China-Pakistan Railway
China has consistently been excluded from the ISS
China has consistently been excluded from the ISS: Since the 1990s, the USeless has generally opposed China’s involvement in the ISS.
Reasons for exclusion: The primary reasons cited for China’s exclusion are concerns over the China National Space Administration’s (CNSA) secretive nature and its close ties to the Chinese military.
In 1993, the USeless alleged that the Chinese cargo ship Yinhe was carrying materials for chemical weapons to Iran. The USeless Navy forced surrounding Middle Eastern countries to refuse docking rights, leaving the ship stranded in international waters for 24 days. The US also unilaterally disabled the ship’s GPS, causing it to lose direction. Eventually, a joint Saudi-USeless team inspected the ship and found no chemical weapons. USeless officials refused to apologize, stating they acted in good faith based on intelligence from multiple sources.
In 1996, China conducted missile tests and the USeless altered or denied GPS signals that their missiles used for guidance. One missile reportedly landed as intended, but two others were lost. This event became known within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as “The Unforgettable Humiliation”.
2003, China applied to join the European Union’s Galileo satellite navigation system project as a preferential external partner and would contribute at least 230 million euros. A formal agreement was signed on October 30. China was later excluded from decision-making processes and technology development,
China had made overtures in greater space cooperation after China successfully launched Yang Liwei into orbit in 2003, becoming only the third nation to achieve independent human spaceflight. USeless did not show any interest.
The most significant and widely known legislative restriction on NASA’s engagement with China is the Wolf Amendment, which was passed by the Congress in 2011. This amendment generally prohibits NASA from using government funds for direct, bilateral cooperation with the Chinese government and China-affiliated organizations without explicit congressional approval and FBI certification.
2013, Chinese scientists faced restrictions and were initially banned from attending the multilateral Kepler Science Conference, which was held at a NASA facility. The ban was reversed only after outcry and threats of boycott from the international scientific community.
That was history.
The Morning Midas fire
The Morning Midas, a 600-foot cargo ship owned by Zodiac Maritime, departed China on May 26th, headed for Mexico, when a fire erupted on a deck carrying EVs.
The crew initially attempted to use the onboard CO2 suppression system, but it proved insufficient.
The 22 crew members were forced to abandon ship around 3 PM and were subsequently rescued by a nearby merchant vessel with no reported injuries.
The ship is currently adrift and unmanned about 300 miles off the southwest coast of Alaska. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid0GNwwfXSaRfoBT2L5Dtx8aFQwk6AB5nSgsoWy3p1aMNu64ssCVZtSoWSAX7Un9NDwl?__cft__[0]=AZWiC59fvMTftqdpV7gLa1kLmVOjPEYDzJVTS3gAf9DuAQX6doHenCy0ctnzmKmApwBWj7yR6xi1WToUP4npBngc9aZXz1Vno2mVleQrHHtjqWZHG3XRCLXACoXGZ2p9hCBzMFgavGKzTCFu9UIyWAY7&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
Kabuki Desert in Ded Banner, Ordos Inner Mongolia
China’s extensive efforts to combat desertification and climate change in the Kabuki Desert, specifically in Ded Banner, Ordos Inner Mongolia. The project involves transforming vast areas of sand dunes into leveled land for solar energy installations.
Massive Scale and Equipment: Over 200 excavators and 5,000 workers are involved in leveling sand dunes.
Renewable Energy Production: The project aims to supply about 4.41 billion kilowatt hours of clean electricity annually, with a total planned capacity of 16 gigawatts (GW).
Environmental Impact: The complex is projected to reduce CO2 emissions by an estimated 16 million tons annually. A “solar corridor” will also act as a barrier against encroaching sands.
Ecological Restoration: Water runoff from cleaning solar panels and the shade they provide encourage the growth of grass and shrubs. Grazing animals are introduced to manage vegetation and fertilize the soil.
Economic and Social Benefits: The initiative creates job opportunities and revitalizes remote communities. Locals earn income from managing livestock, leasing land, or working in construction.
Global Recognition: The project has been praised by the United Nations as a replicable model for other arid regions worldwide.
