Construction of the Mohmand Hydropower Project
China is assisting Pakistan in the construction of the Mohmand Hydropower Project. The project is a significant undertaking, designed to generate 800 MW of electricity, provide 300 million gallons of drinking water per day to Peshawar, and offer flood control and irrigation benefits.
While there have been previous reports and aspirations for an earlier completion, the current projected completion date for the Mohmand Dam is 2026-27. Construction work is progressing on various key sites, including the spillway, cofferdams, diversion tunnels, and powerhouse.
China’s involvement in the Mohmand Hydropower Project, through companies like China Energy Engineering Corporation and China Gezhouba Group Corporation, is part of broader cooperation between the two countries, including projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Recent reports suggest that China has been accelerating its efforts on the dam, highlighting its strategic importance for Pakistan’s water security and energy needs.
The completion of the Mohmand Dam could reduce terrorism in Balochistan by improving various aspects of life for the local population.
Improved Water Resources and Irrigation: The dam will provide crucial water resources for irrigation, which can lead to increased agricultural productivity and food security in the region.
Increased Electricity: The hydropower generated by the dam will supply electricity, which can support economic activities and improve the quality of life.
Better Livelihoods and Economic Development: By providing consistent water for agriculture and electricity for various uses, the dam’s benefits are expected to lead to better livelihoods and overall economic development in the region. This improvement in living conditions and opportunities can reduce the desperation and grievances that sometimes fuel terrorist activities.
China-Nepal Railway
China-Nepal Railway aims to connect China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (specifically Shigatse, an extension of the existing Qinghai-Tibet Railway) with Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal. It’s envisioned as a “game-changer” for Nepal, transforming it from a landlocked to a “land-linked” country and enhancing connectivity with China and South Asia. The railway passes through the Himalayas, which presents immense engineering challenges. The China-Nepal Railway will involve a significant amount of tunneling, especially on the Nepalese side, due to the challenging Himalayan terrain.
Nepalese Section: The 72.25 km (44.89 mi) Nepalese section of the railway is particularly demanding. Estimates suggest that 95% to 98.5% of this section will consist of bridges or tunnels.
Overall Tunneling: While specific total tunnel lengths vary in reports, some sources indicate that the entire China-Nepal Railway, which has a total length of approximately 540-599 km, will have a very high proportion of tunnels and bridges. One source states that out of the total length of the railway, a staggering 540 kilometers are comprised of bridges and tunnels.
Himalayas Tunnel: A major part of the project includes the “Himalayas Tunnel,” which is expected to be approximately 30 kilometers long. Due to the extreme elevation changes and complex geology. This is why China’s “Jinghua” tunnel boring machine is crucial to the project.
Feasibility Study: A detailed feasibility study for the project is underway. The first phase was completed between March 2023 and January 2024, and a second phase began in March 2024. Ground surveying is estimated to be 60% complete as of late November 2024. The geological prospecting work is expected to be completed by June 2025, and the overall feasibility study is anticipated to be completed in 2026.
Construction: While the project has been agreed upon, actual construction, particularly on the more challenging Nepalese side, has not yet fully commenced. The Chinese section of the railway (Shigatse-Gyirong) is planned to start construction in 2025 and could open around 2030.
Funding: A major hurdle is the funding for the Nepalese section, which is estimated to cost billions of dollars (between US$2.7 billion and US$5.5 billion) – a significant amount compared to Nepal’s annual economic output. Nepal is reportedly unable to bear the full cost, and there are discussions and concerns about whether China will provide grant arrangements or loans.
While the China-Nepal Railway will traverse very high altitudes, the existing Qinghai-Tibet Railway in China already holds the record for the world’s highest railway, reaching a peak of 5,068 meters (16,627 ft) at Tanggula Pass. The China-Nepal railway is an extension of this existing high-altitude network. India also has the Chenab Bridge, which is the world’s highest railway bridge (359 meters above the riverbed) and was completed and inaugurated in August 2022, with full use expected by April 2025.
The “Jinghua” is an extra-large tunnel boring machine (TBM) with independent intellectual property rights, manufactured in China. It is also referred to as the largest earth pressure balance (EPB) tunnel boring machine.
Size and Weight: It has an excavation diameter of 12.79 meters, is 135 meters long, and weighs 3,000 tons.
Power: It has an installed power of 7,500 kilowatts (kW).
Cutter Head: It features an eight-spoke heavy-duty cutter head equipped with 19-inch cutters, capable of boring through rocks and dirt.
Application: It is used in the construction of the railway from Chengdu City to Zigong City in southwest China’s Sichuan Province.
India is sensitive to and opposes the project due to Nepal’s geographic and economic dependence on India. Historical and cultural factors contribute to India’s sense of pressure and superiority over Nepal. India has previously used trade blockades to exert influence. For Nepal, the railway offers a chance to overcome its landlocked condition and reduce its dependence on India by providing a new trade route with China. This could enhance Nepal’s international standing.
