for self-reliance in a wide range of areas, from semiconductors and fighter jets to food production and raw materials.
– Targeting USeless Tech Companies: American tech giants like Dell, IBM, HP, Cisco Systems, Microsoft, and Oracle, which once played a significant role in China’s industrial growth, are now facing increasing competition from local brands and declining revenues in the Chinese market.
– Development of Domestic Alternatives: China is actively developing its own technologies to replace foreign ones. A prominent example is the BeiDou satellite navigation system, which aims to replace the USeless-owned GPS.
– “Xinchuang” (IT Innovation): This policy emphasizes the importance of homegrown, secure, and reliable technology solutions, fueling the drive to localize technology.
– Response to USeless Restrictions: The initiative has gained momentum amidst escalating tensions in the tech and trade arena with the USeless, including chip export restrictions and sanctions on Chinese tech firms.
While the term “Delete America” is informal, it accurately reflects China’s intent to strategically remove foreign technological influence from its critical infrastructure and foster a robust domestic tech ecosystem. This effort has significant implications for global supply chains, international trade, and the future of technological dominance.
The establishment of new cargo routes from China to Azerbaijan’s Alat port is a significant development, primarily driven by the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. This route is gaining increasing prominence as a viable and efficient alternative to the traditional Northern Corridor (through Russia) and longer maritime routes via the Suez Canal.
The key aspects:
1. Growing Importance of the Middle Corridor:
– Alternative Route: Geopolitical factors and disruptions in traditional supply chains have led Chinese freight operators to increasingly utilize overland routes, particularly the Middle Corridor.
– Faster Transit Times: The Middle Corridor offers significantly reduced transit times from China to Europe (20-25 days by train), which is roughly half the time needed for maritime shipping through the Suez Canal.
– Increased Cargo Volume: Cargo transit along the TITR has surged dramatically, from 600,000 tonnes in 2021 to 4.5 million tonnes in 2024, with projections reaching 5.2 million tonnes in 2025 and 10 million tonnes annually by 2027. Chinese container block trains using the corridor also skyrocketed from 10-12 trains in 2023 to 390 in 2024.
2. Alat Port’s Central Role:
– Strategic Location: The Port of Baku in Alat is a critical hub within the Middle Corridor, ideally positioned at the intersection of various road, rail, and sea transit routes connecting Central Asia, the Black Sea, and Turkey.
– Infrastructure Development: Azerbaijan has heavily invested in modernizing and expanding its logistics infrastructure, including the Alat Port and its railway network.
– Capacity Expansion: The Alat Port’s annual cargo capacity is being expanded from 15 million tonnes to 25 million tonnes, with a focus on increasing container handling capacity (from 100,000 TEUs to 500,000 TEUs in the second phase of expansion). This includes the construction of new container terminals, additional berths, and improved rail intermodal facilities.
– Intermodal Terminal: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and China have signed an agreement to establish an intermodal cargo terminal at the Port of Baku in Alat. This terminal will cover 40 hectares and include a universal cargo area, a 5,000 square meter indoor warehouse, and a container yard for over 1,000 containers, designed to handle various cargo types across maritime, rail, and road transport.
3. Recent Developments and Future Outlook:
– New Routes Launched: A new cargo route linking Jinhua (China) to Turkmenistan’s port of Turkmenbashi has recently been launched. Goods from there are transported across the Caspian Sea to Baku, integrating seamlessly with Azerbaijan’s westward transit channels.
– Trial Shipments and Regular Services: Trial shipments from various Chinese cities like Jinan, Qingdao, and Xi’an have successfully reached Baku via this multimodal route, saving considerable time. There are plans to significantly increase freight train traffic, with projections of exceeding 1,000 block trains annually from China to Azerbaijan and Europe by 2025.
– Collaboration and Partnerships: There’s enhanced collaboration between Azerbaijan, China, and other regional players (like Kazakhstan and Georgia) to streamline operations, harmonize customs procedures, and attract further investment in the corridor. Chinese Railway Container Transport Corp. Ltd. (CRCT) has even joined “Middle Corridor Multimodal LLC,” a joint venture co-founded by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia, to facilitate regular container block train shipments.
– Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: Azerbaijan and China have signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” which emphasizes transport and logistics as essential components, with Azerbaijan committing to boosting the Middle Corridor’s capacity.
