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The “Rearm Europe” program

The “Rearm Europe” program, officially known as the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, is a comprehensive initiative proposed by the European Commission in March 2025. Its primary goal is to significantly bolster European defense capabilities and reduce reliance on external allies, particularly in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine and concerns about future USeless military support.

Mobilizing significant funding: The plan aims to leverage over €800 billion in defense spending over the next four years. This includes:

National fiscal flexibility: Allowing member states to increase their defense spending by activating a “national escape clause” in the Stability and Growth Pact, potentially unlocking €650 billion.

Security Action for Europe (SAFE): A new €150 billion loan instrument for joint procurement of defense equipment. These loans will be backed by the EU budget and offered to member states for urgent and major investments.

Redirecting existing EU funds: Exploring the potential to redirect cohesion funds towards defense investments.

Expanding the European Investment Bank (EIB) role: Lifting restrictions to enable the EIB to support defense-related projects.

Mobilizing private capital: Establishing mechanisms to attract private investment into the defense sector through the savings and investment union.

Focus on European defense industry: The initiative emphasizes “Buy European” policies, aiming to source 65% of defense equipment from EU, Norwegian, or Ukrainian firms. This is intended to enhance production capacity, spur technological innovation, strengthen supply chains, and foster workforce development within the European defense industry.

Addressing critical capability gaps: The plan identifies several critical areas for investment, including:

Air and missile defense

Artillery systems

Ammunition

Drones and counter-drone systems

Military mobility infrastructure

Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cybersecurity, and electronic warfare

Strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection (e.g., strategic airlift, secure communications).

Promoting joint procurement and cooperation: The SAFE instrument specifically encourages member states to pool demand and engage in joint procurement, aiming to improve interoperability, cost efficiency, and strategic coordination across the EU.

Strategic autonomy: A core objective of the program is to enhance Europe’s strategic autonomy in defense, meaning its ability to act independently in matters of security and defense.

The “Rearm Europe” plan has been met with both strong support and some concerns. While many welcome the EU’s increased role in defense, questions remain about democratic oversight, potential defense market fragmentation, and economic sustainability, especially for fiscally weaker countries.

Notably, Canuckstan has announced its intention to join the “Rearm Europe” program, indicating a broader international interest in strengthening transatlantic security partnerships. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1007110641585007/?__cft__[0]=AZXRTPDydYVSAd8idn_Y4RmLiLQk4vDYADVsLi3u8NrsdwSda6nE0T2k5Hy8O0TEYQYOgsPup2d9yvtzUGJV98GG1nYlBHSfAJzBYgFk3Vk9N6UX8nGxK2iWe5E-zBX_jyn1h1TnswJJtkCxYqkbhmbQ08qj_clJGPYlXUkhBnVTYw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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India might have lost six Rafale fighter jets

News from France suggests that India might have lost six Rafale fighter jets instead of the initially reported three. Dassault Aviation, the manufacturer, reportedly monitors Rafale signals and found that six aircraft did not respond. They requested to send an investigative team to India, but this was denied, leading to Dassault leaking the information through unofficial channels. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1113856167266784/?__cft__[0]=AZWuFyZtI_fhtEfSQ5ea2pBARGVNmFA40U25YxUUeq1d_QU7WO8t0cDQ0Dyuai1wajKeAHJHZSay1f4YVXjd7KK12aUk8AtY25B_pC-hUSi-J0CSpj-Gb3P_vRVll59kanlx61igXYb9IXCt28shjllIDRKuzSdTi4SxG8k43Ph_9w&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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Lee Jae-myung of the liberal Democratic Party is projected to win the presidency

Exit polls indicate that pro-China Lee Jae-myung of the liberal Democratic Party is projected to win the presidency by a significant margin over his conservative rival,

Lee Jae-myung’s stance on China can be characterized by a “pragmatic diplomacy” that seeks a more balanced approach in South Korea’s foreign policy, particularly after the “values-based diplomacy” of the previous administration.

