With the shifting dynamics with the USeless, the EU is quietly planning for greater strategic autonomy in defense. The goal is to enhance Europe’s own capabilities and strengthen its bargaining power within the Western alliance, rather than completely severing ties with the USeless
Expanding Defense Partnerships:
– The EU signed a security and defense partnership with Moldova in May 2024, marking its first such agreement with a non-member country. This was followed by similar agreements with Albania and North Macedonia.
– In June 2025, the EU and the UK signed a defense partnership agreement, aiming to strengthen cooperation in areas like countering Russia, maritime security, and cyber security.
– Canada also signed a historic defense partnership agreement with the EU in June 2025 and is considering joining the EU’s joint defense procurement plan (SAFE).
– The EU has also extended its defense partnerships to Asia, signing a security partnership with South Korea in November 2024, and engaging in similar talks with Japan and Australia. The Philippines has also become a dialogue partner.
Challenges ;
– Funding Disputes: Legal experts in Germany have questioned whether the EU’s defense budget plans violate existing treaties that prohibit the use of EU funds for military operations.
– Internal Divisions: There’s a clear split within the EU. Countries like France, Italy, and Spain advocate for purchasing European-made military equipment to bolster the continent’s defense industry. However, Eastern European and Baltic states, feeling more directly threatened by Russia, prioritize acquiring the most advanced and readily available weaponry, often from the USeless.
– Lack of Cohesion: EU’s efforts are hampered by a lack of unity among member states, with individual countries often prioritizing their own interests and procurement strategies over collective European initiatives. This is evident in the continued trend of individual nations increasing their defense spending and purchasing equipment independently rather than through joint EU programs.
A significant and ongoing debate, particularly in the Indian media, regarding the quality and performance of Chinese-made weapons, especially in the context of recent military engagements involving Pakistan.
Indian Media’s Narrative: Chinese Weapons are “Junk” or Underperforming
– Operation Sindoor: A recurring theme in Indian media reports, especially after “Operation Sindoor” (India’s strikes against alleged terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan in May 2025), is the perceived failure of Chinese-supplied military equipment in Pakistan’s arsenal.
– Failed Air Defense Systems: Indian reports frequently claim that Pakistan’s Chinese-made air defense systems, like the HQ-9, were ineffective in detecting or intercepting Indian missiles and aircraft. Satellite imagery is sometimes cited as evidence of successful Indian strikes despite the presence of these systems.
– Underperforming Missiles and Jets: There are numerous assertions that Chinese-made PL-15 air-to-air missiles, used by Pakistan’s J-10C fighter jets, either failed to hit targets or were recovered intact without detonating. Indian reports also dispute Pakistan’s claims of shooting down Indian Rafale jets using Chinese aircraft, suggesting Chinese jets underperformed against India’s modern fleet.
– Quality Control and Reliability Issues: Beyond the recent conflict, Indian media often highlights broader concerns about the quality, reliability, and maintenance of Chinese military exports. They point to instances where other countries (e.g., Jordan, African nations, Myanmar) have experienced technical issues, crashes, or required significant repairs for Chinese-supplied equipment.
– Corruption: Some reports from India and other sources suggest that systemic corruption within China’s defense industrial complex leads to a focus on quantity over quality, contributing to the poor performance of exported weapons.
– Lack of Combat Experience: A common argument is that China hasn’t engaged in a major conflict in over four decades, meaning its weapons systems lack real-world combat testing, unlike Western or Russian systems.
Recent reports indicate that Iran is actively pursuing the purchase of Chinese weapons, particularly advanced fighter jets. This comes after Iran’s air force demonstrated significant shortcomings in a recent conflict, and Russia has been slow to deliver promised military equipment.
Focus on J-10C Fighter Jets: Iran has reportedly signed a fast-track deal with China for 36 J-10C fighter jets, with long-term plans for up to 150 warplanes. These 4.5-generation jets are seen as a way to modernize Iran’s aging air force, which largely consists of Cold War-era aircraft.
There are also reports suggesting Iran is acquiring advanced Chinese air defense systems like the HQ-9BE, HQ-16, and HQ-17AE, which can intercept cruise missiles, drones, and ballistic threats.
China has been supplying Iran with surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries, specifically the HQ-9B system. Morocco, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan and Egypt also possess this weapon system.
