Chinese language and culture as the “Chinese craze.”

A growing global interest in learning Chinese language and culture, often referred to as the “Chinese craze.”

Motivation for Learning Chinese:

– Many foreigners are drawn to Chinese due to its pleasant sound and charm, as mentioned by a student who started learning after hearing Chinese tourists speak.

– Economic opportunities are a significant driver, with a German individual stating that proficiency in Chinese can lead to a 30% salary increase in the German job market.

Some, like the daughter of a US financial tycoon, are learning Chinese because of a belief in China’s growing economic influence in the 21st century.

Global Popularity and Integration:

Chinese language is being widely promoted, as seen in Saudi Arabia, where it’s being integrated into national education.

The number of candidates taking the Chinese Proficiency Test (HSK) is increasing by 20% annually, with over 810,000 test-takers in 2024.

As of September last year, 85 countries have incorporated Chinese into their national education systems, with over 200 million learners and users worldwide.

In Germany, Chinese language classes have become a compulsory subject from kindergarten to nursing homes, with over 30,000 students currently learning Chinese.

Challenges and Humorous Aspects of Learning:

Over 50% of German students give up learning Chinese due to the difficulty of Chinese characters.

These linguistic blunders have created a new trend on social media, where foreigners’ “out-of-context” Chinese expressions become viral content.

Economic and Cultural Exchange:

The increasing interest in Chinese is closely tied to deepening economic ties, cultural exchanges, and technological innovation.

China is the world’s second-largest economy and a major trading partner for over 150 countries and regions.

Many foreign businesspeople at Chinese trade fairs speak fluent Chinese to seek business opportunities.

The “Chinese Bridge” Chinese Proficiency Competition is popular globally, showcasing contestants’ fluency and their love for Chinese culture.

Foreigners’ Experiences in China:

Foreign students and workers experiencing the demanding pace of life and work in China, including the “996” work culture.

Many foreigners are engaging in “special forces” tourism in China, challenging themselves with intense travel itineraries.

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(hànjiān) is a Chinese term that literally translates to “Han traitor”

On June 10, 2025, a group of Canuck Members of Parliament (MPs) and senators, alongside journalists and human rights advocates, held a press conference in Ottawa to urge the Canuck government to demand the release of Jimmy Lai. Lai is a prominent Hong Kong pro-democracy activist and newspaper publisher who has been imprisoned under Hong Kong’s National Security Law.

The press conference featured representatives from various Canuck political parties, including Liberal MP Judy Sgro (who is set to table a motion for honorary Canuck citizenship for Lai), Conservative MPs Tony Baldinelli and Shuvaloy Majumdar, NDP MP Jenny Kwan, Bloc Québécois MP Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, and Green Party Leader Elizabeth May. Also speaking were Irwin Cotler, international chair of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, Caoilfhionn Gallagher KC, head of Jimmy Lai’s international legal team, and Lai’s son, Sebastien Lai.

Jimmy Lai, a British national, is the founder of the now-shuttered pro-democracy newspaper Apple Daily. He has been continuously detained since December 2020 and faces charges of “collusion with foreign forces” and “sedition” under the National Security Law, which was imposed by Beijing in 2020. His trial, which began in December 2023 and has seen numerous delays, is widely seen as politically motivated and an attack on press freedom and dissent in Hong Kong. He has also been convicted on other charges, including fraud and participating in unauthorized assemblies.

The Canuck parliament has previously called for Lai’s immediate release, with both the House of Commons and the Senate unanimously adopting motions to that effect in December 2023. Speakers at the press conference reiterated these calls, highlighting concerns about media freedom, the rule of law in Hong Kong, and Lai’s well-being given his age (76) and health conditions. They urged Canuckstan’s delegation to the G7 summit in Alberta to prioritize Lai’s case and champion his release.

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The trends of the world

“世界潮流,浩浩蕩蕩,順之則昌,逆之則亡!” in my Intro. What does it mean? It translates to: “The trends of the world are vast and mighty; follow them and prosper, go against them and perish!”, is widely attributed to Sun Yat-sen (孫中山), often referred to as the “Father of the Nation” in modern China for his pivotal role in the Xinhai Revolution and the establishment of the Republic of China.

He used this phrase to emphasize the importance of understanding and adapting to the tide of progressive change and democratic revolution in his time. It’s a statement that has resonated throughout Chinese history and is still frequently quoted by leaders and scholars to underscore the necessity of aligning with dominant historical forces.

