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BC to buy new vessels from China Merchants Industry Weihai Shipyards

Say goodbye to the rust buckets that constantly break down. BC Ferries, a company owned and subsidized by the province of British Columbia, has recently announced its decision to purchase four new vessels from China Merchants Industry Weihai Shipyards, a state-owned shipyard in China. This decision has sparked significant controversy in British Columbia and Canada.

No Canadian Bids: BC Ferries stated that no Canadian shipyards submitted bids for the project. Seaspan, British Columbia’s largest shipbuilder, indicated they are currently busy with orders for the Royal Canadian Navy and Canadian Coast Guard and cannot compete with lower-wage countries on commercial contracts.

Cost and Value: BC Ferries CEO Nicholas Jimenez stated the decision was based on getting the “best possible deal for customers,” citing the Chinese shipyard’s technical capabilities, high-quality and safety standards, ferry-building experience, reliable timelines, and overall cost and value. While the exact contract value has not been disclosed, BC Ferries claims it fits within the approved budget and that building in Europe would be twice as expensive, and three times the cost if a Canadian company had bid.

Government Disappointment and Geopolitical Concerns: British Columbia’s Transportation Minister, Mike Farnworth, expressed disappointment that more involvement from Canadian shipyards was not part of the contract. He also raised concerns about procuring services from a country “actively harming Canada’s economy” with tariffs and protectionism, referencing ongoing trade disputes between Canada and China. Premier David Eby, while on an Asian trade mission that excluded China, has also expressed past concerns about China’s role in issues like money laundering and election interference.

Economic Impact and “Buy Local” Policy: Critics, including the BC Federation of Labour and the Opposition BC Conservatives, argue that the decision sends hundreds of millions of dollars out of the province and goes against the provincial government’s “buy-B.C.” rhetoric. They believe the contract should have been an opportunity to invest in domestic shipbuilding, create jobs, and stimulate the local economy.

BC Ferries’ Defense: BC Ferries maintains that the procurement process was global and thorough, including site visits and third-party checks. They emphasize the need to replace aging vessels quickly and affordably to avoid service disruptions. They also highlight that while the ships are built overseas, over $1 billion in maintenance and refits over the vessels’ 45-year lifespan is expected to flow back into the B.C. maritime sector.

Contract Protections: BC Ferries CEO Jimenez stated they have a “very, very strong contract” with the Chinese shipyard, with most of the payment tied to delivery and including refund guarantees and fixed-price terms to protect BC Ferries. They will also have a team of experts on-site at the shipyard throughout construction for oversight and quality assurance.

Party Backlash: Even within the ruling NDP, there has been internal criticism, with the provincial labour movement successfully passing an emergency motion at a party council meeting, rebuking the premier for not intervening to ensure the ships were built in B.C.

The new vessels are expected to be diesel-battery hybrid propulsion systems, with the capability to operate on full electric power in the future. The first of the four new ferries is expected to come into service in 2029, with the others following by 2031.

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The Canuck House of Commons Transport Committee has decided to investigate the C$1 billion loan from the Canuck Infrastructure Bank to BC Ferries. This loan is intended for the purchase of four new hybrid-electric vessels from a Chinese shipbuilding company.

The committee plans to summon Canuck Minister of Transport Chrystia Freeland, Infrastructure Minister Gregor Robertson, and the CEOs of BC Ferries and the Canuck Infrastructure Bank to testify in a hearing within the next 30 days.

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China is rapidly advancing its satellite internet capabilities

China is rapidly advancing its satellite internet capabilities with several ambitious mega-constellations under development, most notably Guowang and G60 (also known as SpaceSail or Qianfan). While a definitive single “commercial availability” date for a nationwide Chinese satellite internet service is not yet set, here’s what the current information suggests:

Regional Service:

Geespace (a subsidiary of Geely) has already begun commercial deployment in regions, including the Middle East (as of June 2024) and plans to expand into Southeast Asia and Africa in the coming years.

