The Hare Krishna movement, formally known as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), has undergone a notable transformation in its public presence and activities since its more visible heyday in the 1970s.
One of the most apparent changes is the diminished presence of street chanting (sankirtan) in many Western cities. While this remains an important spiritual practice, the movement has matured and diversified its outreach. They have established a global network of temples and cultural centers, which now serve as their primary hubs for worship, community gatherings, and educational programs.
In Canada, ISKCON has a significant presence with several temples, including major centers in Toronto, Burnaby, and Montreal. There are also other centers and communities across the country, indicating a broader reach than just these three main temples.
In Hong Kong, ISKCON has an active temple in Tsim Sha Tsui. This serves as an important regional base, particularly given the more restrictive environment for religious groups in mainland China, where ISKCON operates unofficially, often focusing on cultural and philosophical aspects to gain acceptance.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defense Ministers’ meeting took place in Qingdao, where Defense Minister Dong Jun emphasized the SCO’s role as a stabilizing anchor in the turbulent international situation.
Dong Jun stated that he met with defense ministers from several countries and highlighted that hegemonic actions are the biggest source of chaos, urging all parties to strengthen cooperation to maintain global strategic stability.
India (spoiler) noted that the meeting failed to pass a joint statement.
Defense Minister Dong Jun stated that China is willing to work with all member states to firmly uphold international fairness and justice, jointly address security challenges, and promote practical cooperation in defense and security.
Russia’s Defense Minister Belousov stated that Russia-China relations are at an unprecedented high level and that Russia is willing to work with China to deepen strategic communication and practical cooperation.
Not too far away from Iran, Indian Minister of Home Affairs Amit Shah stated in an interview with The Times of India on the 21st that India will never resume compliance with the Indus Waters Treaty signed with Pakistan, and the water that previously flowed to Pakistan will be redirected for domestic use in India.
“No, there will be no resumption (of compliance),” Shah said. “We will construct a canal to divert the water originally flowing to Pakistan to Rajasthan. Pakistan will not be able to access the water.”
Pakistan has previously stated that the treaty does not grant either party the right to unilaterally withdraw, and any Indian action to block river water flow to Pakistan would be considered an “act of war.” Regarding India’s decision to suspend the treaty, Pakistan is also studying legal actions under international law.
In 1960, the World Bank facilitated the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan, regulating the distribution of water resources from the Indus River and its tributaries between the two countries. The Indian government recently announced the suspension of the treaty in response to a gun attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir that killed over 20 people. Regarding the attack, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stated that India’s accusations against Pakistan are baseless. On May 22, Pakistan’s National Assembly passed a resolution condemning India’s attempt to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty, calling it a violation of international agreements and a threat to regional stability.
Ethnic Makeup of South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh): Indigenous Tribes and Ancestry
Located in Northeast India, is renowned for its exceptional ethnic diversity, characterized by a rich array of indigenous tribal groups. While there are ancient, shared linguistic and genetic connections across East Asian populations (including the ancestors of Han Chinese), none of the indigenous tribes of Arunachal Pradesh are considered direct descendants of the Han Chinese ethnic group. They are distinct Tibeto-Burman communities with their own unique histories and identities.
1. Dominance of Indigenous Tibeto-Burman Tribes:
The state is predominantly inhabited by 26 major tribes and over 100 sub-tribes, constituting approximately two-thirds of the total population.
These tribes are indigenous to the Himalayan foothills and plains of Arunachal Pradesh, possessing distinct cultures, languages, and traditional governance systems.
Linguistically, almost all indigenous languages spoken in Arunachal Pradesh belong to the Tibeto-Burman branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family. This indicates a shared ancient linguistic origin with Chinese (which belongs to the Sinitic branch of the same family), but it signifies a distant, common ancestral language rather than direct ethnic descent from Han Chinese. These languages have diverged significantly over millennia.
The following are the officially recognized 26 major indigenous tribes of Arunachal Pradesh, each with unique cultural practices, languages (mostly Tibeto-Burman), and traditional livelihoods:
Adi (with sub-groups like Galo, Minyong, Padam, Bokar, Pasi, etc.)