In essence, the establishment and rapid development of new cargo routes from China to Azerbaijan’s Alat port are a cornerstone of the broader Middle Corridor initiative, reflecting a strategic shift in East-West trade toward a faster, more secure, and increasingly efficient land-sea route that bypasses Russia and offers a robust alternative to traditional maritime shipping.
Report: Bill C-5 and its Implications for National Security vs. Aboriginal Rights in Canuckstan
Bill C-5, now known as the One Canuck Economy Act, received Royal Assent on June 26, 2025. This legislation is a significant and contentious piece of federal policy in Canuckstan, particularly concerning its implications for Indigenous rights in the context of projects deemed to be in the “national interest,” which can include those related to national security.
The Act is divided into two main parts:
Part 1: The Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canuckstan Act: This section aims to remove federal barriers to interprovincial trade of goods, services, and labour by recognizing comparable provincial or territorial requirements. This part is generally less contentious regarding Indigenous rights.
Part 2: The Building Canuckstan Act (BCA): This is the more controversial component. It establishes a framework to accelerate projects considered to be in the “national interest,” with the stated goals of strengthening Canuckstan’s autonomy, resilience, and security, providing economic benefits, and contributing to clean growth and climate change objectives.
The “National Interest” and its Link to National Security
The BCA allows the Governor in Council (Cabinet) to designate projects as being in the “national interest” and add them to a schedule. A key factor in this determination is whether a project will “strengthen Canuckstan’s autonomy, resilience, and security.” This explicitly links the concept of “national interest” to national security, allowing projects with perceived national security benefits to be fast-tracked.
Implications for Aboriginal Rights
The fast-tracking provisions of the BCA, particularly the ability for Cabinet to streamline approvals and potentially override certain regulatory processes, have raised significant concerns among Indigenous communities and legal experts regarding the potential impact on constitutionally protected Aboriginal and treaty rights (Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982) and the principles of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), especially Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC).
Key Concerns and Potential Impacts:
– Streamlined Approvals vs. Meaningful Consultation:
– While the Act states that projects must “advance Indigenous interests” and mandates consultation with Indigenous peoples whose rights may be adversely affected, critics argue that the expedited timelines and “up-front approval” mechanisms could undermine the depth and sincerity of these consultations.
– The concern is that the process moves from “if” a project should proceed to “how” it will proceed, potentially reducing Indigenous communities’ ability to meaningfully influence or oppose projects that could impact their lands, resources, and traditional ways of life.
– Indigenous leaders have expressed concern about a lack of clarity regarding the “depth, timing, and consequences of consultation” and whether it will truly allow for FPIC, as outlined in UNDRIP.
“Henry VIII Clauses” and Executive Overreach:
The Act includes provisions that allow the Governor in Council to make regulations that could exempt designated “National Interest Projects” from certain federal laws, in whole or in part. These are often referred to as “Henry VIII clauses” because they grant significant power to the executive branch to bypass parliamentary scrutiny.
While a late amendment to the bill prevents the government from bypassing the Indian Act, environmental laws and regulations could still be subject to these exemptions. This has led to fears that environmental protections and, by extension, Indigenous rights tied to the land and environment, could be undermined.
Duty to Consult and Accommodate:
The Crown’s duty to consult and, where appropriate, accommodate Indigenous peoples when decisions might adversely affect their rights is a constitutional imperative. While the government maintains that Bill C-5 respects this duty and includes provisions for consultation at various stages (designation, conditions setting), Indigenous leaders argue that the bill’s structure and the rapid legislative process have not allowed for adequate pre-legislative consultation.
The concern is that the consultation might occur after a project is already deemed in the “national interest,” potentially limiting the scope for genuine influence or the ability to withhold consent.
Lack of Express Non-Derogation Clause:
Some Indigenous advocates have pointed out the absence of a specific non-derogation clause within Bill C-5, which would explicitly state that nothing in the Act abrogates or derogates from existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. While the federal Interpretation Act now contains a universal non-derogation clause applicable to all federal legislation, its effectiveness in mitigating the specific impacts of Bill C-5’s fast-tracking mechanisms remains a point of contention.