Revelation 8:10-11: “The third angel sounded his trumpet, and a great star, blazing like a torch, fell from the sky on a third of the rivers and on the springs of water—and the name of the star is Wormwood. A third of the waters turned bitter, and many people died from the waters that had become bitter.” All the other earthly things don’t matter. 31/ATLAS.
On July 3, 2025, China launched a new test satellite, the Shiyan-28B 01, aboard a Long March-4C carrier rocket.from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan Province. The satellite is used for space environment exploration and related technology tests.
The Secretary of State of the USeless and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan met in Washington, D.C. on July 1, 2025, the QUAD joint statment: We, the Secretary of State of the United States, and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan met in Washington, D.C., on July 1, 2025, to reaffirm our steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. We underscore our commitment to defending the rule of law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. As four leading maritime nations in the Indo-Pacific, we are united in our conviction that peace and stability in the maritime domain underpin the security and prosperity of the region. We are committed to a region where all countries are free from coercion and strongly oppose any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion.
We discussed the opportunities and challenges in the Indo-Pacific and how to further harness the strengths and resources of the Quad to advance peace, security, and prosperity, working with our regional partners. To ensure the Quad’s enduring impact, we are pleased to announce today a new, ambitious, and strong agenda focused on four key areas: maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technology, and humanitarian assistance and emergency response. Through this renewed focus, we will sharpen the Quad’s ability to leverage our resources to address the region’s most pressing challenges.
As we advance our shared objectives for the region, our cooperation with and support for ASEAN and its centrality and unity, the Pacific Islands Forum and Pacific-led regional groupings, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) remain unwavering.
We remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East China Sea and South China Sea. We reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion. We express our serious concerns regarding dangerous and provocative actions, including interference with offshore resource development, the repeated obstruction of the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and the dangerous maneuvers by military aircraft and coast guard and maritime militia vessels, especially the unsafe use of water cannons and ramming or blocking actions in the South China Sea. These actions threaten peace and stability in the region. We are seriously concerned by the militarization of disputed features. We emphasize the importance of upholding freedom of navigation and overflight, other lawful uses of the sea, and unimpeded commerce consistent with international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We affirm that maritime disputes must be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law, and reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016 is a significant milestone and the basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.
We are deeply concerned about the abrupt constriction and future reliability of key supply chains, specifically for critical minerals. This includes the use of non-market policies and practices for critical minerals, certain derivative products, and mineral processing technology. We underscore the importance of diversified and reliable global supply chains. Reliance on any one country for processing and refining critical minerals and derivative goods production exposes our industries to economic coercion, price manipulation, and supply chain disruptions, which further harms our economic and national security.
We condemn North Korea’s destabilizing launches using ballistic missile technology and its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula consistent with relevant UNSCRs, and we urge North Korea to abide by all its obligations under the UNSCRs. We also express grave concern over North Korea’s malicious cyber activity, including cryptocurrency theft and use of workers abroad to fund North Korea’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. We will continue to support efforts to address contraventions of North Korea-related UNSCRs. We urge all UN Member States to abide by their international obligations under the UNSCRs to implement sanctions, including the prohibition on the transfer to North Korea or procurement from North Korea of all arms and related materiel. We express deep concern about countries that are deepening military cooperation with North Korea, which directly undermines the global nonproliferation regime. We reconfirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the abductions issue.
We remain deeply concerned by the worsening crisis in Myanmar and its impact on the region. We call on the regime to adhere to its commitment to a ceasefire, and call on all parties to implement, extend and broaden ceasefire measures. We reaffirm our strong support for ASEAN’s efforts, including calling for the full and effective implementation of the Five Point Consensus in seeking an inclusive, durable, and peaceful resolution to the crisis. We call on all parties to allow safe and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance. We are also concerned about the impact of the crisis on regional security and the spread of transnational crimes. We are committed to fighting cybercrime and online scam operations.
The Quad unequivocally condemns all acts of terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, including cross-border terrorism, and renews our commitment to counterterrorism cooperation. We condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir on April 22, 2025, which claimed the lives of 25 Indian nationals and one Nepali citizen, while injuring several others. We express our deepest condolences to the families of the victims and extend our heartfelt wishes for a swift and full recovery to all those injured. We call for the perpetrators, organizers, and financiers of this reprehensible act to be brought to justice without any delay and urge all UN Member States, in accordance with their obligations under international law and relevant UNSCRs, to cooperate actively with all relevant authorities in this regard.