Aka (Hrusso)
Apatani
Bugun (Khowa)
Chakma (Note: While residing in Arunachal Pradesh, Chakmas are primarily refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, and their indigenous status within AP is sometimes debated, though they are recognized for settlement purposes).
Deori
Digaru Mishmi
Galo (often considered a major sub-group of Adi, but increasingly recognized as distinct)
Idu Mishmi
Khampti (Tai Khamti)
Karka (often associated with the Adi group)
Miji (Sajolang)
Mishmi (often used as a collective term for Idu, Digaru, and Miju Mishmi)
Mochel (A sub-tribe within Tangsa)
Monpa (with various sub-groups like Tawang Monpa, Dirang Monpa, Lish Monpa, etc.)
Memba
Na (often considered a sub-tribe of Tangsa)
Nocte
Nyishi (Nishi)
Pai-Li (often associated with the Miji)
Ramo (often considered a sub-group of Adi)
Sherdukpen
Singpho
Tangsa (with numerous sub-tribes like Lungchang, Mosang, Moklum, Hakhun, etc.)
Thaksin (A smaller group, sometimes linked to other larger tribes or distinct)
Wancho
Important Note on Tribe Lists: The exact list of 26 major tribes can sometimes vary slightly in specific classifications or official documents, as some groups gain more distinct recognition or are categorized as sub-groups within larger communities. The list above reflects commonly cited major groups.
Exiled Tibetans in Arunachal Pradesh:
Exiled Tibetans residing in Arunachal Pradesh are not one of the indigenous tribes of the state. They are a refugee community that sought asylum in India after the 1959 Tibetan uprising and the subsequent Chinese takeover of Tibet.
Origin: They originate from the Tibetan Plateau.
Status: The Indian government recognizes them as refugees. While some Tibetans born in India before 1987 may be legally eligible for Indian citizenship by birth (following court rulings), the majority maintain their Tibetan identity and refugee status. They are not considered Indian or Chinese citizens in the same way as permanent residents or nationals of those countries.
Population: Their population in Arunachal Pradesh is estimated to be between 4,759 and 7,500 individuals, residing in various settlements across the state (e.g., Tenzingang, Miao, Tezu, Tuting).
Livelihood & Support: They maintain their subsistence through agriculture, handicrafts, the sale of winter garments, and employment within the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) and various NGOs. They also receive humanitarian aid and support from the Indian government and international organizations.
Cultural Identity: Despite living in exile for decades, they actively preserve their distinct Tibetan culture, language, and Buddhist traditions.
2. Genetic Ancestry and Shared East Asian Lineages:
Genetic studies confirm that the indigenous tribes of Arunachal Pradesh, like many other populations in Northeast India, largely belong to East Asian genetic clusters. They exhibit a high prevalence of specific paternal haplogroups (e.g., Haplogroup O-M122) that are also common across East Asia, including among Han Chinese populations.
This shared genetic marker points to a common deep ancestry within the broader East Asian migration patterns that occurred thousands of years ago.
3. Historical Migrations and Distinct Identities:
The indigenous tribes are believed to have migrated over centuries from various parts of the Tibetan Plateau and regions further to the east. These migrations predate the modern concepts of nation-states and established ethnic identities like “Han Chinese.”
Each tribe in Arunachal Pradesh has its own unique ethno-history, traditional territories, social structures, and cultural practices, which are distinct from those of the Han Chinese.
4. The Case of the Lisu (Yobin) Tribe:
The Lisu people, known as Yobin in Arunachal Pradesh, are an example of a Tibeto-Burman ethnic group found across mountainous regions of Myanmar, Southwest China (Yunnan, Sichuan), Thailand, and India.
While the Lisu are one of the 56 officially recognized ethnic groups in the People’s Republic of China, their origin is generally traced to eastern Tibet. Their culture and language in their traditional Chinese dwelling areas were influenced by Han Chinese culture after the Ming Dynasty. This demonstrates historical cultural contact and influence, but it does not mean they are ethnically “Han Chinese” or direct descendants of the Han. They maintain their distinct Lisu identity.
The Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs recently announced standardized names for 27 locations in what China refers to as “Zangnan,” or South Tibet. This move, announced on May 12, 2025, marks the fifth time China has released such a list, with previous instances in 2017, 2021, 2023, and 2024.