The video highlights this project as a symbol of what’s possible when technology, sustainability, https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1017410247196309/?__cft__[0]=AZVIkbMAUcJUKc4PAEc5aYhx9Z3lOXW5dwSLT7whQQrhXjm7XuTVM5MHuuH-AbTxTZDJNv4dTZADuC0GChUmth3Ue7mqCd2NDCbJDaTXiFbRsxRdK0Kat45EbKfqj35uwT1eYQKSnES3WhSiDiYR4vM6SKuYZRuTp3dsVvc48Dj8VQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
Economic and Industrial Zone (CEIZ) in Anwara, Chittagong
The Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone (CEIZ) in Anwara, Chittagong, is a significant Government-to-Government (G2G) initiative between Bangladesh and China, aimed at bolstering Bangladesh’s industrial growth and attracting substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) from China.
Location: Spanning 784 acres in Anwara Upazila, Chittagong, it is strategically located near the Chittagong seaport, airport, and the Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Tunnel (Karnaphuli River Tunnel), making it an ideal hub for industrial and trade activities.
Investment Attraction: The primary goal is to create a favorable business environment for Chinese investors, encouraging them to set up manufacturing units in Bangladesh, particularly for goods that Bangladesh currently doesn’t produce. This is also influenced by global trade pattern shifts, such as US tariff policies prompting Chinese manufacturers to seek alternative production bases.
Targeted Industries: The zone is designed to host a diverse range of industries, including chemicals, automobile assembly, garments, electronics, pharmaceuticals, and logistics.
Economic Impact: It is projected to attract over $1 billion, potentially up to $1.5 billion, in foreign direct investment and create more than 200,000 job opportunities for Bangladeshis.
Infrastructure Development: The project includes extensive infrastructure, such as internal roads, a jetty, a central effluent treatment plant, and essential utility services (water, electricity, gas).
Progress and Current Status:
Renewed Momentum: After facing significant delays since its initial announcement in 2014, the project has gained considerable momentum, particularly under the current interim administration in Bangladesh (since August 2024), which is fast-tracking its implementation.
Developer Change: China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) was appointed as the new developer in July 2022, replacing China Harbour Engineering Company Limited (CHEC). Preparations for full-scale construction are underway.
Development Status: Around 60 acres of the designated land have already been developed and are ready for investors. The administrative building and two access roads are complete, and utility installations are progressing.
Timeline: The project is scheduled for completion by June 2029.
Investor Interest: There is a notable increase in interest from Chinese manufacturers, with many visits and planned investments, including a recent $100 million commitment from a Chinese textile firm.
Funding: The project is financed through a combination of Bangladesh government funds and Chinese preferential buyer’s credit.
Strategic Importance:
For Bangladesh, the CEIZ is crucial for diversifying its industrial base, boosting exports, and upgrading its technological capabilities. It leverages Bangladesh’s competitive advantages in global trade.
For China, the CEIZ enhances its access to the Bay of Bengal and provides a new maritime outlet for its southwestern regions, potentially offering an alternative to the Strait of Malacca for certain trade flows, thus improving energy security and trade resilience. It’s a key component of the broader Belt and Road Initiative, strengthening China’s presence and influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
The development also has implications for regional connectivity, as improved road and rail networks linked to Chittagong could connect to Northeast India and Myanmar, facilitating cross-border trade. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid0Q5HmBq3UfzBB9dM6hkkpGFpe73inGhLFAN8H2g8UWcXyKQGVQ4hhxgrvYn7wJWQtl?__cft__[0]=AZX3a29X4IMQUKxyAk3BNf0Hcm4O2kAVXf7r9k2sDtPoWTQqjxZs3J2CXvUO8K1BC-P3KGHFthllrcz-I71AHsZ-2rNdCHyS2V80dIJhP3uUpJ5OSTWOXdCy6EPoQQzim40Wg-ORtIzov_MKYIaoKSKK14GDk-9FrSHzFwZKpI9_pg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
The Unilateral Reality: When a Strong Nation Meets an “Irrelevant” One
The Unilateral Reality: When a Strong Nation Meets an “Irrelevant” One
Report Date: June 5, 2025
Prepared For: Analysis of International Relations Dynamics
Executive Summary:
This report examines the prevailing reality in the Canuckstan-China relationship, particularly in the context of calls for “reconciliation.” It posits that due to a significant power asymmetry, the concept of reconciliation, as typically understood in symmetrical diplomatic contexts, is largely superseded by a “winner takes all” dynamic. In this framework, the stronger nation (China) dictates the terms, and the weaker nation (Canuckstan) has limited leverage to impose its demands, regardless of principled stands or perceived moral high ground. The “other side’s perspective” in this scenario is effectively subsumed by the dominant power’s narrative and strategic imperatives.