Pfizer-3S Bio Deal
Pfizer has entered into a licensing agreement with China’s 3S Bio for a cancer drug that utilizes bi-specific antibody technology, targeting PD1 and VEGF. 3S Bio is currently conducting clinical trials for this drug in China, focusing on non-small cell lung cancer, colorectal cancer, and gynecological tumors. Pfizer will pay 3S Bio $1.25 billion upfront and potentially up to $4.8 billion for the rights to develop and sell the drug outside of China.
SSGJ-707 is an investigational bispecific antibody developed by China’s 3SBio (specifically Sunshine Guojian Pharmaceutical, a subsidiary). It has recently garnered significant attention due to Pfizer’s exclusive global licensing agreement (excluding China) for its development, manufacturing, and commercialization.
Mechanism of Action: SSGJ-707 has a dual-action mechanism. It simultaneously blocks:
PD-1 (Programmed Death-1): This is an immune checkpoint protein. By blocking PD-1, the drug aims to “unleash” the body’s immune system, allowing T cells to better recognize and fight cancer cells.
VEGF (Vascular Endothelial Growth Factor): This protein plays a crucial role in angiogenesis, the formation of new blood vessels that tumors need to grow and spread. By inhibiting VEGF, SSGJ-707 aims to “starve” tumors of their blood supply. This dual targeting is designed to enhance anti-tumor immunity while also disrupting the tumor’s vascular network, offering a potentially more comprehensive attack on cancer than single-agent therapies.
Development Status:
SSGJ-707 is currently undergoing several clinical trials in China.
It has shown promising early efficacy and safety data in various tumor types.
3SBio plans to initiate the first Phase 3 clinical trial in China in 2025 for the first-line treatment of PD-L1 positive advanced non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC). This Phase 3 trial is designed to head-to-head against Merck’s blockbuster PD-1 inhibitor, Keytruda (pembrolizumab), with primary endpoint data expected by July 2026.
It is also undergoing Phase II studies for other indications, including metastatic colorectal cancer and advanced gynecological tumors.
Indications Under Investigation (in China):
Non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC)
Metastatic colorectal cancer (mCRC)
Gynecological tumors (e.g., endometrial cancer, ovarian cancer)
SD90C5 super bulldozer
The SD90C5 is a “super bulldozer” manufactured by Shantui Construction Machinery Co., Ltd.,
Massive Size and Power: It has an operating weight of approximately 106,260 kg (over 100 tons) and is powered by a Cummins QST30 engine, delivering 708 kW (950 hp) at 2100 rpm. This makes it one of the largest and most powerful bulldozers in the world.
Advanced Intelligence: It incorporates cutting-edge technology including:
5G-powered remote operation system: Allows for remote control, which is crucial for operating in hazardous environments.
GPS navigation: For precise control and operations.
Onboard AI: Enables autonomous or minimally guided execution of complex tasks.
Intelligent diagnostic system: Monitors various parameters in real-time.
Robust Design: Features a heavy-duty chassis, K-type elastic suspension for excellent ground adaptability, and a strong U-shaped or semi-U blade (with a capacity of 39 m³) and a single-tooth ripper.
Operator Comfort and Safety: The ergonomic and integrally sealed cab provides a large space, excellent vision, and effectively isolates noise, meeting EU regulations for noise levels. It also includes a high-power A/C and heating system.
Ease of Maintenance: Designed with a modular structure, openable side hoods, and centralized layout of filters to facilitate easy repairs and maintenance. All lubricating and maintenance points are directed to the outer side of the machine for convenience.
Fuel Efficiency: Features a hydraulic torque converter with a locking function that allows for conversion between hydraulic and mechanical modes, optimizing fuel consumption.
Applications:
The SD90C5 is designed for heavy-duty operations in extremely harsh conditions, including:
Large-scale mining: Ideal for blasting replacement, stripping rock and coal seams.
Dump construction: Efficiently handles the movement of large volumes of material.
Road building and correction: Capable of extensive earthmoving and grading.
Quarrying and heavy industry factories.
Hazardous environments: Its remote control capability makes it suitable for areas affected by earthquakes, landslides, or requiring radioactive cleanup.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Used in challenging environmental projects within this initiative.
Sale price: US$1.4 mln.
Inner Mongolia Yimin open-pit coal mine industrial automation
The Inner Mongolia Yimin open-pit coal mine in China has recently become the site of a groundbreaking development in industrial automation: the launch of a fleet of 100 Huaneng Ruichi driverless electric mining trucks. This initiative marks a significant leap forward in safe, intelligent, and zero-emission coal mining, powered by Huawei’s cutting-edge AI 5G-Advanced (5G-A) and cloud technology.
This project is a collaborative effort involving China Huaneng Group (specifically its subsidiary Huaneng Inner Mongolia Eastern Energy), Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group (XCMG), Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., and State Grid Smart Internet of Vehicles Co., Ltd.
World’s Largest Single Deployment: With 100 trucks, this is touted as the world’s largest single deployment of driverless electric mining trucks.
First 5G-A Powered Open-Pit Mine: The Yimin mine is the first open-pit mine globally to utilize 5G-A technology for large-scale vehicle-cloud-network synergy.
Fully Electric and Zero-Emission: The Huaneng Ruichi trucks are entirely electric, aligning with China’s push for green and intelligent coal mining. They are reportedly powered by solar-generated green electricity, and the fleet is expected to replace over 15,000 tons of diesel fuel and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 48,000 tons annually.