The G60 (SpaceSail) constellation aims to provide regional service by the end of 2025. They have already signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Brazil for service starting in 2026 and are in business negotiations with over 30 countries.

Global Service:

The G60 (SpaceSail) constellation has a stated goal of providing global service by the end of 2027. They plan to have 1,296 satellites in orbit by then, increasing to 15,000 by 2030 to offer direct-to-mobile service.

The Guowang constellation, run by state-owned China Satellite Services, is also aiming for global coverage, with a massive plan of 12,992 satellites. While test launches are ongoing, a specific global commercial launch date is less defined than for G60, but their overall timeline aims for completion by 2030.

Competition: China’s efforts are seen as a direct challenge to SpaceX’s Starlink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper, aiming to compete in the global satellite internet market.

“Digital Iron Curtain”: Some analysts express concern that China’s satellite internet services could extend its model of digital authoritarianism and censorship globally.

Rapid Development: China’s commercial space sector is growing rapidly, with significant government support and increased investor interest, indicating a strong commitment to these projects.

In summary, we can expect to see regional commercial availability of Chinese satellite internet services potentially by late 2025 or 2026, with global coverage targeted by late 2027 or 2030 as their mega-constellations are fully deployed.

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Chinese “super embassy” in London

There are strong rumors and accusations that the potential approval of the Chinese “super embassy” in London is linked to, or is part of an exchange for, the lifting of sanctions by China against certain UK Members of Parliament.

“Offering to Labour” Accusation: Leading sanctioned MPs, such as Sir Iain Duncan Smith (who is one of the nine predominantly Tory parliamentarians sanctioned by China in 2021 for speaking out against human rights abuses in Xinjiang), have explicitly stated this. Duncan Smith has been quoted saying that China’s offer to lift sanctions is “an offering from China” to the Labour government to “grease the wheels” for their proposed new embassy facility at Royal Mint Court.

Timing of Developments: The timing is seen by critics as suspicious. The Labour government, under Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, has reportedly moved quickly to re-engage with China since taking power in July 2024. This includes high-level meetings, and Starmer himself reportedly spoke with President Xi Jinping to press for the embassy’s approval, leading to the decision being “called in” by the Deputy Prime Minister. Simultaneously, reports from The Guardian (as noted by the Global Times) emerged in June 2025 suggesting China is considering lifting the 2021 sanctions on UK MPs.

Chinese Foreign Ministry’s Response: When asked directly if the lifting of sanctions was discussed during recent China-UK official meetings, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated they were “not aware of the specifics of the issue” but stressed that “Equality, mutual benefit, and meeting each other halfway form the foundation for growing bilateral relations and the principle for solving any differences.” This non-committal but suggestive language can be interpreted in various ways.

Political Context: The previous Conservative government had opposed the embassy project, partly due to grave warnings from domestic intelligence services about espionage risks. The current Labour government’s perceived readiness to approve it, coupled with the potential lifting of sanctions, is fueling the “dirty deal” narrative, particularly among opposition MPs and human rights advocates.

While there is no explicit, publicly confirmed “deal” or official statement from either government directly linking the two issues, the coinciding developments and the vocal accusations from sanctioned MPs strongly suggest that this exchange is indeed a significant rumor with some perceived basis in the political maneuvering between the two countries. Critics argue that it shows the UK government prioritizing economic and diplomatic engagement with China, potentially at the expense of human rights principles.

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Second China-Central Asia Summit

The Second China-Central Asia Summit in Astana marks a significant continuation and deepening of cooperation established at the inaugural summit in Xi’an in May 2023. The consensus to “uphold the ‘China-Central Asia spirit,’ persist in permanent good-neighborliness and friendship, and collaboratively advance the construction of a China-Central Asia community with a shared future” highlights a commitment to a long-term, comprehensive partnership.