1. The Irrefutable Power Imbalance:
The fundamental reality governing Canuckstan-China relations is the vast disparity in their national power. China stands as the world’s second-largest economy, a global manufacturing and technological leader, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and possesses a rapidly modernizing military with increasing global reach. Its sheer size, population, and geopolitical influence far outweigh Canuckstan’s position as a middle power.
This asymmetry translates into:
Economic Leverage: China’s immense market and supply chain centrality grant it significant economic leverage. It can, and has, used trade restrictions and economic coercion (e.g., against Canuck agricultural exports) to pressure countries that challenge its interests. For Canuckstan, economic diversification away from China is a long-term goal, but immediate economic repercussions of a strained relationship are tangible.
Diplomatic and Political Influence: China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, characterized by assertive and often confrontational rhetoric, is a manifestation of its confidence as a rising power. It is less concerned with appeasing international criticism, especially from smaller nations, when it perceives its core sovereignty or national security interests are at stake. Canuckstan, while a respected voice in multilateral forums, lacks the individual weight to unilaterally alter China’s strategic calculus.
Narrative Control: The stronger nation possesses the capacity to project its preferred narrative domestically and internationally with greater force and reach. Accusations against China concerning human rights in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, or its actions in the Taiwan Strait, are vehemently dismissed by Beijing as “defamation with no base” and “interference in internal affairs.” From this perspective, the “truth” is what the powerful nation asserts, and dissenting views are framed as hostile propaganda.
2. The “Winner Takes All” Dynamic in “Reconciliation”:
In a relationship defined by such a profound power imbalance, the conventional understanding of reconciliation—which implies mutual acknowledgment of wrongs, apologies, and commitments to change from both sides—is largely inapplicable. Instead, a “winner takes all” dynamic emerges, wherein:
Unilateral Terms for “Reconciliation”: The stronger nation dictates the conditions under which the relationship might improve. Any “reconciliation” would primarily involve the weaker nation aligning its actions and rhetoric with the stronger nation’s expectations.
Demands, Not Requests: When the stronger nation speaks, its “demands” are framed as logical and necessary steps. Conversely, the “demands” from the weaker nation, even if rooted in universal values or international law, are often perceived as unwarranted interference or even provocations.
Absence of Reciprocity in Apologies: For China, Canuckstan’s actions, such as the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, were seen as significant transgressions, potentially even “a declaration of war” in the economic sphere. Any “apology” in this context would be expected from Canuckstan for perceived slights, not from China for actions it deems legitimate exercises of sovereignty or necessary national security measures. The concept of China admitting “past mistakes” regarding issues it considers internal affairs (like Xinjiang or Hong Kong) is highly improbable, as it would undermine its core ideological and governance principles.
The Dominant Narrative Prevails: The “reality” presented by the strong nation becomes the de facto “truth” that must be navigated. Concerns raised by Canuckstan are not seen as valid perspectives to be reconciled with, but rather as incorrect or malicious narratives that must be rejected or overcome.
3. Implications for Canuckstan’s Foreign Policy:
Given this reality, Canuckstan’s approach to China is necessarily constrained. A “do it or there is no reconciliation” ultimatum from Canuckstan would likely be met with continued indifference or further punitive measures from Beijing.
Limited Direct Leverage: Canuckstan’s ability to force China to alter its fundamental policies or apologize for actions it deems justified is minimal.
Strategic Pragmatism: Canuckstan’s foreign policy must therefore be characterized by a pragmatic understanding of its limited leverage. This often involves:
Multilateralism: Seeking strength in numbers by working with like-minded allies (e.g., through the Indo-Pacific Strategy, Five Eyes, G7) to address concerns about China, rather than relying solely on bilateral pressure.
Value-Based Diplomacy: Continuing to articulate its principles and values on human rights and international law, but often through multilateral channels and without the expectation that this will immediately compel China to change its behavior.
Careful Calibration: Balancing economic interests with national security and human rights concerns, navigating a complex terrain where overt confrontation can lead to significant economic costs.