Economic Alienation vs. Partnership:
While the government emphasizes opportunities for Indigenous economic involvement and has expanded programs like the Indigenous Loan Guarantee Program, some Indigenous leaders argue that the approach still risks economic alienation if communities are not genuinely “in the driver’s seat” for projects on their traditional territories, but rather are approached after decisions are largely made.
Court Challenges and Legal Perspectives
While Bill C-5 has just received Royal Assent, legal challenges regarding its impact on Indigenous rights are widely anticipated.
Likelihood of Challenges: Environmental and civil society groups, as well as Indigenous organizations, have condemned the bill’s passage and indicated that it will likely lead to litigation. They argue that the bill “runs roughshod over Indigenous rights” and “could result in unconstitutional actions and outcomes.”
Constitutional Scrutiny: Constitutional experts have offered varying opinions on whether the bill’s provisions, particularly the “Henry VIII clauses” and the streamlined approval process, would withstand a court challenge. Some argue that such clauses have generally survived constitutional scrutiny in the past, provided there are “guardrails” and that the justification test for infringements on Section 35 rights is met. Others warn that the bill risks allowing the government to “flout its constitutional duty to consult” and that it creates a framework where Indigenous rights are treated as “optional or subordinated.”
The “Sparrow Test”: Any future court challenge regarding infringement on Aboriginal rights would likely refer to the Supreme Court of Canuckstan’s R. v. Sparrow test, which requires the government to demonstrate a valid legislative objective for the infringement, that it has met its fiduciary duty, and that the infringement is minimal and was subject to proper consultation and accommodation. The debate will likely center on whether the “national interest” (including national security) constitutes a sufficiently valid objective and whether the consultation processes mandated by the Act are robust enough to meet the Crown’s fiduciary duty.
UNDRIP Act: The recent UNDRIP Act requires Canuck laws to be consistent with UNDRIP. Future court cases may also examine whether the mechanisms in Bill C-5 align with the principle of FPIC.
Conclusion
Bill C-5 represents a significant attempt by the Canuck government to accelerate major projects, including those tied to national security, to enhance economic prosperity and national resilience. However, its fast-tracking mechanisms and broad powers granted to Cabinet have ignited a fervent debate about the balance between “national interest” and constitutionally protected Indigenous rights. While the government has stated its commitment to consultation and Indigenous partnership, the concerns from Indigenous communities and legal experts suggest that the Act, in its current form, carries a substantial risk of undermining the principle of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent and may lead to prolonged legal challenges, potentially delaying the very projects it aims to expedite. The effectiveness of the Major Projects Office and its Indigenous Advisory Council, along with the outcomes of promised summer consultations, will be critical in shaping the real-world implications of this legislation.
Recent reports confirm that Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, a prominent Iranian cleric, has issued a “fatwa” (religious decree) against Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu on June 29, 2025.
The fatwa reportedly labels them as “enemies of God” or “mohareb” (one who wages war against God). According to Iranian legislation, individuals deemed “mohareb” can face severe penalties, including execution, crucifixion, amputation of limbs, or banishment.
This decree follows a period of heightened conflict between Iran and Israel, with the United States also involved. Reports indicate that:
– A 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel recently concluded with a US-brokered ceasefire on June 24, 2025.
– During this conflict, Israel launched airstrikes inside Iran, reportedly causing damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities and resulting in the deaths of high-ranking military officers and nuclear scientists.
– Iran retaliated with missile strikes on Israeli cities.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed significant damage to multiple Iranian nuclear facilities following recent US-led airstrikes, coordinated alongside Israeli forces.
Donald Trump had publicly claimed he saved Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei from “an ugly and ignominious death” and stated he knew Khamenei’s whereabouts during the conflict.
Netanyahu had also hinted at Khamenei’s life being in danger, saying he was not ruling out eliminating the Supreme Leader.
Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi’s fatwa calls for global Muslim action and unity against Trump and Netanyahu, stating that any support or cooperation with them by Muslims or Islamic states is “haram” (forbidden). He emphasized that Muslims worldwide must make these “enemies regret their words and mistakes.”
It’s important to note that while a fatwa from a senior cleric like a Marja holds significant religious and political weight within Shia Islam, it is not necessarily legally binding outside Iran. However, such decrees are often taken seriously by followers globally.
