Category: Russia

Outer Manchuria, also known as Russian Manchuria, refers to a vast region in Northeast Asia that is now part of the Russian Far East but historically formed part of Manchuria, the traditional homeland of the Manchu people.

Early History and Chinese Rule:

– The region was inhabited by various indigenous Tungusic peoples (like the Sushen, Mohe, and later Jurchens) for millennia.

– Chinese dynasties, including the Qin, Han, Jin, Sui, and Tang, exerted varying degrees of influence and control over parts of Manchuria, particularly its southern areas, through military commanderies and tributary relationships.

– The kingdom of Bohai (698-926 CE), composed predominantly of Goguryeo and Tungusic-speaking peoples, ruled over all of Manchuria, including what is now Outer Manchuria.

– Later, the Khitan-led Liao dynasty and the Jurchen-led Jin dynasty also controlled parts of Manchuria.

– The Yuan dynasty (Mongol Empire) occupied the entire region, making it the Liaoyang province.

– The Ming dynasty, which overthrew the Yuan, also had influence.

– The Qing dynasty, founded by the Manchu people from this region, maintained administrative control over Manchuria. However, the Qing largely discouraged Han Chinese settlement in these northern areas to preserve the Manchu character, and their authority in Outer Manchuria was often tenuous, particularly over the more remote northern tribes.

Russian Expansion and Annexation (17th-19th Centuries):

– From the mid-17th century, the Russian Empire began its expansion into the Far East.

– Initial conflicts with Qing China led to the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, which defined the Sino-Russian border along the Stanovoy Mountains and the Argun River. This treaty recognized the disputed northern part of Outer Manchuria as Qing territory.

– However, Russia continued its expansionist ambitions. By the mid-19th century, with Qing China weakened by internal rebellions (like the Taiping Rebellion) and external pressures from Western powers (the Opium Wars), Russia seized the opportunity.

– The Treaty of Aigun in 1858, signed by Russia and a local Qing official without full central government authorization, ceded the territory north of the Amur River (Priamurye) to Russia. It also declared the land east of the Ussuri River and south of the Amur (Primorskaya) as a Sino-Russian condominium. The Qing initially refused to recognize this treaty.

– Two years later, amidst the chaos of the Second Opium War (Arrow War), Russia, though not a direct belligerent, acted as an intermediary and leveraged the situation. The Convention of Peking in 1860 affirmed the Treaty of Aigun and further ceded the entire Pacific coast to the Korean border (Primorskaya) to Russia, as well as the island of Sakhalin. This effectively transferred approximately 910,000 square kilometers (350,000 sq mi) of land, collectively known as Outer Manchuria or Russian Manchuria, to the Russian Empire, and cut off China’s direct access to the Sea of Japan.

Subsequent Developments:

The newly acquired Russian territories included key modern cities like Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk.

While China officially settled outstanding boundary issues with Russia in the 1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement and the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship, some in China still regard Outer Manchuria as a territory unfairly taken.

The historical significance for China lies in the loss of a vast territory that was part of its traditional homeland and its access to the Sea of Japan, a sensitive point in its modern history, often viewed through the lens of “unequal treaties.” https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/987299476648010/?__cft__[0]=AZVORqZyKlhTnjVFCApbAspKq9zDeoq9xcS8b8fij2AcII5UTMSyQH8GjPLUtugS8Yel5VTFefQ-Gvg1QVs9fM0ksVl85EqSO8FnMVcyskZkaFlZCBduOI2PJzg_EmW8ruKQMFUZNIqsCfk6ZeXzP5-R5Dj0He8qlAcK2sS9Scxf0Q&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Report on the Geopolitical and Economic Significance of the Moo (Kuskino)/Mokuawei Region

Executive Summary

The Moo (Kuskino) region, historically known to China as Mokuawei, located in Russia’s Far East and encompassing Posi Bay (Zaliv Pos’yeta) and Zarubino Port, holds immense, yet largely untapped, geopolitical and economic significance. Despite possessing natural deep-water harbors with potential for all-weather operation, the area remains underdeveloped due to a complex interplay of historical grievances, strategic anxieties, and economic considerations. For China, these ports represent a vital gateway to the Sea of Japan, offering transformative potential for its landlocked northeastern provinces. For Russia, however, the strategic implications of full development and Chinese access present significant challenges to its security and regional control.

Area Overview and Geographic Advantages

The Moo (Kuskino) region is strategically situated in Russia’s Hasan District, remarkably close to the Chinese border city of Hunchun. While a direct border crossing to the region is nearby (approximately 4 km to the general “Moo” area), the crucial connection between Hunchun and Zarubino Port is approximately 50 kilometers.