The standardized names include 15 mountains, five residential areas, four mountain passes, two rivers, and one lake. These names are provided in Chinese characters, Tibetan script, and Pinyin, along with precise coordinates and maps.
India has strongly rejected this move, stating that Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as “Zangnan,” is an “integral and inalienable part of India.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs has called China’s attempts to rename places “vain and preposterous,” emphasizing that such “creative naming” will not alter the reality on the ground.
This act is seen as a reassertion of China’s territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh, a region that has been a point of contention between the two countries.
Some examples of previously renamed places from earlier batches that have been mentioned include:
From the first batch (2017): Wo’gyainling (for Urgyeling, birthplace of the Sixth Dalai Lama), Mila Ri, Qoidengarbo Ri (for Gorsam Chorten), Mainquka, Bumo La, and Namkapub Ri.
From the second batch (2021): This batch included 15 names, with eight residential areas, four peaks, two rivers, and one mountain pass (Sela).
From the third batch (2023): 11 names were released, including two land areas, two residential areas, five mountain peaks, and two rivers.
From the fourth batch (2024): 30 names were released, including 12 mountains, four rivers, one lake, one mountain pass, and 11 residential areas.
The most recent batch (May 2025) follows a similar pattern in terms of categories of locations, but the specific names are not readily available in public reports at this time.
India’s Strategic Interests: Since its independence in 1947, India has aimed to expand its influence, including actions like occupying parts of Kashmir, encroaching on Nepalese territory, annexing Sikkim, controlling Bhutan, and occupying a significant portion of China’s South Tibet. India maintains control over 68,000 square kilometers of this land and heavily defends it, fearing China’s potential advance towards the Gangetic Plain.
Geographical Significance of South Tibet: Located on the southern slopes of the Himalayas, South Tibet is a well-watered region with extensive forest cover, making it one of China’s three major forest areas. The area has significant altitude variations, leading to diverse ecosystems and substantial water resources, particularly from the Yarlung Tsangpo River (Brahmaputra) which has the potential for massive hydropower development.
Strategic Military Importance: If China were to fully control South Tibet, its border would extend to the edge of the Ganges Plain, offering a significant geographical advantage. This is a major concern for India, which explains its strong military presence in the region.
Challenges for China: Despite the strategic advantage of controlling South Tibet, China faces logistical challenges due to the difficult terrain, including the Himalayas, Nyenchen Tanglha Mountains, and Hengduan Mountains. The population disparity also poses a challenge, with the Indian state of Assam bordering South Tibet having a much larger population than Tibet.
Historical Context and Current Situation: In 1962, China launched a limited military operation in the region and then withdrew, creating decades of peace. China has since improved infrastructure in Tibet, including railways (Tibet-Xinjiang railway) and highways, which enhances its logistical capabilities in the South Tibet area. However, considering the harsh environment of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and the priority of economic development, peaceful negotiation remains the preferred option for resolving the South Tibet issue.
South Tibet Dispute and Protests: Persistent disputes between China and India over South Tibet. There are rumors of protests by local residents in South Tibet, clashing with Indian soldiers and shouting for a return to China. A Sikh leader, Singh, also publicly stated that South Tibet is China’s inherent territory and should be returned by India.
Importance of South Tibet: The strategic significance of South Tibet, it could bottleneck China’s southwest region. Additionally, South Tibet is rich in natural resources, considered the “green lung” of Tibet, and the only large area on the plateau suitable for rice cultivation.
China’s Military Deployment in South Tibet: The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has so-called “nine major trump cards” for reclaiming South Tibet, including combined land and air operations, missiles, drones, the Rocket Force, and high-density satellite monitoring. China’s upgrade of military equipment for mountain warfare, such as light tanks, new artillery, precision-guided rockets, and improved helicopters, which poses a significant threat to India. China has significantly increased its military presence in the southern Tibetan plateau, including the deployment of J-20 stealth fighters and KJ-500 early warning aircraft at the Shigatse Peace Airport, which is located about 300 kilometers from India’s Hashimara Air Force Station. This deployment is seen as a move to establish air superiority in the region. The high altitude of the airport (3900 meters) necessitates longer runways (5000 meters) for aircraft operations
Historical Ownership: Ethnologically, Tibetans and Han Chinese share common origins, and South Tibet was originally Chinese territory. It was demarcated to India by the British during their colonial rule through the “McMahon Line,” when China was in a civil war and unable to intervene.