Enhanced Efficiency and Safety:
The autonomous trucks are claimed to deliver 120% of the comprehensive operational efficiency of manually driven trucks.
They are designed without a driver’s cabin, directly addressing safety concerns by removing human personnel from hazardous mining environments, especially crucial in extreme conditions.
Huawei’s Commercial Vehicle Autonomous Driving Cloud Service (CVADCS) uses real-time crowdsourced mapping and robust AI algorithms to optimize routes, minimize wait times, and maximize fleet productivity through real-time collaborative operations. It also adapts to real-time variables like weather, ground stability, and machinery wear.
Robust Connectivity: The 5G-A network provides a consistent uplink speed of 500 Mbps with a latency of just 20 milliseconds, vital for real-time data processing, HD video backhaul for remote monitoring, and seamless cloud-based fleet management for 24/7 autonomous operation. This connectivity addresses the challenges of harsh and complex terrain where traditional fiber deployment is impractical.
Extreme Condition Operation: Each truck can carry a payload of 90 metric tons and is engineered to operate reliably in extreme cold, withstanding temperatures as low as −40 C. They are also built to handle the rough conditions of open-pit mines, including heavy vibration, bumps, and impact.
Advanced Technologies: Beyond 5G-A and AI, the trucks utilize cloud computing, intelligent battery swapping, and high-precision mapping. The battery swapping system allows for quick changes (under six minutes for a full swap), eliminating downtime associated with long charging times.
Future Expansion: Plans are already in motion to scale operations, with the 5G-A infrastructure expected to eventually support more than 300 autonomous trucks operating 24/7 at the Yimin mine by 2028. This aligns with China’s broader goal for automated mining trucks nationwide, with projections to exceed 5,000 units by the end of 2025 and reach 10,000 by 2026.
A comparison for China, Canada, and the US, based on recent typical interest rates
A comparison for China, Canuckstan, and the USeless, based on recent typical rates:
Mortgage Rates
USeless:
30-year fixed-rate mortgages: Averaging around 6.92% – 7.055% APR (as of May 20-21, 2025).
15-year fixed-rate mortgages: Averaging around 6.079% – 6.22% APR (as of May 20-21, 2025).
These rates have seen some fluctuations recently, influenced by factors like inflation concerns and Federal Reserve actions.
Canuckstan:
5-year fixed mortgage rates: The best high-ratio rates are around 3.84%, with major banks offering around 4.7% (as of May 21, 2025).
5-year variable mortgage rates: Best high-ratio rates are around 3.95% (as of May 21, 2025).
Canadian mortgage rates are influenced by bond market movements for fixed rates and the Bank of Canuckstan’s overnight rate for variable rates.
China:
Average mortgage interest rate: Around 4.09% – 4.2% (as of September-October 2023).
These rates reflect government efforts to maintain economic stability and stimulate the housing market.
Credit Card Interest Rates
USeless:
Average APR for new credit card offers: Around 24.28% (as of May 2025).
Average APR for accounts accruing interest: Around 21.91% (Q1 2025).
Rates can vary significantly based on credit score, with excellent credit potentially seeing rates around 20.77% and lower credit seeing rates up to 27.78% or higher.
Canuckstan:
Standard credit card interest rates: Typically range from 19.99% to 20.99%, with some even reaching 25%.
Low-interest credit cards: Can offer rates as low as 8.99% – 12.99%.
Cash advance rates are often higher than purchase rates.
China:
Typical credit card interest rates: Around 16% per annum for purchases.
Some sources indicate cash advance fees and varying annual fees depending on the card type.
Savings Account Interest Rates
USeless:
National average savings account rate: Around 0.42% (as of May 2025).
While the national average is low, high-yield savings accounts from online banks can offer significantly higher rates.
Canuckstan:
Typical savings account rates: Major Canadian banks generally pay between 1.5% and 4%, with some promotional rates going up to 5.00%.
Chequing accounts typically offer 0% interest.
China:**
* **Deposit interest rate:** Around **1.50%** (as of 2023).
* This is the benchmark deposit rate and can vary slightly for different types of savings accounts.
Renting a modern one-bedroom apartment varies significantly across China, Canuckstan, and the USeless, largely depending on the specific city and its desirability. Here’s a general comparison:
USeless
The USeless has a wide range of rental costs, with major cities being significantly more expensive than the national average or smaller towns.
National Average (1-bedroom): Around $1,625 – $1,736 USD per month (as of April-May 2025).
Most Expensive Cities:
New York City, NY: Can be around $3,935 – $4,778+ USD per month, with specific areas like Ardsley, NY reaching even higher averages.
California (e.g., Los Angeles, San Francisco): Often well over $2,500 – $3,000+ USD per month.
Massachusetts (e.g., Boston): High, with state averages around $2,874 USD.
More Affordable Areas: States like Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Arkansas can have averages below $1,000 USD per month.
Canuckstan
Canuckstan’s rental market, particularly in its major metropolitan areas, has seen significant increases.
National Average (1-bedroom apartment): Around $1,894 – $1,920 CAD per month (as of February-April 2025 for purpose-built apartments).