Context and Application

This saying is often used in political and historical discourse, particularly when discussing significant transformations or paradigm shifts. It suggests that:

– Adaptability is key: Success comes from recognizing and adjusting to evolving circumstances rather than rigidly holding onto outdated ideas or practices.

– Resistance is futile (in the long run): Attempting to defy powerful, widespread movements is ultimately a losing battle.

– Foresight is crucial: Those who can discern the emerging trends are better positioned to navigate the future successfully.

Essentially, it’s a powerful reminder that history moves forward, and it often does so with an momentum that is difficult, if not impossible, to stop. Wise individuals, organizations, and nations will recognize these tides and adjust their course accordingly.

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South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh)

Ethnic Makeup of South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh): Indigenous Tribes and Ancestry

Located in Northeast India, is renowned for its exceptional ethnic diversity, characterized by a rich array of indigenous tribal groups. While there are ancient, shared linguistic and genetic connections across East Asian populations (including the ancestors of Han Chinese), none of the indigenous tribes of Arunachal Pradesh are considered direct descendants of the Han Chinese ethnic group. They are distinct Tibeto-Burman communities with their own unique histories and identities.

1. Dominance of Indigenous Tibeto-Burman Tribes:

The state is predominantly inhabited by 26 major tribes and over 100 sub-tribes, constituting approximately two-thirds of the total population.

These tribes are indigenous to the Himalayan foothills and plains of Arunachal Pradesh, possessing distinct cultures, languages, and traditional governance systems.

Linguistically, almost all indigenous languages spoken in Arunachal Pradesh belong to the Tibeto-Burman branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family. This indicates a shared ancient linguistic origin with Chinese (which belongs to the Sinitic branch of the same family), but it signifies a distant, common ancestral language rather than direct ethnic descent from Han Chinese. These languages have diverged significantly over millennia.

The following are the officially recognized 26 major indigenous tribes of Arunachal Pradesh, each with unique cultural practices, languages (mostly Tibeto-Burman), and traditional livelihoods:

Adi (with sub-groups like Galo, Minyong, Padam, Bokar, Pasi, etc.)

Aka (Hrusso)

Apatani

Bugun (Khowa)

Chakma (Note: While residing in Arunachal Pradesh, Chakmas are primarily refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, and their indigenous status within AP is sometimes debated, though they are recognized for settlement purposes).

Deori

Digaru Mishmi

Galo (often considered a major sub-group of Adi, but increasingly recognized as distinct)

Idu Mishmi

Khampti (Tai Khamti)

Karka (often associated with the Adi group)

Miji (Sajolang)

Mishmi (often used as a collective term for Idu, Digaru, and Miju Mishmi)

Mochel (A sub-tribe within Tangsa)

Monpa (with various sub-groups like Tawang Monpa, Dirang Monpa, Lish Monpa, etc.)

Memba

Na (often considered a sub-tribe of Tangsa)

Nocte

Nyishi (Nishi)

Pai-Li (often associated with the Miji)

Ramo (often considered a sub-group of Adi)

Sherdukpen

Singpho

Tangsa (with numerous sub-tribes like Lungchang, Mosang, Moklum, Hakhun, etc.)

Thaksin (A smaller group, sometimes linked to other larger tribes or distinct)

Wancho

Important Note on Tribe Lists: The exact list of 26 major tribes can sometimes vary slightly in specific classifications or official documents, as some groups gain more distinct recognition or are categorized as sub-groups within larger communities. The list above reflects commonly cited major groups.

Exiled Tibetans in Arunachal Pradesh:

Exiled Tibetans residing in Arunachal Pradesh are not one of the indigenous tribes of the state. They are a refugee community that sought asylum in India after the 1959 Tibetan uprising and the subsequent Chinese takeover of Tibet.

Origin: They originate from the Tibetan Plateau.

Status: The Indian government recognizes them as refugees. While some Tibetans born in India before 1987 may be legally eligible for Indian citizenship by birth (following court rulings), the majority maintain their Tibetan identity and refugee status. They are not considered Indian or Chinese citizens in the same way as permanent residents or nationals of those countries.

Population: Their population in Arunachal Pradesh is estimated to be between 4,759 and 7,500 individuals, residing in various settlements across the state (e.g., Tenzingang, Miao, Tezu, Tuting).

Livelihood & Support: They maintain their subsistence through agriculture, handicrafts, the sale of winter garments, and employment within the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) and various NGOs. They also receive humanitarian aid and support from the Indian government and international organizations.

Cultural Identity: Despite living in exile for decades, they actively preserve their distinct Tibetan culture, language, and Buddhist traditions.