Geographical and Climatic Advantages of South Tibet: The Himalayas block moisture from the Indian Ocean, ma king South Tibet abundant in rainfall, with high forest coverage, making it highly suitable for rice and tree growth.
India’s Concerns and China’s Countermeasures: India views South Tibet as a threat to its southwest. China’s stance during the India-Pakistan conflict, indicating its intention to restore the original name of South Tibet, was meant as a warning to India.
India’s Plan for Indigenous Fifth-Generation Fighter Jet: To counter military pressure from China and Pakistan, India has approved the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program, with delivery expected by 2035. With numerous issues in India’s defense industry, a lack of strategic planning and technological accumulation, and the ineffective utilization of Western fighter jets purchased by India, makes it doubtful.
The Kashmir region remains a potential flashpoint between India and Pakistan. India has reportedly increased its troop presence in South Kashmir to 500,000, raising concerns about potential conflict. The Line of Control is easily crossed due to the contiguous border, and the division of Kashmir into regions controlled by India, Pakistan, and China (Aksai Chin) contributes to the ongoing dispute.
China-Pakistan Military Cooperation and JF-17 Success: The export of China’s J-35 fighter jet to Pakistan. In the India-Pakistan conflict, Chinese mainland fighter jets performed excellently, especially the JF-17, which reportedly shot down an S-400 air defense system, enhancing its reputation in the international arms market. Azerbaijan also reportedly increased its purchase of JF-17s.
Given the geography and existing infrastructure on the Chinese side of the border (which has seen significant development in recent decades), the potential primary axes of advance would likely be concentrated where valleys and passes offer the least formidable obstacles.
General Considerations for Routes:
Western Arunachal Pradesh (Tawang Sector): This sector is historically significant and relatively more accessible from central Tibet.
Bum La Pass: Located at around 5,000 meters (16,500 ft) above sea level, it connects Tsona County in Tibet with India’s Tawang district. This pass has historical significance as the route taken by the 14th Dalai Lama into India in 1959 and was an invasion route during the 1962 Sino-Indian War. China has built significant road infrastructure leading up to its side of the border in this area.
Tulung La Pass: Situated at around 5,260 meters (17,250 ft), also in the Tawang sector, this pass also served as an invasion route in 1962 and has been a site of past clashes. It lies on a watershed between the Tsona Chu river in Tibet and the Tawang Chu.
Eastern Arunachal Pradesh (Upper Siang, Dibang Valley, Anjaw Districts): These areas are also rugged but feature river valleys that could offer routes.
Dihang Pass (Siang Pass): Located at approximately 4,590 meters (15,049 ft), this pass is situated on the way to Tuting in the Upper Siang district and offers views of the Dihang River (known as Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet). River valleys generally provide relatively lower elevation routes through mountainous terrain.
Diphu La Pass: Located near the tri-junction of India, China, and Myanmar, this pass is at a lower altitude (approximately 5,900 feet) and has historically been an important trade route. Its strategic location makes it relevant for potential movement in the easternmost part of Arunachal Pradesh.
Best and Second Best Routes (based on relative accessibility and historical use in challenging terrain):
Considering the terrain, existing infrastructure development on the Chinese side leading up to the border, and historical precedents of movement, the most likely and relatively “best” axes for ground movement would be:
The Tawang Sector (via Bum La Pass and potentially Tulung La Pass):
Why: This region has seen the most historical activity and has the most developed road infrastructure on the Chinese side leading up to the border. The Tawang district is a key strategic area for both sides. The valleys leading from Tsona County in Tibet offer a pathway towards Indian positions.
Challenges: Despite relative “best,” it still involves extremely high altitudes, challenging passes, and is heavily defended by India, with recent infrastructure upgrades like the Sela Tunnel improving India’s all-weather connectivity to Tawang.