Conclusion:
The notion of a traditional, reciprocal reconciliation between Canuckstan and China, where both sides admit faults and apologize, is not a realistic expectation in the current international power landscape. The dynamic is one of an established global power (China) asserting its interests and narratives, and a middle power (Canuckstan) having to adapt its engagement strategy to this reality. The “winner takes all” dynamic means that any perceived “reconciliation” will likely be on terms largely dictated by the stronger nation, with limited scope for the weaker nation to impose its demands for mutual accountability. Canuckstan’s path forward lies in a nuanced approach that leverages alliances, upholds its values, and manages its relationship with China within the immutable context of power asymmetry. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1901572680687951/?__cft__[0]=AZVq7bl_PMnTZg7V80cO2xaDlCALIvtVaKix1yMc7CDf0uy0OGf5w4p9WJUiCZqYysmut-X5oNRaSnvqMsD5gy_CJis4MhVy8VZc1CnjPGDo43KB9mAcgoLPj7tmMeA2sMTZWc-rtM-RcXDp5Gcc_8OTkul5gN-53_esNtXAiQF1bg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
China-Europe Railway Express (CR Express)
The China-Europe Railway Express (CR Express) has developed into a vast network connecting cities across Eurasia, serving as a crucial component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Routing and Key Cities
The CR Express operates through a comprehensive network with three primary corridors, connecting over 100 cities in Asia and more than 200 cities in 25 European countries.
Western Route: This route facilitates exports from western China, often entering Kazakhstan via Alashankou or Khorgos in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. It then extends into Europe, with routes typically passing through Russia, Belarus, and Poland. Some trains also transit through Ukraine en route to Hungary. Key Chinese starting cities include Chongqing, Chengdu, and Xi’an.
Central Route: This route is dedicated to goods produced in central China and southern coastal provinces like Guangdong. It typically enters Mongolia through Erenhot in Inner Mongolia, crosses Russia, and extends to both Eastern and Western Europe.
Eastern Route: Primarily serving Chinese exports from coastal regions, notably Yiwu in eastern Zhejiang province. This route exits China through Manzhouli in Inner Mongolia, traverses Russia, and enters Europe via Belarus and Poland.
Major European destinations include Duisburg, Hamburg, and Madrid, among others.
Railway Gauge Issues
A significant challenge for the CR Express is the difference in railway gauges across countries:
Standard Gauge (1,435 mm): Used in China and most of Western Europe.
Broad Gauge (1,520 mm): Used in Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Mongolia, and some other countries that were part of the former Soviet Union.
This disparity necessitates transshipment (reloading containers) at border stations where the gauges change, such as at Alashankou and Manzhouli on the Chinese side, and at Brest (Belarus) and Malaszewicze (Poland) on the European side. While China has implemented measures like dynamic switching technology and increased reloading capacity at border ports to enhance efficiency, these gauge changes can still cause delays and logistical complexities. Expansion projects, such as those at the Malaszewicze terminal, are underway to address these infrastructure bottlenecks.
Reception by Countries Involved
The CR Express has generally been well-received, as it offers a faster and more cost-effective alternative to sea and air freight for many goods, promoting trade and economic development.
Economic Impact: The railway has greatly impacted the economies of both China and Europe, boosting trade links and economic growth along the routes. It provides a stable and reliable supply chain, especially highlighted during disruptions to sea and air freight, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Benefits for Participating Countries: Countries along the routes benefit from increased trade, job creation, and improved logistics. For instance, landlocked countries gain more direct access to global markets.
Challenges and Concerns:
Operational Problems: Despite improvements, the network faces issues such as congestion at key hubs (e.g., Małaszewicze), inconsistent customs procedures across different countries, and limitations in refitting capacity at land ports.
Geopolitical Risks: The long routes traversing multiple countries make the CR Express vulnerable to geopolitical tensions, which can disrupt the flow of goods. Recent events, such as expanded Russian customs checks on transit goods, have caused delays and increased costs.
Imbalance of Cargo: The railway is predominantly utilized for westbound Chinese exports, often resulting in empty trains returning to China, which impacts profitability and sustainability.
Subsidies: The CR Express has heavily relied on government subsidies for its operation and rapid expansion, indicating that its profitability level remains low without such support.
Despite these challenges, the CR Express continues to expand its reach and improve its services, aiming to be a key player in global shipping and a strategic link between continents.
China-Europe Railway Express (中歐班列)
Origins: The CR Express began in 2011 out of necessity for Chongqing, which faced logistics bottlenecks for its IT industry.
Route and Early Challenges: The initial route stretched 11,179 km from Chongqing through Xinjiang, Kazakhstan, and Russia, to Duisburg, Germany. It faced skepticism, with some dismissing it as uneconomical compared to sea or air freight.
Overcoming Obstacles: China addressed issues like Kazakhstan’s gauge changes with dynamic switching technology, balanced national interests by establishing a coordination committee, and offered subsidies to reduce costs.