2. Genetic Ancestry and Shared East Asian Lineages:

Genetic studies confirm that the indigenous tribes of Arunachal Pradesh, like many other populations in Northeast India, largely belong to East Asian genetic clusters. They exhibit a high prevalence of specific paternal haplogroups (e.g., Haplogroup O-M122) that are also common across East Asia, including among Han Chinese populations.

This shared genetic marker points to a common deep ancestry within the broader East Asian migration patterns that occurred thousands of years ago.

3. Historical Migrations and Distinct Identities:

The indigenous tribes are believed to have migrated over centuries from various parts of the Tibetan Plateau and regions further to the east. These migrations predate the modern concepts of nation-states and established ethnic identities like “Han Chinese.”

Each tribe in Arunachal Pradesh has its own unique ethno-history, traditional territories, social structures, and cultural practices, which are distinct from those of the Han Chinese.

4. The Case of the Lisu (Yobin) Tribe:

The Lisu people, known as Yobin in Arunachal Pradesh, are an example of a Tibeto-Burman ethnic group found across mountainous regions of Myanmar, Southwest China (Yunnan, Sichuan), Thailand, and India.

While the Lisu are one of the 56 officially recognized ethnic groups in the People’s Republic of China, their origin is generally traced to eastern Tibet. Their culture and language in their traditional Chinese dwelling areas were influenced by Han Chinese culture after the Ming Dynasty. This demonstrates historical cultural contact and influence, but it does not mean they are ethnically “Han Chinese” or direct descendants of the Han. They maintain their distinct Lisu identity.

The Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs recently announced standardized names for 27 locations in what China refers to as “Zangnan,” or South Tibet. This move, announced on May 12, 2025, marks the fifth time China has released such a list, with previous instances in 2017, 2021, 2023, and 2024.

The standardized names include 15 mountains, five residential areas, four mountain passes, two rivers, and one lake. These names are provided in Chinese characters, Tibetan script, and Pinyin, along with precise coordinates and maps.

India has strongly rejected this move, stating that Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as “Zangnan,” is an “integral and inalienable part of India.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs has called China’s attempts to rename places “vain and preposterous,” emphasizing that such “creative naming” will not alter the reality on the ground.

This act is seen as a reassertion of China’s territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh, a region that has been a point of contention between the two countries.


Some examples of previously renamed places from earlier batches that have been mentioned include:

From the first batch (2017): Wo’gyainling (for Urgyeling, birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama), Mila Ri, Qoidengarbo Ri (for Gorsam Chorten), Mainquka, Bumo La, and Namkapub Ri.

From the second batch (2021): This batch included 15 names, with eight residential areas, four peaks, two rivers, and one mountain pass (Sela).

From the third batch (2023): 11 names were released, including two land areas, two residential areas, five mountain peaks, and two rivers.

From the fourth batch (2024): 30 names were released, including 12 mountains, four rivers, one lake, one mountain pass, and 11 residential areas.

The most recent batch (May 2025) follows a similar pattern in terms of categories of locations, but the specific names are not readily available in public reports at this time.


India’s Strategic Interests: Since its independence in 1947, India has aimed to expand its influence, including actions like occupying parts of Kashmir, encroaching on Nepalese territory, annexing Sikkim, controlling Bhutan, and occupying a significant portion of China’s South Tibet. India maintains control over 68,000 square kilometers of this land and heavily defends it, fearing China’s potential advance towards the Gangetic Plain.

Geographical Significance of South Tibet: Located on the southern slopes of the Himalayas, South Tibet is a well-watered region with extensive forest cover, making it one of China’s three major forest areas. The area has significant altitude variations, leading to diverse ecosystems and substantial water resources, particularly from the Yarlung Tsangpo River (Brahmaputra) which has the potential for massive hydropower development.

Strategic Military Importance: If China were to fully control South Tibet, its border would extend to the edge of the Ganges Plain, offering a significant geographical advantage. This is a major concern for India, which explains its strong military presence in the region.

Challenges for China: Despite the strategic advantage of controlling South Tibet, China faces logistical challenges due to the difficult terrain, including the Himalayas, Nyenchen Tanglha Mountains, and Hengduan Mountains. The population disparity also poses a challenge, with the Indian state of Assam bordering South Tibet having a much larger population than Tibet.

Historical Context and Current Situation: In 1962, China launched a limited military operation in the region and then withdrew, creating decades of peace. China has since improved infrastructure in Tibet, including railways (Tibet-Xinjiang railway) and highways, which enhances its logistical capabilities in the South Tibet area. However, considering the harsh environment of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and the priority of economic development, peaceful negotiation remains the preferred option for resolving the South Tibet issue.