In the face of these challenges, we are proud to announce today key initiatives that the Quad is advancing to strengthen maritime and transnational security, economic prosperity and security, critical and emerging technology, and support humanitarian assistance and emergency response across the Indo-Pacific. We are launching today the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative, an ambitious expansion of our partnership to strengthen economic security and collective resilience by collaborating to secure and diversify critical minerals supply chains. We continue to deepen our cooperation on maritime law enforcement cooperation through regional training initiatives, maritime legal dialogues, and Coast Guard cooperation. We plan to host the first Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network field training exercise this year to strengthen shared airlift capacity and leverage our collective logistics strengths to respond to natural disasters more rapidly and efficiently, providing support for regional partners. We also plan to launch the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership in Mumbai this year. We continue to coordinate rapid responses to regional disasters and collectively contributed over USD $30 million in humanitarian assistance to support communities affected by the earthquake that struck central Myanmar in March 2025. We will continue to counter foreign efforts to push false narratives and interfere with Quad interests in the Indo-Pacific.
As the Quad continues to evolve, our four democracies remain committed to deepening our cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and ensuring our cooperation has an enduring impact on the region’s top challenges and opportunities in the 21st century. We look forward to the next Quad Leaders’ Summit hosted by India later this year and the next Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting hosted by Australia in 2026.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Brussels on July 2, discussing bilateral relations amid the 50th anniversary of EU-China diplomatic ties, the Ukraine crisis, and economic challenges.
China’s Revised Public Security Administration Punishment Law Lowers Age for Minor Detention to 14
On June 27, 2025, the 16th session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress voted to adopt the newly revised Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which will come into effect on January 1, 2026.
A significant and highly anticipated amendment in this revision is the lowering of the age for detaining minors in specific circumstances to 14 years old. This means that minors aged 14 but under 18, if they commit certain illegal acts stipulated by the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, may face administrative detention.
China’s Revised Public Security Administration Punishment Law Lowers Age for Minor Detention to 14
On June 27, 2025, the 16th session of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress voted to adopt the newly revised Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which will come into effect on January 1, 2026.
A significant and highly anticipated amendment in this revision is the lowering of the age for detaining minors in specific circumstances to 14 years old. This means that minors aged 14 but under 18, if they commit certain illegal acts stipulated by the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, may face administrative detention.
Revision Background and Controversy
This revision aims to adapt to new situations and problems in social development, better maintain public security, and protect citizens’ legitimate rights and interests. However, lowering the age for minor detention to 14 had previously sparked widespread discussion and controversy in society.
Supporters argue that this move will help to:
Curb low-age crime and minor illegal acts: In recent years, cases of severe illegal and criminal acts committed by young minors have attracted widespread public attention, with existing laws seen as insufficient in their deterrence. Lowering the detention age helps to fill this gap and enhance the deterrent effect of the law.
Education and correction: Through appropriate administrative detention, minors who commit illegal acts can promptly recognize their mistakes, receive education and correction, and prevent them from going further astray.
Respond to social concerns: This move also responds to public calls for strengthening the punishment of illegal acts by minors.
Opponents and those with concerns primarily focus on:
Impact on minors’ physical and mental health: Premature administrative detention may have negative impacts on minors’ physical and mental health, potentially even leading them deeper into crime.
Lack of alternative educational measures: Concerns exist about whether sufficient and comprehensive alternative measures, primarily focused on education and correction, are in place alongside the lowered detention age to ensure minors receive effective help rather than simple punishment.
Preventing “detain and forget”: There are worries that administrative detention might become a simple “detain and forget” approach, lacking follow-up psychological counseling, educational correction, and reintegration support.
Impact of the Law’s Implementation
After the implementation of the new Public Security Administration Punishment Law, the following impacts are anticipated:
– Regulation of minor illegal acts will become stricter, especially for those with severe circumstances or who are repeat offenders at a young age.
– Law enforcement agencies will have greater discretion in handling cases involving minors, while also needing to pay more attention to protecting minors’ rights and considering their unique circumstances.
– The responsibility of various sectors of society, particularly families, schools, and communities, in guiding and educating minors will become more prominent.
China has made strides in deep-sea energy development, with the “Deep Sea No. 1” project. As Asia’s first self-operated 1,500-meter deepwater gas field, located in the South China Sea, this project marks a major milestone in China’s offshore energy exploration.