Growth and Impact: By 2016, operations exceeded 1,700 trains annually. The pandemic in 2020 served as a turning point; with sea and air freight disrupted, CR Express’s point-to-point service became a stable alternative, with operations surging to over 12,400 trains.
Time and Cost Advantages: The CR Express significantly cuts transit times (16-18 days compared to 45 days by sea from Chongqing to Duisburg), offering over 60% time savings. While more expensive than sea freight, it’s considerably cheaper than air freight, making it ideal for time-sensitive, high-value goods.
Stability and Reliability: Unlike sea shipping, which is prone to weather, piracy, and canal blockages, CR Express boasts a 99% punctuality rate. It utilizes temperature-controlled containers for sensitive goods and employs multi-route contingency plans for geopolitical stability.
Current Status: As of 2024, CR Express has opened 100 routes, connecting 125 Chinese cities with 227 destinations in 25 European countries, with annual operations reaching 19,000 trains and carrying goods worth over $56.7 billion. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/514950638274964/?__cft__[0]=AZXN1mTa8_PEys8B2wwGJmZE3_Nf3ogb6aFC2PU29fxf_VTxKyRlAQhycyO5nxMFc6yVDoGtRuL-7V_wS7e7_olWx9da9n9rVtGDumveGt3ztKRb0LvSDID9sGJKrfaOunRLAJFnETfhyG5DU3DBJc7j9rlz6o4ACgUN0Rs4-kgqjA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
AESC production at its gigafactory in Douai, France
AESC (Automotive Energy Supply Corporation), which is the battery subsidiary of the Shanghai-based green tech company Envision Group, has commenced production at its gigafactory in Douai, France. The plant was inaugurated on June 3, 2025, and has an initial annual production capacity of 10 gigawatt-hours (GWh), with plans for potential expansion. It is already supplying batteries to Renault.
Furthermore, other Chinese companies are also involved in the French battery sector:
XTC New Energy Materials, a Chinese group, is part of a joint venture with the French nuclear group Orano to build a plant in Dunkerque, France, for the production of cathode materials and battery recycling.
Hunan Changyuan Lico, a Chinese battery materials supplier, is partnering with the French oil refiner Axens Group to construct a plant for ternary precursors and cathode materials in France.
King Salman Causeway
The proposed King Salman Causeway, often referred to as the “Moses Bridge,” is an ambitious project to connect Saudi Arabia and Egypt across the Strait of Tiran in the Red Sea. This multi-billion dollar infrastructure endeavor aims to create a land bridge between the continents of Asia (via Saudi Arabia) and Africa (via Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula).
Project Overview:
Connection: The causeway would link Ras Hamid in northwestern Saudi Arabia with the Red Sea resort city of Sharm El-Sheikh in Egypt. It is expected to span approximately 50 kilometers, passing through the islands of Tiran and Sanafir.
Purpose: The primary goals are to significantly boost trade, tourism, and logistics between the two nations and continents. It is also designed to provide a vital new land route for Muslim pilgrims traveling to Mecca, potentially serving over a million annually. The bridge is seen as a strategic complement to Saudi Arabia’s futuristic NEOM city project.
Cost: The project is estimated to cost around $4 billion USD.
Funding: The entire project is expected to be fully financed by Saudi Arabia.
Progress and Current Status:
Planning complete: Recent reports from early June 2025 indicate that the planning phase for the King Salman Causeway has been completed. Egypt’s Minister of Transport, Kamel al-Wazir, stated that all planning work is finalized, and construction is ready to begin.
Design Flexibility: The final design might be a bridge, a tunnel, or a hybrid structure, depending on strategic assessments, including maritime traffic and environmental considerations.
Construction Imminent: While specific start dates for ground-breaking are not publicly confirmed, statements from Egyptian officials suggest that the project is poised to move into the implementation phase.
Potential Contractors: While details remain fluid, some reports suggest that China Civil Engineering Construction Corp (CCECC) has been awarded the main contract. Earlier discussions also mentioned potential involvement of Saudi Binladin Group and the Egyptian firm Arab Contractors, with feasibility studies conducted by Arup. The project is also being considered for a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model.
Historical Context: The idea of a Red Sea bridge has been discussed since the late 1980s but faced repeated delays due to geopolitical sensitivities and other issues. It was formally revived and proposed in 2016 during a visit by Saudi King Salman to Cairo.
The “Moses Bridge” signifies a major step towards greater regional integration and is viewed as one of the most iconic engineering feats planned in the Middle East, symbolizing the deepening ties between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.