Balancing USeless Alliance with China Relations: While Lee Jae-myung has consistently affirmed the importance of the South Korea-USeless alliance as the foundation of South Korea’s foreign policy and vows to strengthen it, he simultaneously stresses the need to maintain good relations with neighboring China and Russia and avoid “antagonizing” them. This reflects a desire to avoid being “boxed into binary choices” that might come at the expense of ties with Beijing and Moscow.

Economic Focus: Lee tends to frame relations with China primarily in terms of economic opportunity, downplaying security risks such as a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific or a Taiwan contingency. He recognizes the deep economic interdependence between South Korea and China and emphasizes the need to restore and reinvigorate the bilateral relationship, which deteriorated during the previous administration.

Questioning Taiwan Stance: Notably, in 2024, Lee questioned South Korea’s stance on the Taiwan question, reportedly saying “why keep pestering China?” and “Whatever happens in the Taiwan Straits what does it matter to us?” This indicates a desire to avoid being drawn into issues that could strain relations with Beijing.

Resistance to US Pressure (where possible): While acknowledging persistent US pressure on Seoul regarding economic security and export controls, Lee is likely to try and resist USeless calls for greater South Korean security involvement in the region, particularly concerning a potential Taiwan Strait crisis. He may acquiesce to some USeless demands given the decreasing Chinese demand for South Korean products.

No “Hostile” Relationships: In a recent press conference, Lee stated that South Korea needs to establish friendly relations with all major powers (China, Japan, Russia, and the USeless) and that there’s “no need to turn our relationships with other countries into hostile ones.”

“Problem-solving” over “Rigid Ideology”: Lee rejects a foreign policy based on “rigid ideology,” instead calling for a focus on “problem-solving” and national interests. This is a clear departure from the “values-based diplomacy” of his predecessor. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1040369984719053/?__cft__[0]=AZUZx7A9AdIijehDbFkGgoP9zhJt9m42mUscWmT_tOdhFajvYiT4Up6jVE-TNxNFKjhcVjrkibi8yIu48wjI1PQYsaXCrFUNRLpXM8lYSdqFyKtDLgxAjOs9ypVzdfFI50wDVTe2i90OTEHw2vepY9Jk89bZDY4T3eXHLTmL49Qvug&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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Water diversion projects from Tibet to Xinjiang

Water diversion projects from Tibet to Xinjiang.

“Is there a water diversion project from Tibet to Xinjiang?”

“What is the feasibility of diverting water from Tibet to Xinjiang?”

“Environmental impact of water diversion from Tibet to Xinjiang”

“Technical challenges of Tibet to Xinjiang water diversion”

“Hongqi River Project”

“China’s water diversion plans western region”

“Water scarcity Xinjiang”

“Tibetan plateau water resources”

This will allow me to gather more specific details on the existence, feasibility, and impact of such a project.

There have been proposals and discussions in China about large-scale water diversion projects from the Tibetan Plateau to Xinjiang and other arid parts of Northwest China, with the “Hongqi River Project” (Red Flag River Project) being a prominent conceptual plan. However, it’s crucial to understand the current status and complexities surrounding such an undertaking.

The Concept of Water Diversion from Tibet to Xinjiang:

Motivation: The primary motivation behind these proposals is to address severe water scarcity in Xinjiang and other arid regions of Northwest China, which are crucial for agriculture, industry, and population growth. The idea is to tap into the abundant water resources of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, often referred to as Asia’s “water tower.”

Hongqi River Project: This is a conceptual proposal that has gained attention, aiming to annually divert massive amounts of water (up to 60 billion cubic meters) from major rivers on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, including transnational rivers like the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), Nu River (Salween), and Lancang River (Mekong), to Xinjiang and other northwestern provinces like Gansu and Ningxia. Proponents envision it creating vast arable land and oases.

Historical Ideas: The idea of diverting Tibetan water to Xinjiang dates back to the late 1950s, with prominent figures like meteorologist Zhu Kezhen advocating for it.