1. “China-Central Asia Spirit” and Political Trust:

Deepened Mutual Trust: The “China-Central Asia Spirit” is characterized by “mutual respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit, and mutual assistance for the joint pursuit of modernization through high-quality development.” This has translated into closer political dialogue and coordination on regional and international issues.

Legal Foundation: A major step forward is the signing of a treaty on “eternal good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation” at the Astana summit. This legally enshrines the principle of everlasting friendship and provides a solid foundation for future relations.

Institutionalization: The establishment of the China-Central Asia mechanism and the regular Foreign Ministers’ Meeting mechanism in 2020, along with the creation of the China-Central Asia Secretariat in early 2024, demonstrates a strong move towards institutionalizing cooperation.

Support for Core Interests: Both sides have committed to firmly supporting each other in safeguarding independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national dignity, and in choosing development paths suitable to their respective national conditions.

2. Economic Cooperation and Trade:

Rapid Trade Growth: Since the Xi’an Summit, two-way trade has seen significant growth. In 2024, trade reached a record high of nearly $95 billion, up by $5.4 billion from the previous year, and is expected to exceed $100 billion in 2025. China remains Central Asia’s top trading partner and a major source of investment.

Diversified Trade: While Central Asia exports agricultural products like honey, fruits, wheat, and poultry to China, Chinese new energy vehicles (NEVs) and photovoltaic products are increasingly entering Central Asian markets. This includes Chinese-brand NEVs accelerating their entry, with 51,000 units exported to Central Asia through Khorgos Port in 2023 (a 608.5% increase).

Industrial Investment: There’s been important progress in industrial investment, with examples like China National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Group jointly acquiring a stake in Kazakhstan’s Allur Group, leading to a significant increase in automobile production and sales. BYD has also established an NEV factory in Uzbekistan.

Energy Cooperation: The China-Central Asia Gas Pipeline continues to be a major overland route for China’s natural gas imports, and cooperation in renewable energy (solar and wind power) is emerging.

Agricultural Cooperation: Chinese crop varieties, technologies, machinery, and agricultural supplies are flowing into Central Asia, while Central Asian agricultural products are diversifying Chinese markets.

3. Connectivity and Infrastructure (Belt and Road Initiative – BRI):

Central Role of BRI: The Belt and Road Initiative continues to play a central role in advancing cooperation, with Central Asia serving as a crucial gateway to Europe.

Railway Development:

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) Railway: This is a flagship project with groundbreaking for mainline construction advancing. Once completed, it will provide Kyrgyzstan with its first direct route to the sea and serve as an important corridor connecting Asia-Pacific with Europe.

China-Europe Freight Trains: These services are expanding, with 4,725 trips made in the first four months of 2025, up 21% year-on-year, significantly enhancing transportation efficiency and quality.

Beijing-Central Asia Freight Train Service: A new service launched in March 2025, creating an efficient land corridor for exporting high-value, high-tech products from the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region.

Other Infrastructure: Projects like the China-Kazakhstan crude oil pipeline, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan highway, and the China-Tajikistan expressway are contributing to a more robust logistics network. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route has been upgraded and expanded.

Port Infrastructure and Airway Transportation: Efforts are being made to advance the upgrading of port infrastructure and further open up airway transportation markets, developing regional logistics networks.

4. People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges:

Visa-Free Arrangements: China has made mutual visa-free arrangements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, facilitating significant travel between the countries (e.g., over 1.2 million travels between China and Kazakhstan in 2024).

Educational and Vocational Training: Progress has been made in establishing cultural centers, opening branches of Chinese universities, and launching Luban Workshops (e.g., in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) to cultivate technical talents and provide opportunities for youth.

Tourism and Cultural Events: Tourism and cultural years, as well as art festivals, are popular, with examples like the first cultural tourist train trip between Xi’an and Almaty.

Archaeological and Film Collaborations: Cultural cooperation is flourishing through joint film productions, book translations, and archaeological collaborations.