Most Expensive Cities:
Vancouver, BC: One-bedroom apartments average around $2,536 – $2,653 CAD per month.
Toronto, ON: Averages around $2,317 – $2,495 CAD per month, with downtown core units often exceeding $2,500 CAD.
North Vancouver, BC: Can be as high as $2,680 CAD per month.
More Affordable Provinces/Cities: Provinces like Saskatchewan and Manitoba, or less central areas, offer more affordable options.
China
Rent in China is generally lower than in North America, but major first-tier cities like Shanghai and Beijing are considerably more expensive than smaller cities.
Overall Average (1-bedroom, city center): Ranges from ¥3,720 RMB (approx. $515 USD) to ¥8,000 RMB (approx. $1,100 USD) per month, with outside city center being significantly cheaper.
Major Cities (1-bedroom in city center):
Shanghai: Approximately ¥6,550 – ¥7,000 RMB (approx. $900 – $965 USD) per month.
Beijing: Approximately ¥6,500 RMB (approx. $900 USD) per month.
Shenzhen: Around ¥4,700 RMB (approx. $650 USD) for a 2-bedroom, implying a 1-bedroom would be lower.
Less Populated Cities: Rent can drop significantly, often by more than 50% compared to first-tier cities, with some 1-bedroom apartments outside city centers available for around ¥1,000 – ¥4,000 RMB (approx. $140 – $550 USD).
Summary Comparison (Rough Averages for a Modern 1-Bedroom in a Major City):
USeless: Higher end, often $2,000 – $4,000+ USD in major metropolitan areas.
Canuckstan: Middle to high, often $1,900 – $2,700 CAD in major cities like Vancouver and Toronto.
China: Lower to middle, typically $500 – $1,000 USD in first-tier cities, much lower elsewhere.
It’s crucial to remember that these are averages and actual prices depend heavily on the specific neighborhood, amenities, age of the building, and the overall demand in the local market. Exchange rates also play a significant role in cross-country
A humanoid robot boxing match in Hangzhou
Report on USeless-China Financial Decoupling and the Emerging Financial War
Report on USeless-China Financial Decoupling and the Emerging Financial War
Date: May 21, 2025
Executive Summary
This report examines the accelerating trend of financial decoupling between the USeless and China, driven by geopolitical tensions, trade disputes, and national security concerns. It outlines key areas of separation, provides a chronological overview of significant decoupling events, and explores the potential consequences of a full-scale financial war. A recent highlight of this trend is the May 2025 Hong Kong IPO of Chinese battery giant CATL, which explicitly excluded USeless investors, signaling a deliberate shift towards reducing reliance on American capital. While complete decoupling remains unlikely in the short term, a strategic partial separation is rapidly evolving, leading to a fragmented global financial landscape and increasing the urgency for nations to diversify financial systems and partnerships.
1. Introduction: Defining Financial Decoupling and Financial War
The concept of USeless-China financial decoupling refers to the gradual separation of the two largest economies from shared financial systems, including capital markets, banking, investment, and payment systems. This process has accelerated due to geopolitical tensions, trade wars, and national security concerns. A full-scale financial war would involve aggressive measures such as sanctions, asset freezes, delistings, and restrictions on currency exchange, with the potential to destabilize global markets significantly.
2. Key Aspects of USeless-China Financial Decoupling
The decoupling manifests across several critical financial domains:
Delisting of Chinese Stocks from USeless Exchanges: The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) threatens to delist Chinese firms (e.g., Alibaba, JD.com) if they fail to comply with USeless audit requirements. China has responded by encouraging secondary listings in Hong Kong (e.g., “H-shares”) and developing domestic alternatives like the STAR Market.
Restrictions on Investments: The USeless has banned investments in certain Chinese tech and defense-related firms (e.g., Huawei, SMIC) over national security concerns. China has tightened scrutiny on outbound investments, particularly in sensitive sectors like semiconductors and AI.
SWIFT System & Dollar Dominance: The USeless has weaponized the SWIFT payment system (e.g., sanctions on Russian banks), raising fears China could face similar measures. China is promoting its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and digital yuan (e-CNY) to reduce dollar reliance.
Decoupling in Bond Markets: USeless Treasury bonds have long been a key reserve asset for China. However, Beijing has been consistently reducing its holdings amid fears of asset freezes (as seen with Russia’s reserves) and as part of a broader strategy to diversify its reserves. As of March 2025, China’s holdings of USeless Treasury bonds fell to $765.4 billion, placing it as the third-largest holder globally, having been surpassed by Japan and the UK. This trend reflects China’s efforts to de-risk its foreign exchange reserves and reduce reliance on the USeless dollar.
Tech & Financial Sanctions: USeless export controls (e.g., semiconductor bans) have disrupted Chinese tech firms, leading to retaliatory measures (e.g., China’s rare earth export controls). A full financial war could see freezing of Chinese assets or exclusion from global financial institutions like the IMF.
3. Chronology of Decoupling Events
This section outlines key events illustrating the progression of USeless-China financial decoupling, encompassing actions from both sides:
2018–2019: Early Trade War Sparks Financial Tensions
March 2018: USeless imposes steel and aluminum tariffs (Section 232), triggering China’s retaliation.