The project utilizes China’s first independently developed deepwater semi-submersible production and storage platform, capable of operating in waters 1,500 meters deep. It integrates drilling, production, and storage, significantly enhancing efficiency and reducing reliance on foreign technology.
With an estimated 3 billion cubic meters of annual gas production, “Deep Sea No. 1” can meet the energy needs of 4 million households, bolstering China’s natural gas supply. The project reduces dependence on imported energy, supporting China’s strategy for self-sufficiency in critical resources. It also reinforces China’s presence in the South China Sea, a region rich in oil and gas reserves.
China plans to expand deep-sea exploration, with more projects like “Deep Sea No. 2” in development. These efforts align with the national “Marine Power” strategy, aiming to harness offshore resources sustainably while enhancing technological innovation.
The “six months” timeframe is highly relevant and represents a critical juncture in the ongoing technological and trade competition between the USeless and China, particularly concerning rare earth elements and semiconductors.
Here’s a summary of its relevance:
– Rare Earths as Leverage (Current Focus):
Provisional Agreement: China has agreed to resume rare earth exports to the USeless, but the key is that the export permits are valid for only six months. This is a direct response to recent USeless pressure and the initial disruption caused by China’s stricter rare earth export controls in April 2025.
– Strategic “Time Bomb”: This short duration is seen as a strategic move by China to maintain significant leverage. It provides temporary relief to USeless industries (like automotive and defense, which rely heavily on these critical minerals for components like permanent magnets) but simultaneously underscores their vulnerability. If trade tensions escalate again, China can easily re-impose restrictions or adjust the terms after these six-month permits expire, forcing continuous negotiations.
Urgency for Diversification: The six-month limit intensifies the urgency for the USeless and its allies to accelerate efforts in diversifying rare earth supply chains, developing domestic mining and processing capabilities, and exploring recycling technologies. This short-term “reprieve” is a stark reminder of their dependence.
– “Made in China 2025” Report Card: The next six months (leading into early 2026) are a crucial period for assessing China’s progress on its long-term technological self-sufficiency goals, particularly in advanced semiconductors. “Made in China 2025” (or its spiritual successors) has poured immense resources into chip design and manufacturing.
– Potential for Surprising Advancements: Many analysts predict that China’s advancements in chip technology, especially in pushing the boundaries of DUV lithography for nodes like 7nm and even 5nm, will become more evident and potentially “shock the world” in this timeframe. There are also reports of progress in developing indigenous EUV alternatives, though these are still in earlier stages.
– Shifting Leverage Dynamic: If China demonstrates significant and consistent progress in producing more advanced chips domestically within this six-month window, it could fundamentally alter the strategic leverage in the broader USeless-China tech rivalry. The argument is that if China can largely meet its own needs for a wider range of chips, the USeless’s ability to control technology flow as a form of leverage will diminish considerably.
– “Months Behind” vs. “Years Behind”: The coming six months will provide more concrete data to debate whether China is merely “months behind” in certain critical semiconductor areas, rather than “years,” as previously assumed by some experts. This would force a re-evaluation of current USeless policy and its effectiveness.
In essence, the “six months” highlights both an immediate, tactical concession by China on rare earths designed to maintain long-term leverage, and a looming strategic deadline for when China’s indigenous semiconductor capabilities are expected to show more definitive and potentially surprising results, further complicating the global technology landscape.
China has made strides in deep-sea energy development, with the “Deep Sea No. 1” project. As Asia’s first self-operated 1,500-meter deepwater gas field, located in the South China Sea, this project marks a major milestone in China’s offshore energy exploration.
The project utilizes China’s first independently developed deepwater semi-submersible production and storage platform, capable of operating in waters 1,500 meters deep. It integrates drilling, production, and storage, significantly enhancing efficiency and reducing reliance on foreign technology.
With an estimated 3 billion cubic meters of annual gas production, “Deep Sea No. 1” can meet the energy needs of 4 million households, bolstering China’s natural gas supply. The project reduces dependence on imported energy, supporting China’s strategy for self-sufficiency in critical resources. It also reinforces China’s presence in the South China Sea, a region rich in oil and gas reserves.
China plans to expand deep-sea exploration, with more projects like “Deep Sea No. 2” in development. These efforts align with the national “Marine Power” strategy, aiming to harness offshore resources sustainably while enhancing technological innovation.