5. Emerging Areas of Cooperation:

Green Economy and Sustainable Development: Cooperation is expanding into green development, including the adoption of Chinese electric vehicles and investments by Chinese EV enterprises in the region. There is also alignment in national development strategies to promote sustainability and environmental protection.

Digital Economy and AI Development: Digital transformation, e-commerce, and AI development are becoming new drivers of cooperation, with China offering opportunities in these fields.

High-tech Cooperation: Beyond traditional sectors, there’s a growing focus on high-tech collaboration.

In essence, the Second China-Central Asia Summit builds on the strong foundation laid in Xi’an, emphasizing a comprehensive and long-term partnership across political, economic, security, and cultural spheres. The focus is on implementing existing consensuses and expanding cooperation into new and emerging areas, aiming to further integrate the region and achieve mutual development under the framework of a “China-Central Asia community with a shared future.”

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China waste management

In China, a significant shift has occurred in waste management, moving from a critical “garbage siege” to an unexpected “garbage shortage.”

In 2011, the documentary “Beijing Besieged by Waste” by filmmaker Wang Jiuliang highlighted the severe waste problem in and around Chinese cities, where landfills were overwhelmed. However, in just over a decade, China’s waste treatment capabilities have expanded dramatically. The number of waste incineration plants surged from 130 in 2011 to 927 in 2023, now accounting for nearly half of the global total. This rapid expansion has resulted in many incineration plants operating below their capacity due to an insufficient supply of waste.

To address this “garbage shortage,” China has implemented innovative solutions:

Excavating Old Landfills: Some cities are digging up older landfills to retrieve buried waste for incineration, though this practice carries potential pollution risks.

Exporting Waste Treatment Technology: Having banned solid waste imports by January 1, 2021, China is now exporting its advanced waste treatment technologies and solutions, particularly to Southeast Asian countries facing similar waste management issues.

Several key factors have driven this transformation:

– Technological Breakthroughs: China has developed advanced domestic waste incineration technologies, such as the grate furnace and reverse push grate, which are efficient in treating waste with high moisture content and low calorific value, common in China. These technologies ensure thorough combustion, effective pollutant removal, and efficient energy recovery, proving more cost-effective than imported alternatives.

– Policy Guidance and Economic Incentives: Government policies, like the “13th Five-Year Plan” for urban domestic waste harmless treatment facilities, have set clear targets for incineration capacity. Financial incentives, including construction subsidies, waste treatment fees (around 130 yuan per ton), long-term operating rights (up to 30 years), and subsidized electricity prices for waste-to-energy projects, have made these ventures highly profitable.

– Waste Classification System: The mandatory waste classification policies implemented in 2019 have significantly improved resource recovery, reduced the load on incineration plants, and increased the overall efficiency of waste treatment and resource utilization.

China’s success in waste management exemplifies a broader trend where environmental challenges are converted into industrial opportunities through practical actions and technological innovation, moving beyond mere theoretical discussions.

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Belt and Road Initiative

It was the spring of 2013, and the world was still finding its footing after the global financial crisis. In the grand halls of Beijing, a new leader, Xi Jinping, was settling into his role as China’s President. His vision was bold, ambitious, and, as we would later see, world-changing.

Across the Pacific, in Washington D.C., the seasoned diplomat John Kerry, then the U.S. Secretary of State, embarked on a crucial trip to China. The air between the two great powers was a mix of cooperation and cautious competition. During their meeting, President Xi, with a glint of what might have been genuine partnership in his eye, laid out a nascent idea to Secretary Kerry: a grand initiative to connect the world through infrastructure, trade, and investment. He called it, in those early days, something akin to a “new Silk Road,” and importantly, he suggested that China and the United States should build it together.

Kerry, a man known for his forward-thinking approach, was intrigued. The scale of the proposal, the potential for global cooperation, and the promise of shared prosperity resonated with his diplomatic instincts. He saw a glimmer of a historic opportunity, a chance for the two largest economies to collaborate on a venture that could benefit billions.