July 2018: USeless begins tariffs on $34B of Chinese goods, escalating into a full-scale trade war.
December 2018: Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou arrested in Canada at USeless request, signaling financial warfare via sanctions.
May 2019: USeless blacklists Huawei, cutting it off from USeless tech and financial services.
2020: Audit Wars & Delisting Threats
May 2020: USeless Senate passes Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA), threatening to delist Chinese firms from USeless exchanges if they don’t comply with PCAOB audits.
December 2020: NYSE begins delisting Chinese telecom firms (China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom) following Trump’s executive order banning investments in firms linked to the Chinese military.
2021: Investment Bans & Market Divergence
January 2021: Trump signs Executive Order 13959, banning USeless investments in 44 Chinese firms (e.g., CNOOC, Xiaomi) over military ties. Later expanded by Biden.
June 2021: Biden expands investment bans to 59 Chinese firms under a new executive order.
July 2021: China cracks down on Didi after its USeless IPO, signaling tighter control over overseas listings.
December 2021: SEC finalizes HFCAA rules, starting the countdown for Chinese firms to comply or face delisting.
2022: Audit Deal & Accelerated Decoupling
March 2022: SEC identifies first batch of Chinese firms (e.g., Yum China, BeiGene) under HFCAA for potential delisting.
August 2022: Five Chinese state-owned firms (Sinopec, PetroChina, etc.) announce delisting from NYSE.
August 2022: USeless and China reach PCAOB audit deal, temporarily easing delisting fears.
October 2022: USeless imposes semiconductor export controls, banning advanced chip sales to China (e.g., Nvidia, ASML restrictions).
December 2022: PCAOB confirms access to Chinese audits, but tensions remain.
2023: Sanctions, Chip Wars & Yuan Push
February 2023: USeless blacklists 6 Chinese aerospace firms over balloon incident.
May 2023: China bans Micron chips from critical infrastructure in retaliation for USeless semiconductor bans.
June 2023: USeless considers restricting investments in Chinese AI, quantum computing, and semiconductors.
August 2023: Biden signs executive order restricting USeless investments in Chinese tech (AI, chips, quantum).
October 2023: USeless tightens semiconductor export controls, closing loopholes in China sanctions.
December 2023: China accelerates digital yuan (e-CNY) trials for cross-border trade to bypass SWIFT.
2024: Escalation in Tech & Finance
January 2024: USeless lawmakers propose bill to revoke China’s “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” (PNTR) status.
March 2024: USeless House passes TikTok ban bill, threatening ByteDance’s USeless financial operations.
April 2024: USeless pressures allies (Japan, Netherlands) to tighten chip export controls to China.
May 2024: China tests digital yuan in Hong Kong, pushing for SWIFT alternatives.
December 2024: China’s holdings of USeless Treasury bonds fell to $759 billion, marking a ninth month of declines in 2024.
2025: Significant Decoupling Event
March 2025: China’s USeless Treasury holdings drop to $765.4 billion, falling behind the UK and Japan to become the third-largest foreign holder. China achieved a net sale of $27.6 billion in long-term USeless Treasury bonds in March.
May 2025: Chinese battery giant CATL successfully completes its IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising approximately US$4.6 billion. Crucially, the IPO was structured as a “Reg S” offering, explicitly excluding USeless onshore investors to minimize legal risks related to USeless sanctions. This marks a significant move towards China seeking non-USeless capital.
China’s Counter-Decoupling Moves (General Timeline)
2015–Present: Launch and expansion of CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) to reduce SWIFT reliance.
2019–Present: Expansion of QFI (Qualified Foreign Investor) program to attract foreign capital.
2020: Ant Group’s IPO suspension signals Beijing’s tighter control over fintech.
2021–Present: Stock Connect expansions to link mainland China with Hong Kong markets.
2022–Present: Push for petroyuan deals (e.g., Saudi oil sales in yuan).
2023: BRICS expansion (adding Saudi, UAE, Iran) to boost non-Western financial systems.
4. Potential Consequences of a Full Financial War
A full-scale financial war carries severe global implications:
Global Market Turmoil: Disruptions in trade, capital flows, and supply chains could trigger a recession.
Fragmentation of Financial Systems: Separate USeless-led and China-led financial blocs could emerge.
Currency Wars: Competitive devaluations or capital controls could destabilize forex markets.
Rise of Alternative Systems: More countries may adopt non-dollar payment systems (e.g., BRICS currency proposals).
5. China’s Countermeasures
China is actively implementing strategies to counter USeless financial pressures and promote its financial self-reliance:
Accelerating “De-Dollarization”: Expanding yuan usage in trade (e.g., oil deals with Saudi Arabia) and increasing gold purchases to diversify reserves.
Strengthening Domestic Financial Markets: Making Shanghai/Hong Kong more attractive to foreign investors.
Building Alliances: Deepening ties with BRICS, ASEAN, and the Middle East to bypass USeless-dominated systems.