The area boasts two natural deep-water harbors:

Posi Bay (Залив Посьета): A vast and deep water body capable of accommodating large vessels.

Zarubino Port: Located in close proximity to the Chinese border, offering direct access for trade.

Both ports possess the inherent potential, with the aid of icebreakers, to function as year-round, ice-free ports, a significant advantage in the often-frozen northern latitudes. This makes them exceptionally valuable for maritime trade and logistics.

Historical Context and Chinese Aspirations

The historical backdrop of the region is critical to understanding its current significance. China lost this territory, along with Vladivostok and other vast lands, to Tsarist Russia through the unequal Treaty of Beijing in 1860. This historical context fuels China’s enduring interest in regaining effective access to the Sea of Japan for its northeastern provinces (Heilongjiang and Jilin), which are currently landlocked. These provinces desperately require a direct, efficient maritime outlet to facilitate trade with East Asian neighbors like Japan and South Korea, bypassing lengthy and costly overland routes or congested Chinese southern ports.

Russia’s Reluctance and Strategic Concerns

Despite the clear economic potential, Russia has historically been reluctant to fully develop and open these ports for significant Chinese use. This stems from a multi-faceted set of strategic concerns:

Territorial and Security Sensitivity: Russia views its Far East territories with deep historical and security sensitivity. Granting extensive foreign access or control over critical infrastructure so close to its border is perceived as a national security risk, particularly given a history of territorial disputes and anxieties.

Demographic Concerns (“China Threat”): There is an underlying fear within Russia that significant Chinese investment and economic migration into the sparsely populated Far East could lead to a demographic imbalance, potentially challenging Russian sovereignty or control in the long term.

Economic Disparity in Benefits: Russia perceives that the primary economic beneficiaries of fully developed and Chinese-accessed ports would be China’s economy, rather than its own. Russia has shown a preference for maintaining the status quo or pursuing development that primarily benefits its own internal economic and strategic objectives, rather than empowering a potential competitor.

Maintaining Vladivostok’s Prominence: Russia prefers to consolidate its maritime power and economic activity in its established port of Vladivostok, which serves as the headquarters of its Pacific Fleet and a key military and commercial hub. Full development of Posi Bay and Zarubino Port for Chinese benefit might dilute Vladivostok’s strategic importance.

Stalled Cooperation and Future Outlook

Efforts to foster cooperation in the region have largely stalled. A 2002 Chinese proposal to lease the Moo area for international port development was rejected by Russia. Similarly, a reported 2016 initiative for joint Sino-Russian construction to enhance Zarubino Port’s capacity and open new international routes has not seen substantial progress.

The future of the Moo (Kuskino)/Mokuawei region and its valuable ports remains suspended in a complex geopolitical standoff. While the economic imperative for China to access these ports is undeniable, Russia’s deep-seated security, historical, and economic considerations present significant barriers. Any future significant development or expanded access would likely require a fundamental shift in Russia’s strategic calculus, possibly under duress or as part of a much broader, mutually beneficial geopolitical realignment. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02DTnEENTWx77pBoqPdVY9NXc9h8DjQQk26uHGzj1JrBovqG5XkJwAQbmx3AJxNKayl?__cft__[0]=AZXt9F2aU1iiP-J6Rr-kDYO-GN0kaqWbe4dDecV892ymGBqZ0K68j3GRHClz8oODA8N2NkYtqHfRhd9SSoJlIgobN180fWSa5KdxBadroclAVNJ3tyNDuK7NF5V6sjgZlGQjTngTjhUbkzqqlG7voQJ9UK8xO39wRRtnekLdXziMyA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02mv18wpqzXu573ZQRRKbJhhek318B6ydZau7Mm7GJXRQujb5Raj6sq4gU2uACXHmfl?cft[0]=AZWOLADDXz4i6wdViyNcWNOuvxTrHOhuDsL1e47197G6lJ5ZcwHTd8aQBhG2569IH3E29x6J94i2zTqqt9W2MSkOkRAV5ktMuM417MvlJFcfmsUm-OEcAKGdHc_cgEl9QADy0qifMCL9RhEMCse9zrzD&tn=%2CO%2CP-R

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid035utMjm4bnzAX9orzneVUodn8UwXXtSebi6WhaErH1w4ocb67YsiRWoPSToDtfG8Dl?cft[0]=AZWENLi8CA7uEcPM7QmbXmpo5no9vgoc-vsODNdfAi-ifRgl3rOxb1Ak1XNy_LIkur_Cznb62FEDMznwUMNmjWBqNSPK07c7axVWyUSZrIHjG-eoDs6Tig4c9QJSWFX_o58h8xesZOBZzcgejMt0jAO9&tn=%2CO%2CP-R