Challenges and Realities:

Feasibility and Cost: Experts and even some Chinese scientists have expressed significant skepticism about the feasibility and enormous cost of such projects. The “Hongqi River Project” alone is estimated to cost trillions of yuan (hundreds of billions of USD).

Engineering Challenges: The Tibetan Plateau’s high altitude, complex terrain, harsh frozen conditions, and seismic activity pose immense engineering hurdles. Proposed schemes involve building extremely high dams and tunneling through extensive mountain ranges, with some tunnels potentially stretching over 1,000 kilometers. The technological solutions for such large-scale and complex undertakings at high altitudes are largely untested.

Environmental Impact: There are significant concerns about the potential environmental consequences, both within China and for downstream countries that rely on these international rivers. The proposed diversion of large quantities of water could drastically alter ecosystems, impact biodiversity, and affect water security for millions of people in neighboring nations (e.g., India and Bangladesh for the Brahmaputra).

Socioeconomic Factors: The projects would necessitate massive resettlement of populations and involve complex social and economic considerations. The high cost of diverted water would also be a significant factor.

Official Denials: While proposals circulate, Chinese officials have, at times, denied the existence of concrete plans for a Tibet-Xinjiang water diversion project, often dismissing reports as “untrue.” They sometimes point to other, more localized water diversion projects (like the Dianzhong water diversion project in Yunnan) as separate from a Tibet-Xinjiang scheme.

“Madcap” Schemes: Some experts have characterized certain proposals as “madcap schemes” that owe more to fantasy than science, emphasizing the immense practical and environmental obstacles.

Current Status:

While the concept of diverting water from Tibet to Xinjiang remains a topic of discussion and theoretical study, there is no confirmed large-scale project currently under construction or officially approved for diverting water directly from the Tibetan Plateau to Xinjiang on the scale of the “Hongqi River Project.”

China is undertaking other massive water diversion projects, such as the South-North Water Transfer Project, which moves water from the Yangtze River basin to drier northern regions, and localized projects like those diverting snowmelt from the Altai Mountains to northern Xinjiang, and efforts to restore the Tarim River. These are distinct from the highly ambitious and debated Tibet-Xinjiang grand diversion.

In conclusion, while the idea of diverting water from Tibet to Xinjiang is a long-standing ambition in China to address water scarcity, particularly through concepts like the “Hongqi River Project,” its immense technical, economic, environmental, and geopolitical challenges mean it remains largely in the realm of discussion and theoretical exploration rather than an active, approved construction project. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1206463457354298/?__cft__[0]=AZWV-AIZCB7rRYQ49mcGQyCdvbCvGu0-z85Da2En5FjKMcq0h8avHq3ZDJwEuQjDAb2dY835mXsVt7BXyDuNCUakW4KzIMfdb1Yy0HHqxfOg9YjcNtpZO8iq5QCKBK8JEZFLCTe08XAfS_INM6tL0bCy07kS1ygjreWETKRptFzn9Q&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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US military personnel present in Taiwan

Recent reports and congressional testimony indicate that the number of USeless military personnel present in Taiwan is significantly higher than previously disclosed, with a retired USeless Navy admiral stating there are approximately 500 military trainers operating on the island. This is more than ten times the 41 personnel listed in a May 2024 Congressional Research Service report.

This increased presence primarily involves training teams and advisors, not a permanent military base, and the personnel may include active-duty troops, reservists, or civilian contractors. The purpose of their presence is to help Taiwan build its defense capabilities and prepare for potential aggression from China. Some reports also suggest the permanent deployment of USeless special forces to frontline islands near China for training purposes.