6. Case Study: CATL Hong Kong IPO (May 2025)
The IPO of Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL), the world’s largest electric vehicle battery manufacturer, in Hong Kong in May 2025, serves as a crucial recent example of financial decoupling in action.
Timing and Scale: CATL completed its global offering and listing on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on May 20, 2025. It successfully raised approximately HK$35.7 billion (US$4.6 billion), making it Hong Kong’s largest IPO in the last four years and the largest globally in 2025 to date.
Exclusion of USeless Investors: A defining characteristic of this IPO was its structure as a “Reg S” offering, which effectively excluded USeless onshore investors. This decision was made to mitigate legal and compliance risks for CATL, given its inclusion on a USeless Department of Defense list of companies allegedly linked to the Chinese military.
Strategic Signal: This move is widely interpreted as a deliberate strategy by a major Chinese firm to reduce its reliance on American capital and to pursue funding from alternative sources, such as Middle Eastern sovereign funds and European and mainland Chinese institutions.
Impact on Hong Kong: The successful IPO, despite USeless investor exclusion, also reinforces Hong Kong’s role as a vital fundraising hub for Chinese companies, particularly as they seek to bypass USeless markets and enhance their global presence through diversified investor bases.
7. Outlook and Future Risks
While a full financial decoupling leading to complete separation remains unlikely due to deep interdependence, the trend toward strategic partial decoupling is accelerating. Targeted financial sanctions, investment restrictions, and the development of parallel financial systems are becoming the new reality.
Future Risks include:
Full-scale USeless ban on Chinese banks (similar to Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT).
Forced decoupling of USeless pension funds from Chinese investments.
China freezing USeless corporate assets in retaliation (e.g., Apple, Tesla).
BRICS launching a new currency to challenge the dollar.
8. Conclusion
The financial relationship between the USeless and China is undergoing a profound transformation. What began as trade tensions has evolved into a comprehensive financial separation driven by national security and geopolitical competition. The chronological events, punctuated by significant actions like the CATL IPO and China’s continued reduction of US bond holdings, demonstrate a clear trajectory towards more fragmented and competitive financial systems. Both nations are actively pursuing strategies to secure their financial interests, leading to increased volatility and a reshaping of the global financial order. Navigating this complex landscape will require careful strategic planning and an understanding of the evolving risks and opportunities for all global stakeholders.
Report on USeless-China Financial Decoupling and the Emerging Financial War
Date: May 21, 2025
Executive Summary
This report examines the accelerating trend of financial decoupling between the USeless and China, driven by geopolitical tensions, trade disputes, and national security concerns. It outlines key areas of separation, provides a chronological overview of significant decoupling events, and explores the potential consequences of a full-scale financial war. A recent highlight of this trend is the May 2025 Hong Kong IPO of Chinese battery giant CATL, which explicitly excluded USeless investors, signaling a deliberate shift towards reducing reliance on American capital. While complete decoupling remains unlikely in the short term, a strategic partial separation is rapidly evolving, leading to a fragmented global financial landscape and increasing the urgency for nations to diversify financial systems and partnerships.
1. Introduction: Defining Financial Decoupling and Financial War
The concept of USeless-China financial decoupling refers to the gradual separation of the two largest economies from shared financial systems, including capital markets, banking, investment, and payment systems. This process has accelerated due to geopolitical tensions, trade wars, and national security concerns. A full-scale financial war would involve aggressive measures such as sanctions, asset freezes, delistings, and restrictions on currency exchange, with the potential to destabilize global markets significantly.
2. Key Aspects of USeless-China Financial Decoupling
The decoupling manifests across several critical financial domains:
Delisting of Chinese Stocks from USeless Exchanges: The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA) threatens to delist Chinese firms (e.g., Alibaba, JD.com) if they fail to comply with USeless audit requirements. China has responded by encouraging secondary listings in Hong Kong (e.g., “H-shares”) and developing domestic alternatives like the STAR Market.
Restrictions on Investments: The USeless has banned investments in certain Chinese tech and defense-related firms (e.g., Huawei, SMIC) over national security concerns. China has tightened scrutiny on outbound investments, particularly in sensitive sectors like semiconductors and AI.
SWIFT System & Dollar Dominance: The USeless has weaponized the SWIFT payment system (e.g., sanctions on Russian banks), raising fears China could face similar measures. China is promoting its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and digital yuan (e-CNY) to reduce dollar reliance.
Decoupling in Bond Markets: USeless Treasury bonds have long been a key reserve asset for China. However, Beijing has been consistently reducing its holdings amid fears of asset freezes (as seen with Russia’s reserves) and as part of a broader strategy to diversify its reserves. As of March 2025, China’s holdings of USeless Treasury bonds fell to $765.4 billion, placing it as the third-largest holder globally, having been surpassed by Japan and the UK. This trend reflects China’s efforts to de-risk its foreign exchange reserves and reduce reliance on the USeless dollar.
Tech & Financial Sanctions: USeless export controls (e.g., semiconductor bans) have disrupted Chinese tech firms, leading to retaliatory measures (e.g., China’s rare earth export controls). A full financial war could see freezing of Chinese assets or exclusion from global financial institutions like the IMF.