The Eastern Arunachal Pradesh via River Valleys (e.g., Dihang/Siang River Valley or routes connecting to the Lohit River Valley):
Why: While also extremely difficult, river valleys generally provide the lowest elevation and most natural corridors through the highly mountainous terrain of the Himalayas. The Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) river system flows from Tibet into Arunachal Pradesh (where it becomes the Siang River).
Challenges: These valleys are deep, narrow, and often heavily forested, making movement difficult. India has also been significantly upgrading its infrastructure in these eastern sectors, including roads like the Arunachal Frontier Highway. Passes like Diphu La, while lower, still involve complex terrain.
A potential North-South divide in India is a widely discussed topic, characterized by significant economic, cultural, and political disparities. The southern region is sometimes referred to as “Blue India,” while the northern region is called “North India”.
Key Aspects of the Potential Divide:
Geographical and Racial Differences: “Blue India” generally has a darker-skinned population, while North India has a lighter-skinned population.
Economic Disparity: Southern India (“Blue India”) is more economically developed, contributing over 37% to India’s GDP despite having a smaller land area and population compared to North India’s 28%. This is reflected in higher per capita income and industrial output in the South.
Cultural and Social Differences: Significant differences exist in language, customs, food, and political affiliations. Southern states primarily speak Dravidian languages, while the North largely speaks Indo-Aryan languages, primarily Hindi. Southern states often prioritize regional identity and resist what they perceive as Hindi imposition.
Development Disparities: South India generally exhibits higher literacy rates, better healthcare outcomes, and more developed infrastructure.
Political Tensions and Resource Allocation: There are concerns that the central government’s policies favor North India in tax revenue distribution and fund allocation, potentially disadvantaging the South. Southern states often contribute a larger share to central taxes but receive a comparatively smaller share back.
Frozen Parliamentary Seat Allocation (Delimitation): A major point of contention is the freezing of parliamentary seat allocation based on the 1971 census, which is set to be lifted after 2026. Southern states, which have successfully controlled population growth, fear that reallocation based on more recent population figures will disproportionately increase seats for the more populous northern states, diminishing the South’s political influence. This constitutional freeze was originally implemented to encourage family planning.
Growing Sentiment for Separation: These grievances contribute to a growing sentiment in South India of unfair treatment, leading to discussions about a potential split, especially as the 2026 parliamentary seat reallocation approaches.
Recent Incidents and Ongoing Tensions (mid-2020 to mid-2025):
Delimitation and Political Representation: This remains the most significant flashpoint, with southern leaders like Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M.K. Stalin openly protesting the potential reduction in political influence.
Fiscal Federalism and Resource Allocation: Southern states frequently allege unfair penalization for their economic success and efficient governance, citing disproportionate tax shares and “step-motherly treatment” in central fund allocation.
Hindi Imposition: Efforts by the central government to promote Hindi have recurrently sparked protests, particularly in Tamil Nadu, which views it as an imposition on its distinct linguistic and cultural identity. This includes resistance to Hindi signage and rejection of the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 due to its “three-language formula”.
Political Divergence: The ruling BJP’s strong base in the Hindi-speaking North and its struggle to gain significant ground in many southern states contribute to the perception that central government policies often overlook southern priorities.
Impact of Democracy and Elections:
Democracy and elections present both positive and negative aspects for the North-South relationship.
Potential Positives: Elections provide a platform for Southern states to voice grievances, ensure accountability from national parties, allow for negotiation and compromise, and represent diverse interests, ideally resolving disputes peacefully.
Potential Negatives: The democratic principle of “one person, one vote” directly links political power to population, and the impending 2026 delimitation could exacerbate divisions by marginalizing the South’s political voice. Electoral cycles can encourage populist rhetoric that deepens regional differences, and the numerical dominance of northern states could lead to a “tyranny of the majority” in policymaking. Consensus-building on sensitive issues like fiscal federalism can be challenging.
South India (“Blue India”): Bengaluru (IT, economic dynamism), Chennai (automobile, IT, Tamil culture), Hyderabad (IT, biotech, modern progress), Kochi (port city, tourism, human development).
Prime Minister Narendra Modi is from Gujarat, in western India. While not strictly “North India” in the Hindi-belt sense, Gujarat is generally considered part of the broader northern/western cultural and political sphere in the context of the North-South divide.