South Tibet Dispute and Protests: Persistent disputes between China and India over South Tibet. There are rumors of protests by local residents in South Tibet, clashing with Indian soldiers and shouting for a return to China. A Sikh leader, Singh, also publicly stated that South Tibet is China’s inherent territory and should be returned by India.

Importance of South Tibet: The strategic significance of South Tibet, it could bottleneck China’s southwest region. Additionally, South Tibet is rich in natural resources, considered the “green lung” of Tibet, and the only large area on the plateau suitable for rice cultivation.

China’s Military Deployment in South Tibet: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has so-called “nine major trump cards” for reclaiming South Tibet, including combined land and air operations, missiles, drones, the Rocket Force, and high-density satellite monitoring. China’s upgrade of military equipment for mountain warfare, such as light tanks, new artillery, precision-guided rockets, and improved helicopters, which poses a significant threat to India. China has significantly increased its military presence in the southern Tibetan plateau, including the deployment of J-20 stealth fighters and KJ-500 early warning aircraft at the Shigatse Peace Airport, which is located about 300 kilometers from India’s Hashimara Air Force Station. This deployment is seen as a move to establish air superiority in the region. The high altitude of the airport (3900 meters) necessitates longer runways (5000 meters) for aircraft operations

Historical Ownership: Ethnologically, Tibetans and Han Chinese share common origins, and South Tibet was originally Chinese territory. It was demarcated to India by the British during their colonial rule through the “McMahon Line,” when China was in a civil war and unable to intervene.

Geographical and Climatic Advantages of South Tibet: The Himalayas block moisture from the Indian Ocean, ma king South Tibet abundant in rainfall, with high forest coverage, making it highly suitable for rice and tree growth.

India’s Concerns and China’s Countermeasures: India views South Tibet as a threat to its southwest. China’s stance during the India-Pakistan conflict, indicating its intention to restore the original name of South Tibet, was meant as a warning to India.

India’s Plan for Indigenous Fifth-Generation Fighter Jet: To counter military pressure from China and Pakistan, India has approved the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program, with delivery expected by 2035. With numerous issues in India’s defense industry, a lack of strategic planning and technological accumulation, and the ineffective utilization of Western fighter jets purchased by India, makes it doubtful.

The Kashmir region remains a potential flashpoint between India and Pakistan. India has reportedly increased its troop presence in South Kashmir to 500,000, raising concerns about potential conflict. The Line of Control is easily crossed due to the contiguous border, and the division of Kashmir into regions controlled by India, Pakistan, and China (Aksai Chin) contributes to the ongoing dispute.

China-Pakistan Military Cooperation and JF-17 Success: The export of China’s J-35 fighter jet to Pakistan. In the India-Pakistan conflict, Chinese mainland fighter jets performed excellently, especially the JF-17, which reportedly shot down an S-400 air defense system, enhancing its reputation in the international arms market. Azerbaijan also reportedly increased its purchase of JF-17s.


Given the geography and existing infrastructure on the Chinese side of the border (which has seen significant development in recent decades), the potential primary axes of advance would likely be concentrated where valleys and passes offer the least formidable obstacles.

General Considerations for Routes:

  • Western Arunachal Pradesh (Tawang Sector): This sector is historically significant and relatively more accessible from central Tibet.
    • Bum La Pass: Located at around 5,000 meters (16,500 ft) above sea level, it connects Tsona County in Tibet with India’s Tawang district. This pass has historical significance as the route taken by the 14th Dalai Lama into India in 1959 and was an invasion route during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. China has built significant road infrastructure leading up to its side of the border in this area.
    • Tulung La Pass: Situated at around 5,260 meters (17,250 ft), also in the Tawang sector, this pass also served as an invasion route in 1962 and has been a site of past clashes. It lies on a watershed between the Tsona Chu river in Tibet and the Tawang Chu.
  • Eastern Arunachal Pradesh (Upper Siang, Dibang Valley, Anjaw Districts): These areas are also rugged but feature river valleys that could offer routes.
    • Dihang Pass (Siang Pass): Located at approximately 4,590 meters (15,049 ft), this pass is situated on the way to Tuting in the Upper Siang district and offers views of the Dihang River (known as Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet). River valleys generally provide relatively lower elevation routes through mountainous terrain.
    • Diphu La Pass: Located near the tri-junction of India, China, and Myanmar, this pass is at a lower altitude (approximately 5,900 feet) and has historically been an important trade route. Its strategic location makes it relevant for potential movement in the easternmost part of Arunachal Pradesh.