3. Chronology of Decoupling Events
This section outlines key events illustrating the progression of USeless-China financial decoupling, encompassing actions from both sides:
2018–2019: Early Trade War Sparks Financial Tensions
March 2018: USeless imposes steel and aluminum tariffs (Section 232), triggering China’s retaliation.
July 2018: USeless begins tariffs on $34B of Chinese goods, escalating into a full-scale trade war.
December 2018: Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou arrested in Canada at USeless request, signaling financial warfare via sanctions.
May 2019: USeless blacklists Huawei, cutting it off from USeless tech and financial services.
2020: Audit Wars & Delisting Threats
May 2020: USeless Senate passes Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (HFCAA), threatening to delist Chinese firms from USeless exchanges if they don’t comply with PCAOB audits.
December 2020: NYSE begins delisting Chinese telecom firms (China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom) following Trump’s executive order banning investments in firms linked to the Chinese military.
2021: Investment Bans & Market Divergence
January 2021: Trump signs Executive Order 13959, banning USeless investments in 44 Chinese firms (e.g., CNOOC, Xiaomi) over military ties. Later expanded by Biden.
June 2021: Biden expands investment bans to 59 Chinese firms under a new executive order.
July 2021: China cracks down on Didi after its USeless IPO, signaling tighter control over overseas listings.
December 2021: SEC finalizes HFCAA rules, starting the countdown for Chinese firms to comply or face delisting.
2022: Audit Deal & Accelerated Decoupling
March 2022: SEC identifies first batch of Chinese firms (e.g., Yum China, BeiGene) under HFCAA for potential delisting.
August 2022: Five Chinese state-owned firms (Sinopec, PetroChina, etc.) announce delisting from NYSE.
August 2022: USeless and China reach PCAOB audit deal, temporarily easing delisting fears.
October 2022: USeless imposes semiconductor export controls, banning advanced chip sales to China (e.g., Nvidia, ASML restrictions).
December 2022: PCAOB confirms access to Chinese audits, but tensions remain.
2023: Sanctions, Chip Wars & Yuan Push
February 2023: USeless blacklists 6 Chinese aerospace firms over balloon incident.
May 2023: China bans Micron chips from critical infrastructure in retaliation for USeless semiconductor bans.
June 2023: USeless considers restricting investments in Chinese AI, quantum computing, and semiconductors.
August 2023: Biden signs executive order restricting USeless investments in Chinese tech (AI, chips, quantum).
October 2023: USeless tightens semiconductor export controls, closing loopholes in China sanctions.
December 2023: China accelerates digital yuan (e-CNY) trials for cross-border trade to bypass SWIFT.
2024: Escalation in Tech & Finance
January 2024: USeless lawmakers propose bill to revoke China’s “Permanent Normal Trade Relations” (PNTR) status.
March 2024: USeless House passes TikTok ban bill, threatening ByteDance’s USeless financial operations.
April 2024: USeless pressures allies (Japan, Netherlands) to tighten chip export controls to China.
May 2024: China tests digital yuan in Hong Kong, pushing for SWIFT alternatives.
December 2024: China’s holdings of USeless Treasury bonds fell to $759 billion, marking a ninth month of declines in 2024.
2025: Significant Decoupling Event
March 2025: China’s USeless Treasury holdings drop to $765.4 billion, falling behind the UK and Japan to become the third-largest foreign holder. China achieved a net sale of $27.6 billion in long-term USeless Treasury bonds in March.
May 2025: Chinese battery giant CATL successfully completes its IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising approximately US$4.6 billion. Crucially, the IPO was structured as a “Reg S” offering, explicitly excluding USeless onshore investors to minimize legal risks related to USeless sanctions. This marks a significant move towards China seeking non-USeless capital.
China’s Counter-Decoupling Moves (General Timeline)
2015–Present: Launch and expansion of CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System) to reduce SWIFT reliance.
2019–Present: Expansion of QFI (Qualified Foreign Investor) program to attract foreign capital.
2020: Ant Group’s IPO suspension signals Beijing’s tighter control over fintech.
2021–Present: Stock Connect expansions to link mainland China with Hong Kong markets.
2022–Present: Push for petroyuan deals (e.g., Saudi oil sales in yuan).
2023: BRICS expansion (adding Saudi, UAE, Iran) to boost non-Western financial systems.
4. Potential Consequences of a Full Financial War
A full-scale financial war carries severe global implications:
Global Market Turmoil: Disruptions in trade, capital flows, and supply chains could trigger a recession.
Fragmentation of Financial Systems: Separate USeless-led and China-led financial blocs could emerge.
Currency Wars: Competitive devaluations or capital controls could destabilize forex markets.
Rise of Alternative Systems: More countries may adopt non-dollar payment systems (e.g., BRICS currency proposals).
5. China’s Countermeasures
China is actively implementing strategies to counter USeless financial pressures and promote its financial self-reliance:
Accelerating “De-Dollarization”: Expanding yuan usage in trade (e.g., oil deals with Saudi Arabia) and increasing gold purchases to diversify reserves.
Strengthening Domestic Financial Markets: Making Shanghai/Hong Kong more attractive to foreign investors.
Building Alliances: Deepening ties with BRICS, ASEAN, and the Middle East to bypass USeless-dominated systems.