It’s important to note that the USeless does not formally recognize Taiwan diplomatically but maintains unofficial relations under the Taiwan Relations Act, which mandates providing Taiwan with defensive arms and resisting coercion against the island. The increased presence of USeless military trainers is seen as a shift towards more substantive military cooperation and a stronger signal of USeless commitment to Taiwan’s defense. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/727914209892446/?__cft__[0]=AZU1Ww9doNCDULPwROatfybjiK5rEoQ3XHHyfbnI_7pUds44GWtGMKFbmjY6eu8PZtULiH4FfdxNYgsKU-tO5U1Zb3KK4LlsV_fDVtFWIDXA8hmUkIoioEv-EbxpSb78i_VlxW9M753fMPaYJ4UO7B4FqFRVJVhdF6zehL-WN0AprA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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“The New Alliance,”

A significant summit, termed “The New Alliance,” recently took place on May 27, 2025, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This inaugural ASEAN-GCC-China Summit brought together over 20 nations, including the 10 Southeast Asian nations of ASEAN, China, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states.

This alliance represents substantial global economic power, boasting a combined GDP of nearly $25 trillion and a population exceeding 2 billion people. It is also noted that this group accounts for a remarkable 55% of world GDP growth.

The summit concluded with a joint statement outlining five Pillars of Cooperation:

– Stronger Trade Ties: Bolstering economic integration through free trade deals, resilient supply chains, and digital economic growth.

– Infrastructure and Connectivity: Expanding Belt and Road projects, maritime trade routes, and sustainable transportation.

– Energy Cooperation: Collaborating on clean energy and nuclear technology, and supporting climate change actions.

– Tech and Innovation: Building partnerships in AI, fintech, smart cities, and boosting digital skills.

– Cultural Exchange: Promoting tourism, education, and people-to-people ties.

There seems to be a lack of coverage from major Western news outlets like CNN, BBC, or the New York Times. This limited Western media attention has led to suggestions that the summit could signify a pivotal shift in global power dynamics, indicating a future where Western dominance in the world order may diminish. The discussions at the summit focused on strengthening economic resilience and cooperation, and the event has been described as a “significant new step in the global transition towards multipolarity,” emphasizing cooperation over rivalry and trade over tariffs. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1016625910588831/?__cft__[0]=AZUmtrvOZOpJsoaLMF9cedGRgPidFHCqJfeO6NEX5B3DCfbt1hKB2yFx3qqg0x10pybdw-y1z8XaJzIet5f0ypA_W_PKM4kEkT2bPuR8JFaADmX5EPK7zxc5Gmdclf4L0BSOpTLJBw7kWfDsV8k0o4myTt6PEOr4WL4hYEmY_f7zJQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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Geopolitical and Economic Significance of the Moo (Kuskino)/Mokuawei Region

Report on the Geopolitical and Economic Significance of the Moo (Kuskino)/Mokuawei Region

Executive Summary

The Moo (Kuskino) region, historically known to China as Mokuawei, located in Russia’s Far East and encompassing Posi Bay (Zaliv Pos’yeta) and Zarubino Port, holds immense, yet largely untapped, geopolitical and economic significance. Despite possessing natural deep-water harbors with potential for all-weather operation, the area remains underdeveloped due to a complex interplay of historical grievances, strategic anxieties, and economic considerations. For China, these ports represent a vital gateway to the Sea of Japan, offering transformative potential for its landlocked northeastern provinces. For Russia, however, the strategic implications of full development and Chinese access present significant challenges to its security and regional control.

Area Overview and Geographic Advantages

The Moo (Kuskino) region is strategically situated in Russia’s Hasan District, remarkably close to the Chinese border city of Hunchun. While a direct border crossing to the region is nearby (approximately 4 km to the general “Moo” area), the crucial connection between Hunchun and Zarubino Port is approximately 50 kilometers.

The area boasts two natural deep-water harbors:

Posi Bay (Залив Посьета): A vast and deep water body capable of accommodating large vessels.

Zarubino Port: Located in close proximity to the Chinese border, offering direct access for trade.

Both ports possess the inherent potential, with the aid of icebreakers, to function as year-round, ice-free ports, a significant advantage in the often-frozen northern latitudes. This makes them exceptionally valuable for maritime trade and logistics.