However, the wheels of government often turn slowly, and sometimes, with a heavy hand. As Kerry’s delegation prepared to leave Beijing, the proposal landed on the desk of a senior official in the U.S. Treasury Department – a “mandarin,” as Kerry would later recall, perhaps referencing the perceived bureaucratic stiffness. This official, acting within the prevailing strategic framework of the Obama administration, saw not opportunity, but risk.

The Obama White House, while seeking cooperation with China on certain issues, was deeply invested in its “Pivot to Asia,” a strategy designed to reassert American leadership and influence in the Indo-Pacific. This pivot was manifested in initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement aimed at knitting together economies around U.S.-led standards, often seen as a counterweight to China’s rising economic might.

From the Treasury Department’s perspective, the proposed “new Silk Road” carried significant concerns:

Competition, not collaboration: It was viewed as a potential rival to U.S.-led global institutions and economic frameworks, rather than a complementary effort.

Transparency and governance: There were nascent worries about the transparency of Chinese financing and the potential for debt traps in developing nations – concerns that would only grow louder in the years to come.

Strategic implications: The initiative was seen through the lens of strategic competition, a potential vehicle for China to expand its geopolitical influence and undermine U.S. interests.

And so, before John Kerry’s plane even touched down back on American soil, the nascent idea of a U.S.-China joint “Belt and Road” was “nixed.”

Xi Jinping officially launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in September 2013, a few months after his meeting with Kerry. It grew into a colossal undertaking, reshaping landscapes and economies across Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond. It brought both development and debt, opportunities and challenges.

John Kerry would later reflect on that moment with a pang of regret, calling it “the single biggest missed opportunity of my life.” He saw what might have been: a world where the two great powers could have channeled their immense resources and ingenuity into a truly collaborative global development project, shaping its principles and ensuring its benefits were broadly shared.

The Tale’s Lessons:

The Weight of Missed Opportunity: Sometimes, the greatest regrets are not about what we did, but what we failed to do, the doors we chose not to open. Visionary ideas, especially in international relations, can be fragile and time-sensitive.

The Power of Perspective: What one person sees as a grand opportunity for collaboration, another, from a different vantage point, might perceive as a strategic threat or an unacceptable risk. National interests, pre-existing strategies, and deeply ingrained suspicions can overshadow potential partnerships.

The Bureaucratic Filter: Even the most senior leaders’ instincts can be overridden by the layered decision-making processes of large governments, where department-specific concerns can become paramount.

The Cost of Non-Engagement: When a rising power proposes a significant global initiative, the choice to disengage rather than engage and influence can lead to that initiative developing in ways that are less aligned with one’s own values and interests.

Hindsight is 20/20: It’s easy to look back and see the “what-ifs.” The challenge for leaders is to balance immediate strategic concerns with long-term vision, to distinguish between a genuine threat and a potential avenue for shared progress.

The story of the U.S. and the early BRI is a reminder that the path of international relations is paved with choices, each with profound and lasting consequences, often unforeseen in the moment they are made.

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The world’s first commercial underwater data center

China has officially launched on June 10, 2025 what is being described as the world’s first commercial underwater data center (UDC) project powered by an offshore wind farm in Shanghai.

Location: Shanghai’s Lin-gang special area, part of the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone.

Power Source: The project is powered by offshore wind energy, making it a significant step towards green computing infrastructure.

Commercial Scale: It’s highlighted as the “world’s first commercial” project of its kind, distinguishing it from earlier prototypes (like Microsoft’s Project Natick).

Partnership: The project is a joint effort involving the administrative committee of Lin-gang, Shanghai Lingang Special Area Investment Holding Group Co., Ltd., and Shanghai Hicloud Technology Co., Ltd.

Phased Development: It will be developed in two phases, starting with a 2.3 MW demonstration unit (expected to be operational by September this year) and scaling up to a 24 MW data cluster.

Environmental Benefits: The UDC integrates natural seawater cooling, which is expected to significantly reduce energy consumption (30-40% compared to land-based centers) and achieve near-zero carbon emissions, with over 90% of energy coming from offshore wind.