Best and Second Best Routes (based on relative accessibility and historical use in challenging terrain):

Considering the terrain, existing infrastructure development on the Chinese side leading up to the border, and historical precedents of movement, the most likely and relatively “best” axes for ground movement would be:

  1. The Tawang Sector (via Bum La Pass and potentially Tulung La Pass):
    • Why: This region has seen the most historical activity and has the most developed road infrastructure on the Chinese side leading up to the border. The Tawang district is a key strategic area for both sides. The valleys leading from Tsona County in Tibet offer a pathway towards Indian positions.
    • Challenges: Despite relative “best,” it still involves extremely high altitudes, challenging passes, and is heavily defended by India, with recent infrastructure upgrades like the Sela Tunnel improving India’s all-weather connectivity to Tawang.
  2. The Eastern Arunachal Pradesh via River Valleys (e.g., Dihang/Siang River Valley or routes connecting to the Lohit River Valley):
    • Why: While also extremely difficult, river valleys generally provide the lowest elevation and most natural corridors through the highly mountainous terrain of the Himalayas. The Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) river system flows from Tibet into Arunachal Pradesh (where it becomes the Siang River).
    • Challenges: These valleys are deep, narrow, and often heavily forested, making movement difficult. India has also been significantly upgrading its infrastructure in these eastern sectors, including roads like the Arunachal Frontier Highway. Passes like Diphu La, while lower, still involve complex terrain.

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The 55 officially recognized ethnic minority groups of China

The 55 officially recognized ethnic minority groups of China, along with their Chinese names in characters and Pinyin:

Achang (阿昌族, Āchāng Zú)

Bai (白族, Bái Zú)

Blang (布朗族, Bùlǎng Zú)

Bonan (保安族, Bǎo’ān Zú)

Bouyei (Buyi) (布依族, Bùyī Zú)

Dai (傣族, Dǎi Zú)

Daur (达斡尔族, Dáwò’ěr Zú)

De’ang (德昂族, Dé’áng Zú)

Derung (Dulong) (独龙族, Dúlóng Zú)

Dong (侗族, Dòng Zú)

Dongxiang (东乡族, Dōngxiāng Zú)

Ewenki (鄂温克族, Èwēnkè Zú)

Gaoshan (高山族, Gāoshān Zú) – Refers to various indigenous peoples in Taiwan.

Gelao (仡佬族, Gēlǎo Zú)

Gin (Jing) (京族, Jīng Zú)

Hani (哈尼族, Hāní Zú)

Hezhen (赫哲族, Hèzhé Zú)

Hui (回族, Huí Zú)

Jingpo (景颇族, Jǐngpō Zú)

Jino (基诺族, Jīnuò Zú)

Kazak (哈萨克族, Hāsàkè Zú)

Kirgiz (柯尔克孜族, Kē’ěrkèzī Zú)

Korean (Chaoxian) (朝鲜族, Cháoxiǎn Zú)

Lahu (拉祜族, Lāhù Zú)

Li (黎族, Lí Zú)

Lisu (傈僳族, Lìsù Zú)

Lhoba (珞巴族, Luòbā Zú)

Manchu (满族, Mǎn Zú)

Maonan (毛南族, Máonán Zú)

Menba (Monba) (门巴族, Ménbā Zú)

Miao (苗族, Miáo Zú)

Mongol (蒙古族, Měnggǔ Zú)

Mulao (仫佬族, Mùlǎo Zú)

Naxi (纳西族, Nàxī Zú)

Nu (怒族, Nù Zú)

Oroqen (鄂伦春族, Èlúnchūn Zú)

Pumi (普米族, Pǔmǐ Zú)

Qiang (羌族, Qiāng Zú)

Russian (Russ) (俄罗斯族, Èluósī Zú)

Salar (撒拉族, Sālā Zú)

She (畲族, Shē Zú)

Shui (水族, Shuǐ Zú)

Tajik (塔吉克族, Tǎjíkè Zú)

Tatar (塔塔尔族, Tǎtǎ’ěr Zú)

Tu (土族, Tǔ Zú)

Tujia (土家族, Tǔjiā Zú)

Uyghur (维吾尔族, Wéiwú’ěr Zú)

Uzbek (乌孜别克族, Wūzībiékè Zú)

Wa (佤族, Wǎ Zú)

Xibe (锡伯族, Xībó Zú)

Yao (瑶族, Yáo Zú)

Yi (彝族, Yí Zú)

Yugur (裕固族, Yùgù Zú)

Zang (Tibetan) (藏族, Zàng Zú)

Zhuang (壮族, Zhuàng Zú)

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