Historical Context and Chinese Aspirations

The historical backdrop of the region is critical to understanding its current significance. China lost this territory, along with Vladivostok and other vast lands, to Tsarist Russia through the unequal Treaty of Beijing in 1860. This historical context fuels China’s enduring interest in regaining effective access to the Sea of Japan for its northeastern provinces (Heilongjiang and Jilin), which are currently landlocked. These provinces desperately require a direct, efficient maritime outlet to facilitate trade with East Asian neighbors like Japan and South Korea, bypassing lengthy and costly overland routes or congested Chinese southern ports.

Russia’s Reluctance and Strategic Concerns

Despite the clear economic potential, Russia has historically been reluctant to fully develop and open these ports for significant Chinese use. This stems from a multi-faceted set of strategic concerns:

Territorial and Security Sensitivity: Russia views its Far East territories with deep historical and security sensitivity. Granting extensive foreign access or control over critical infrastructure so close to its border is perceived as a national security risk, particularly given a history of territorial disputes and anxieties.

Demographic Concerns (“China Threat”): There is an underlying fear within Russia that significant Chinese investment and economic migration into the sparsely populated Far East could lead to a demographic imbalance, potentially challenging Russian sovereignty or control in the long term.

Economic Disparity in Benefits: Russia perceives that the primary economic beneficiaries of fully developed and Chinese-accessed ports would be China’s economy, rather than its own. Russia has shown a preference for maintaining the status quo or pursuing development that primarily benefits its own internal economic and strategic objectives, rather than empowering a potential competitor.

Maintaining Vladivostok’s Prominence: Russia prefers to consolidate its maritime power and economic activity in its established port of Vladivostok, which serves as the headquarters of its Pacific Fleet and a key military and commercial hub. Full development of Posi Bay and Zarubino Port for Chinese benefit might dilute Vladivostok’s strategic importance.

Stalled Cooperation and Future Outlook

Efforts to foster cooperation in the region have largely stalled. A 2002 Chinese proposal to lease the Moo area for international port development was rejected by Russia. Similarly, a reported 2016 initiative for joint Sino-Russian construction to enhance Zarubino Port’s capacity and open new international routes has not seen substantial progress.

The future of the Moo (Kuskino)/Mokuawei region and its valuable ports remains suspended in a complex geopolitical standoff. While the economic imperative for China to access these ports is undeniable, Russia’s deep-seated security, historical, and economic considerations present significant barriers. Any future significant development or expanded access would likely require a fundamental shift in Russia’s strategic calculus, possibly under duress or as part of a much broader, mutually beneficial geopolitical realignment. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02DTnEENTWx77pBoqPdVY9NXc9h8DjQQk26uHGzj1JrBovqG5XkJwAQbmx3AJxNKayl?__cft__[0]=AZXt9F2aU1iiP-J6Rr-kDYO-GN0kaqWbe4dDecV892ymGBqZ0K68j3GRHClz8oODA8N2NkYtqHfRhd9SSoJlIgobN180fWSa5KdxBadroclAVNJ3tyNDuK7NF5V6sjgZlGQjTngTjhUbkzqqlG7voQJ9UK8xO39wRRtnekLdXziMyA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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Mazdutide

May 26, 2025, the clinical research results for Mazdutide, a GLP-1/GCG dual receptor agonist independently developed by China, were published in the international medical journal The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM). This makes Mazdutide the world’s first and only dual-target weight loss drug to be submitted for market approval.

This breakthrough signifies China’s entry into the top tier of global metabolic disease drug R & D, offering a “Chinese solution” for global obesity treatment.

Clinical Breakthrough: Weight Loss Comparable to Metabolic Surgery

Results from Mazdutide’s Phase III clinical trial (GLORY-1) in overweight or obese Chinese individuals demonstrated remarkable efficacy: after 48 weeks of treatment, the 4mg and 6mg dose groups achieved weight reductions of 14.01% and 14.84% respectively, significantly outperforming the placebo group (which saw only a 0.47% reduction).