This initiative truly marks a notable advancement in sustainable digital infrastructure by combining renewable energy sources with computing infrastructure to meet the growing global demand for low-carbon, AI-ready data solutions. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/708600755436502/?__cft__[0]=AZVONhRGtvbamo5Qz5AYgbpVsxj9hn04c03yig7fZinbHYpOXZ9SaiyHiwZ1SWdOGfxcs4GSaXfosm6lrAdJgTl8D-R8aRP4m5ZD0Bc6VggjJ4RGCGm1aMkRCtaJRk8LvJw-27LpIL2Yp4PUtVEovxH–3IPlqutmQ_Icf-GX9dW0g&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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Grey larva of the Yangtze sturgeon hatched

The first tiny, no bigger than a grain of rice, half-translucent grey larva of the Yangtze sturgeon hatched on April 16, 2025, in the shallow waters of the Chishui River in SW China’s Guizhou. The adult sturgeons were released into the modified habitat on April 3, 2025, and fertilized eggs were observed on April 12, 2025. It is the first successful natural reproduction of the critically endangered Yangtze sturgeon in the wild in over two decades.

This breakthrough was the culmination of years of painstaking efforts by researchers from the Institute of Hydrobiology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Sturgeon Research Institute under the China Three Gorges Corporation, and other institutions, organized by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/696948593203867/?__cft__[0]=AZWbE99JbBmmdIpgvVhCCL0cVgglCWlYKTYJ7WKRZZ8XzL7d2v1znxzmcLrXmOuM5QyF-UReevFtGoVW_e3yHQLAjs-3UAtia2mMw_VuGlJPl7umkfor4cmvjckQVNH3nCxzIQgM-9sJ98IHPbx6n11FVFhQ6c-5jgpr2GJuWjOJNQ&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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China rejected a simple resource-for-technology exchange

China rejected a simple resource-for-technology exchange. Instead, Beijing elevated the discussion to a strategic level, demanding:

– The complete removal of 352 punitive tariffs imposed since the Trump administration.

– An immediate halt to sanctions on leading Chinese high-tech companies.

– Removal of export barriers for China’s advantageous industries.

– Cessation of discriminatory visa restrictions on Chinese students.

– A clear demand for the US to stop arms sales to Taiwan.

Even if all conditions were met, rare earth supply would only be conditional and partial, not fully open.

The three rats reported not just a commercial negotiation failure, but a profound strategic misjudgment, as China’s conditions far exceeded their authority. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1369880650794558/?__cft__[0]=AZVkA6_bHkUvDg_fqiORJc1m34t3Rj6LbaWazcyy54QR1vCJD0Nly1upvAQIY4RTKPJii8tMIpgc_yAkMWkKYbh3odDneEz7viX_1JqruHPfmUfPvVl77PuO44E8WdlTsyUsbKLR08VSWydXcm-UPReG_1AYehUwpYNpSld8JAdAmA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

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Relationship between Lithuania and China

The relationship between Lithuania and China has undergone a significant transformation, moving from generally smooth diplomatic ties to a severe diplomatic and economic dispute.

Background of the Relationship

Early Diplomatic Ties and the “One China” Principle:

Lithuania and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially established diplomatic relations on September 14, 1991, shortly after Lithuania regained its independence. Prior to this, China had recognized Lithuania de jure on September 7, 1991. Like many other nations, Lithuania recognized the “One China” principle, acknowledging Beijing’s position that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it. For decades, bilateral relations developed without major incidents, including high-level visits and agreements, such as a Memorandum of Understanding on the Belt and Road Initiative in 2017.

Deterioration of Relations – The “Taiwan Card”:

The relationship began to sour significantly around 2021, primarily due to Lithuania’s increasingly assertive stance on China’s human rights record and its growing engagement with Taiwan. Key events that led to the breakdown include:

Withdrawal from the “17+1” format (May 2021): Lithuania announced its withdrawal from the cooperation framework between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), a move seen as a rejection of China’s influence in the region. Other Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, followed suit in August 2022.