Western Exploitation of the Divide:
There is no concrete, widely reported evidence of explicit Western policies aimed at directly exploiting India’s North-South divide for malevolent purposes. Geopolitical analyses by external powers do consider internal fault lines to understand a country’s stability, but this is standard practice. Western engagement with diverse stakeholders and focus on economic opportunities in southern states are natural consequences of their development, not necessarily exploitation of a divide. Discussions about these divisions are largely driven by internal Indian dynamics.
Recent Elections and Future Outlook:
India concluded its most recent General Election (Lok Sabha election) from April 19 to June 1, 2024, with results declared on June 4, 2024, leading to Narendra Modi securing a third term. The next major national election is expected in May-June 2029. Several state assembly elections are scheduled before then, including in 2025 (Delhi, Bihar, Jharkhand), 2026 (Assam, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Puducherry), and later years. The period leading up to and following the 2026 delimitation will be a critical test of India’s democratic resilience in managing these tensions.
Impact of Recent India-Pakistan Conflict on the North-South Divide
The recent tensions between India and Pakistan could influence the North-South divide in India in several ways, both exacerbating and mitigating existing tensions. Here’s how:
1. National Unity vs. Regional Grievances
Short-Term Rallying Effect: External conflicts often foster national unity, temporarily overshadowing internal divisions. If Pakistan is perceived as a common threat, Southern states may mute their grievances in favor of national security concerns.
Long-Term Resentment: If the conflict leads to increased military spending or resource diversion to border states (mostly in the North), Southern states might resent what they see as an unequal burden, reinforcing their perception of being economically exploited.
2. Political Capital and Centralization of Power
Stronger Central Government: A conflict could strengthen the central government’s authority, making it harder for Southern states to push back against policies like delimitation or tax redistribution.
BJP’s Nationalist Narrative: The ruling BJP may use the conflict to consolidate its nationalist agenda, which is more popular in the North. This could further alienate Southern states, where regional parties resist central dominance.
3. Economic and Resource Allocation Shifts
Defense Spending vs. Development Funds: Increased military expenditure might reduce funds for Southern infrastructure and welfare programs, fueling discontent.
Economic Disruptions: If trade or supply chains are affected, South India’s tech and manufacturing hubs (Bengaluru, Chennai, Hyderabad) could face economic strain, worsening perceptions of North-centric policies.
4. Security vs. Federalism Debate
Security Overrides Federalism: In times of conflict, the central government may impose stricter security measures, potentially overriding state autonomy—something Southern states already resist.
Intelligence and Surveillance: If tensions escalate, increased surveillance could be seen as another form of central overreach, particularly in states with strong regional identities like Tamil Nadu or Kerala.
5. Geopolitical Alignments and Foreign Perceptions
Western Engagement: If India-Pakistan tensions draw more Western diplomatic or military support to India, Southern states (with their stronger economic ties to the West) may demand a greater say in foreign policy, highlighting their global integration compared to the North.
China’s Role: If China supports Pakistan, India may seek stronger alliances with the US and EU, which have significant investments in South India. This could empower Southern states to leverage their economic importance in national debates.
Conclusion: Conflict as a Double-Edged Sword
Short-Term Unity, Long-Term Strain: While India-Pakistan tensions may temporarily suppress North-South divisions, the underlying issues (delimitation, fiscal federalism, cultural identity) will persist and could resurface more sharply post-conflict.
Risk of Exploitation: If the central government uses the conflict to centralize power further, Southern resistance may grow, especially if they perceive their economic contributions as being diverted to Northern security priorities.
Potential for Bargaining: Southern states might use their economic leverage to negotiate better terms in federal policies, especially if national stability relies on their cooperation.
The conflict doesn’t erase the North-South divide but reshapes its dynamics, either by suppressing dissent in the name of security or by deepening resentment if Southern states feel sidelined in national priorities. The 2026 delimitation remains the key flashpoint, but external conflicts could accelerate or delay its political fallout.
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) signed an agreement for cooperation in remote sensing satellite data sharing, according to Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).
The pact inked on August 17 enables building a virtual constellation of specified remote sensing satellites of BRICS space agencies and their respective ground stations will receive the data, ISRO said.