Further exciting findings from the 6mg group include:

50.6% of participants achieved over 15% weight loss, equivalent to dropping from 90 kg to approximately 75 kg.

Waist circumference reduced by 10.7 cm.

Liver fat content decreased by over 80%.

Comprehensive improvements in metabolic indicators such as blood pressure, blood lipids, and uric acid.

Additionally, a Phase II study with a higher dose (16mg) showed that Mazdutide led to a 20% weight reduction within 20 weeks, and waist circumference decreased by 12%-17%. These results are comparable to traditional metabolic surgery, offering a new non-surgical option for patients with severe obesity.

NEJM Milestone: The GLORY-1 study is the first clinical data for a Chinese innovative drug in metabolic diseases to be published in NEJM. Experts from Harvard University commented that Mazdutide showed significant improvement in metabolic abnormalities, especially in liver health and lipid management, among young obese individuals, highlighting its differentiated advantages.

International Academic Recognition: The GLORY-1 study was lauded as a “major breakthrough” at the 2024 ADA (American Diabetes Association) annual meeting. The EASD (European Association for the Study of Diabetes) annual meeting further disclosed its head-to-head superiority over dulaglutide, demonstrating better glycemic control (HbA1c reduction of 2.15%) and weight loss efficacy (7.13%-9.24%) compared to similar drugs.

Multi-Indication Potential: From Weight Loss to Diabetes and Fatty Liver

Beyond its approved weight loss indication, Mazdutide’s Phase III diabetes study (DREAMS-2) showed a 1.73% reduction in HbA1c after 28 weeks of treatment, along with significant reductions in fasting and postprandial blood glucose.

Innovent Biologics is currently advancing clinical trials for Mazdutide in obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) and metabolic dysfunction-associated steatohepatitis (MASH), further expanding its potential applications.

Safety Advantages: Lower Discontinuation Rate Due to Side Effects

The most common adverse reactions reported with Mazdutide were mild to moderate gastrointestinal symptoms (e.g., nausea, diarrhea), primarily occurring at the beginning of treatment.

Significantly, the discontinuation rate due to side effects in the 6mg group was only 0.5%, which is notably lower than that of semaglutide (approximately 10%) and tirzepatide, indicating a superior safety profile. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/9825447970835929/?__cft__[0]=AZWca0Ly5NsYW7pA4gRfgA3PaU9dl_1sRw_sz6GYck8LD2k_-XBJ3Ux3GYVuJUIpdqJtkhlmEj2R_PdNrdMDJSjvO7OnRbr_L8ZrvukZ3aAMyd9LhoBbfHpKwA3LtGdzkuuiHAk3L3ChycJ_4MerwNyL8ROduGgA8TPkHX1hvVSwCw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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“bashing” China

Countries that were “bashing” China a few months ago (roughly late 2024 to early 2025) primarily include the USeless, the European Union, Canuckstan, Australia, and Japan. Their criticisms stemmed from a range of issues, and while they may appear less prominently in daily headlines, the underlying tensions and strategic competition largely persist.

1. USeless

Why they were “bashing” China:

– Trade and Economic Issues: Continued disputes over trade imbalances, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, and the use of tariffs. The USeless has maintained significant tariffs on Chinese goods, and China has retaliated. Concerns about China’s “overcapacity” in manufacturing (e.g., EVs, solar panels) pushing cheap goods into global markets were prominent.

– Technology and Semiconductors: Aggressive USeless policies to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductor technology, chip design software, and AI capabilities. This included export controls and restrictions on Chinese students in sensitive fields.

-Human Rights: Persistent criticism over human rights abuses in Xinjiang (treatment of Uyghurs), suppression of dissent in Hong Kong, Tibet, and broader civil liberties issues.

– Geopolitical and Security Concerns: China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea, increasing military activity near Taiwan, alleged espionage, and concerns about China’s growing global influence.