Opening of the Taiwanese Representative Office (November 2021): The most significant point of contention was Lithuania’s decision to allow Taiwan to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name “Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania.” This was a diplomatic red line for Beijing, as most countries hosting Taiwanese missions refer to them as “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices” to avoid implying state-to-state relations. China viewed this as a violation of the “One China” principle and an attempt to create a “one China, one Taiwan” impression.

Criticism of Human Rights and Chinese Technology: Lithuania had also openly criticized China’s human rights situation in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and expressed concerns about Chinese technology, advising consumers against purchasing Chinese smartphones due to potential censorship features.

China’s Retaliation:

In response to these actions, particularly the Taiwan office, China escalated its diplomatic and economic pressure:

Diplomatic Downgrade: China recalled its ambassador from Vilnius and demanded Lithuania recall its ambassador from Beijing. Relations were downgraded to the chargé d’affaires level on November 21, 2021, a rare move for China.

Economic Coercion: Beijing implemented severe informal trade restrictions, delisting Lithuania as a country of origin in its customs system and blocking imports from the Baltic state. China also pressured multinational companies to stop using Lithuanian components in their products if they wished to maintain access to the Chinese market. This led to a significant disruption of trade, although China has denied claims of targeting Lithuania. The EU has since launched a case at the World Trade Organization (WTO) against China over these discriminatory trade practices.

Future of the Relationship

The future of the Lithuania-China relationship remains highly uncertain and complex.

Current Standoff and Diplomatic Impasse:

As of mid-2025, the relationship is largely at an impasse. The recent reports of Chinese diplomatic staff bidding farewell suggest that China has no immediate intention of restoring full relations. While Lithuania has expressed a desire to normalize relations, it has also emphasized that it will not make political concessions, particularly regarding its ties with Taiwan. China, for its part, insists on Lithuania adhering strictly to the “One China” principle, which likely includes changing the name of the Taiwanese representative office.

Key Factors Influencing the Future:

– Taiwan: The core issue remains Lithuania’s relationship with Taiwan. While some Lithuanian politicians, including the incoming Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas, have expressed a desire to restore ambassadorial-level representation, they have also stressed maintaining trade and cultural ties with Taiwan. This creates a difficult balancing act, as China views any perceived elevation of Taiwan’s international status as a direct challenge.

– EU and USeless Influence: Lithuania’s strong stance has garnered support from other EU members and the United States, who view China’s actions as economic coercion. The EU’s ongoing WTO case and its “anti-coercion instrument” demonstrate a collective effort to push back against such tactics. The outcome of USeless presidential elections could also influence Lithuania’s approach, as its pivot away from China has been partly driven by national security concerns and its alliance with the USeless.

Public Opinion in Lithuania: While the government’s policy towards China has been controversial domestically, polls in 2022 showed that a significant portion of the Lithuanian population views China as an unfriendly country, though only a minority actively supports the government’s policy. This mixed public sentiment could impact the new government’s approach.

Economic Diversification: Following China’s economic pressure, Lithuania has actively sought to diversify its trade partnerships and reduce its dependency on the Chinese market. Taiwan has also offered economic support and investment to Lithuania. This diversification may reduce Lithuania’s incentive to fully capitulate to China’s demands.

China’s Position on Russia: China’s continued alignment with Russia, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, further complicates relations. For Lithuania, which views Russia as an existential threat, China’s “pro-Russian neutrality” makes restoring close ties more problematic.

In essence, while there are signals of a desire for normalization from the Lithuanian side, the fundamental disagreements over Taiwan and China’s broader geopolitical stance make a full restoration of the relationship to its previous state unlikely in the near future. The relationship is likely to remain at a lower diplomatic level, with economic ties continuing to be impacted by political tensions, unless significant concessions are made by either side on the core issues.

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