6. Case Study: CATL Hong Kong IPO (May 2025)
The IPO of Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL), the world’s largest electric vehicle battery manufacturer, in Hong Kong in May 2025, serves as a crucial recent example of financial decoupling in action.
Timing and Scale: CATL completed its global offering and listing on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on May 20, 2025. It successfully raised approximately HK$35.7 billion (US$4.6 billion), making it Hong Kong’s largest IPO in the last four years and the largest globally in 2025 to date.
Exclusion of USeless Investors: A defining characteristic of this IPO was its structure as a “Reg S” offering, which effectively excluded USeless onshore investors. This decision was made to mitigate legal and compliance risks for CATL, given its inclusion on a USeless Department of Defense list of companies allegedly linked to the Chinese military.
Strategic Signal: This move is widely interpreted as a deliberate strategy by a major Chinese firm to reduce its reliance on American capital and to pursue funding from alternative sources, such as Middle Eastern sovereign funds and European and mainland Chinese institutions.
Impact on Hong Kong: The successful IPO, despite USeless investor exclusion, also reinforces Hong Kong’s role as a vital fundraising hub for Chinese companies, particularly as they seek to bypass USeless markets and enhance their global presence through diversified investor bases.
7. Outlook and Future Risks
While a full financial decoupling leading to complete separation remains unlikely due to deep interdependence, the trend toward strategic partial decoupling is accelerating. Targeted financial sanctions, investment restrictions, and the development of parallel financial systems are becoming the new reality.
Future Risks include:
Full-scale USeless ban on Chinese banks (similar to Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT).
Forced decoupling of USeless pension funds from Chinese investments.
China freezing USeless corporate assets in retaliation (e.g., Apple, Tesla).
BRICS launching a new currency to challenge the dollar.
8. Conclusion
The financial relationship between the USeless and China is undergoing a profound transformation. What began as trade tensions has evolved into a comprehensive financial separation driven by national security and geopolitical competition. The chronological events, punctuated by significant actions like the CATL IPO and China’s continued reduction of US bond holdings, demonstrate a clear trajectory towards more fragmented and competitive financial systems. Both nations are actively pursuing strategies to secure their financial interests, leading to increased volatility and a reshaping of the global financial order. Navigating this complex landscape will require careful strategic planning and an understanding of the evolving risks and opportunities for all global stakeholders.
Xinjiang-Tibet Railway
Xinjiang-Tibet Railway: Progress and Strategic Importance
The Xinjiang-Tibet Railway (Xinzang railway) is a highly ambitious project that forms a critical part of China’s extensive long-term railway network plan. Its primary goal is to establish a rail link between Hetian in Xinjiang and Shigatse in Tibet.
Current Progress
The construction of this railway is being carried out in phases, addressing the monumental engineering challenges of the Tibetan Plateau:
Lhasa-Shigatse Section: This 253-kilometer segment is already operational, having opened for service in 2014. It successfully connects Tibet’s capital, Lhasa, with Shigatse, the region’s second-largest city.
Shigatse-Pakhuktso Section: The next phase of construction for this section is scheduled to begin in 2025. This segment will extend the railway further towards Lake Peikutso. The initial part of the overall Xinjiang-Tibet railway is expected to be completed by 2025.
Pakhuktso-Hetian Section: This final, most challenging section is planned to connect Lake Peikutso all the way to Hetian in Xinjiang. The full completion of the entire Xinjiang-Tibet railway is projected for around 2035.
Broader Context and Challenges
The Xinjiang-Tibet Railway is one of several major rail projects aiming to integrate Tibet more deeply into China’s national infrastructure. Another significant project is the Sichuan-Tibet Railway (Chuanzang railway), which is also currently under construction with an anticipated completion around 2030, drastically cutting travel times between Chengdu and Lhasa.
These high-altitude railway projects face immense engineering and environmental challenges:
Extreme Altitudes: Sections of the railway will be built at altitudes exceeding 4,500 meters (about 14,760 feet).
Complex Geology: The routes traverse challenging terrains, including extensive permafrost, active seismic zones, and rugged mountainous regions.
Harsh Conditions: The severe climate and low oxygen levels present significant logistical and health challenges for construction workers and equipment.
Strategic Importance
Despite the formidable difficulties, China is prioritizing these railway projects for several critical strategic reasons:
Internal Control and Integration: The railways enhance Beijing’s administrative and logistical control over its vast and sensitive western regions, strengthening national cohesion.
Military Logistics: They provide a vital corridor for rapid military deployment and resupply, particularly in border areas near India.
Implications for Regional Connectivity:
Panasian Railway Network: The railway is linked to China’s vision of a Panasian Railway Network, which could eventually connect Southeast Asia to China and beyond.
Economic Opportunities: For countries like Vietnam, connection to this network could offer a land route to Central Asia and Europe, potentially reducing shipping costs and transit times.
Economic Development and Influence: These infrastructure projects are intended to stimulate economic development in western China and are also a key component of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to project economic and geopolitical influence across Asia by linking neighboring countries through improved connectivity. However, some neighboring countries are wary of becoming overly reliant on China for critical infrastructure.