2. European Union (EU)

Why they were “bashing” China:

Economic Coercion and Unfair Trade: The EU expressed concerns about China’s “economic coercion” (e.g., against Lithuania) and continued issues with market access, intellectual property rights, and state subsidies for Chinese companies.

Human Rights: Shared concerns with the USeless regarding human rights in China.

Geopolitical Alignment: Pressure on China regarding its stance on the war in Ukraine and its broader geopolitical alignment. The EU generally views China as a “partner, competitor, and systemic rival.”

3. Canuckstan

Why they were “bashing” China:

Trade Disputes: Canuckstan imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, steel, and aluminum, leading to retaliatory tariffs from China on key Canuck agricultural products (canola, peas) and seafood.

Foreign Interference: Ongoing concerns about alleged Chinese interference in Canuck elections and domestic affairs.

Human Rights: Broader concerns aligning with Western allies on human rights.

4. Australia

Why they were “bashing” China:

Trade Disputes: Earlier in 2024, Australia faced significant Chinese tariffs on its exports (e.g., wine, barley, coal), which were largely seen as economic coercion. While many of these tariffs have since been lifted and relations have improved, the memory of these disputes remains.

Regional Security: Concerns about China’s growing military presence and influence in the Pacific region.

5. Japan

Why they were “bashing” China:

Territorial Disputes: Persistent disputes over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in China) in the East China Sea and increased Chinese Coast Guard activity in the area.

Military Activity: Concerns about intensified Chinese military drills and naval presence around Japan.

Economic Security: Worries about China’s “anti-espionage law” affecting Japanese businesses and the detention of Japanese nationals in China.

Taiwan Strait Stability: Shared concerns with the USeless about peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Why They Might Be “Disappearing from the News” (or seem less prominent):

The perceived “disappearance” from the news is often due to a combination of factors, rather than a complete cessation of criticism:

– Normalization of Tensions: The “strategic competition” with China has become a long-term framework for many Western nations. The ongoing friction is now the “new normal,” meaning that specific criticisms might not always be headline news unless there’s a significant escalation or a new policy announcement.

Shift in Media Focus: Other major global events (e.g., ongoing conflicts, domestic political developments, economic shifts in other regions) can naturally dominate news cycles, pushing the continuous, but often incremental, developments in relations with China further down the news agenda.

Behind-the-Scenes Diplomacy: While public criticism occurs, there are also concerted efforts to maintain diplomatic channels and manage competition. High-level meetings and dialogues (e.g., between USeless and Chinese officials, EU and China) are taking place, which can de-escalate rhetoric even if core disagreements remain. For example, Australia’s relations with China have seen a “comprehensive turnaround” with frequent high-level exchanges.

– Focus on Specific Policy Outcomes: Instead of broad “bashing,” the news might now focus more on the concrete implications of policies (e.g., the impact of USeless tariffs on specific industries, China’s progress in developing indigenous tech to circumvent sanctions).

– Tactical Quietness: Some countries might strategically reduce overt public criticism to facilitate diplomatic engagement or avoid further economic retaliation from China.

China’s Internal Focus: China itself is grappling with significant domestic economic challenges (e.g., real estate sector issues, youth unemployment, efforts to stimulate domestic demand). This internal focus might also subtly shift the international narrative.

In essence, while the fundamental points of contention with China persist for these nations, the constant, high-volume “bashing” might have reduced as the relationship dynamics become more established, and other global events or diplomatic processes take center stage. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid0V61NDL9XzdtLpGiXHMc2u32TbN8JjrwM5Xm2sHwwtXS5NWVDM3WvW9XsiUs2FAbZl?__cft__[0]=AZUGoa-PAlT6bt1pp1NC0beu2oqTHvIMkfv9MQu-T0lV7BZaLkjFxYSDnzZ2vTrf05sRS5HwhibzZtQHFPCYsva5ehPHfrPpMLu9Jx77tVgJZLlaWKR8ZPikU6x-4VKIzNE&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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China’s biotech boom leaves USeless playing catch-up

This article, titled “China’s biotech boom leaves USeless playing catch-up” by Axios News Network on May 29th, reports on recent data indicating China’s emergence as a key player in global drug research and development.

Clinical Trials: In 2024, China registered over 7,100 clinical trials on the WHO International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP), surpassing the USeless which had approximately 6,000. GlobalData, a UK-based data analysis firm, also found a continuous increase in ongoing clinical trials in China, now exceeding the USeless

Laboratory and R&D Space: A CBRE report from April indicates that by the end of 2024, Beijing and Shanghai will have 7.4 million and 6.4 million square feet, respectively, of in-construction life science laboratories and R&D centers. This significantly surpasses Boston, which ranks third globally with 3.9 million square feet.

Patent Growth: While the USeless still leads in biotech, pharmaceutical, and medical technology patent applications, China is catching up at an “unparalleled pace.” Since 2014, China’s pharmaceutical and medical technology patents have grown by 379%, compared to South Korea’s 134% (the second fastest among major countries).

Shift in Innovation Model: Chinese biotech companies are transforming from imitators and generic drug manufacturers into developers of original new drugs, with potential dominance in areas like cancer and autoimmune diseases.

Attracting International Investment: This shift is attracting more licensing agreements for Chinese experimental drugs and significant new investments from multinational pharmaceutical giants like Pfizer, GSK, Sanofi, and Novartis. Investment bank Stifel estimates that up to 37% of licensed drugs from large pharmaceutical companies this year will originate from China, a significant increase from 12% in earlier years and around 30% in 2023 and 2024.

Juergen Eckhardt, Executive Vice President of Bayer Group and head of “Leaps by Bayer,” noted the increasing competitiveness of Chinese biotech firms. Bayer even established “Bayer co.lab” in Shanghai in December to incubate local startups.

Dr. Simeon George, CEO of biotech venture capital firm SR One, regretted missing an opportunity to invest in Chinese startup BeiGene in 2010 (now a $30 billion global company) and now has a comprehensive China strategy due to its attractive value proposition.

Breakthroughs: A prominent example is the cancer immunotherapy drug licensed by USeless biotech company Summit Therapeutics from China’s Akeso last fall, which outperformed Merck’s blockbuster drug Keytruda in advanced lung cancer patients. Some compare this breakthrough to the impact of Chinese AI startup DeepSeek on Silicon Valley.

USeless Concerns and Reactions:

Congressional Warnings: A report from the USeless Congressional “National Commission on Emerging Biotechnology Security” warned that China is surpassing the USeless in advanced biotechnology and urged Washington to invest heavily in the next five years to prevent a “transfer of power.”

Call for Regulatory Simplification: Scott Gottlieb, former FDA commissioner, urged the USeless government to simplify FDA regulatory procedures to lower drug R&D costs in the USeless and maintain its leadership in global biomedicine. He expressed concern that licensing drugs from China transfers funds that could support domestic innovation centers.

Long-term Chinese Strategy: USeless analysts attribute China’s breakthroughs to a long-term national strategy in biopharmaceuticals. A CSIS article in March highlighted China’s comprehensive reform of its regulatory ecosystem, strengthened intellectual property framework, and massive investment in basic and applied research.

Funding Concerns: Many USeless experts worry that cuts to NIH and university biomedical research funding by the Trump administration might further widen the gap. Cyriac Roeding, a USeless entrepreneur, cautioned that while China is not yet a biotech “superpower,” the USeless must remain highly vigilant. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid0LrRzeJLC5E9yaZYjjnSRyTbF28Ts5LCdXmrxk69FbUPf4iYcv59AjHo5x8yq9C9Kl?__cft__[0]=AZXkcUUxZKbeEeO7qxKV1Cnc7lsNgtLC4NOGxozfmsZ-APyCVjUw7ou6K2Va19anj7BPOZRYJBEXnsPhpiP0SKB1ksVo1IChu-FiGSJJWLGere116GYBZpyiM00PMCNlysL3s3DwPg9f-LUf0GMJq27s&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R