China will not recognize BNO for Hong Kong residents from 1-31-21

1-29-21 If Hong Kong residents choose to hold the BNO passport, they have to abandon the HKSAR passport, China bans BNOs holders from traveling to China, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).

“From January 31, China will no longer recognise the so-called BNO passport as a travel document and ID document, and reserves the right to take further actions,” foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian.

Day hike from Ngong Ping via the Fat Mun Ancient Path to Tung Chung 1-26-21

昂坪 – 法门古道 – 石门甲 – 东涌 一天遊
宝莲禅寺
宝莲大会堂
法门古道 是舊日村民來往東涌與昂坪的要道 , 法門古道旁有一條被稱為「曹溪」的溪流,在鳳凰山與彌勒山之間由上而下流入東涌灣,故此古道又名曹溪古道。
法门古道
彌勒山
彌勒山
Lots of hikers hiked up
石涧
地塘仔中道亭 中道亭 Midway Pavillion
Lantau Peak
凤鳥石脊 Danger path besides the pavillion
羅漢坑
羅漢塔
禅七期间 禅七起源于佛陀在菩提树下,七日证道。佛陀在菩提树下自誓:若不成道誓不离金刚宝座,实为七日成佛的滥觞。
宝林禅寺,或称宝林寺,为香港一座佛教寺庙,位于新界大屿山凤凰山半麓,地塘仔半216号地段。除年迈高僧外,寺内僧侣都要下田耕种,粮食自给自足。
宝林禅寺
宝林禅寺
宝林禅寺
十方道場 “後枕高山鳳嶺巍巍雲蓋頂,前臨大海曹溪滾滾水來潮。”
十方道場
十方道場
金剛塔
该寺由悟明法师于1955年开创。悟明法师以苦行见称,在凤凰山独居二十多年。1956年,悟明法师过世后,宝林禅寺由圣一和尚接管。
法航精舍
普同塔 存放亡僧骨灰,
华嚴阁
华嚴阁
莲华台 为佛菩萨之常座。
莲华台
法林禅院
法林禅院
法林禅院
东林精舍 已荒廢的精舍,前為僧人靜修之地。
莲觉亭
莲觉亭
羅漢寺
羅漢寺 “山挹遥青佛国恍如灵鹫影;门临清净天风微度海潮音。”
羅漢寺
羅漢寺
玄壇古庙
滿东邨
东涌

China plans tourism development for Greater Bay Area

China has recently rolled out a comprehensive development plan on the cultural and tourism development for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area, said the Ministry of Culture and Tourism on Wednesday.

The country will build the Greater Bay Area into a habitable, entrepreneur-friendly area and a tourist destination with a flourishing cultural industry.

The plan projected that by the year 2035, the area’s tourism and cultural sectors will realize high-quality development, and it will boast greater cultural soft power and higher tourism competitiveness.

The plan also emphasized the promotion of national history and culture and the need to beef up patriotic education among the youth in the area.

The plan was jointly issued by the ministry, the office of the leading group for the development of the Greater Bay Area, and the Guangdong Provincial People’s Government.

Great! That will keep me busy.

Monkey

Two years on, arrest of Huawei exec Meng Wanzhou in Canada still clouds its trade ties with China. From canola, pork to forest products, Canada has seen sliding exports in the Chinese market over the past two years.

China’s trade with Canada dropped by 2.3% y-o-y in the first 11 months, with imports from Canada down by 22.2%, as bilateral ties further deteriorated

Canadian canola still finding its way to China, keeping farmers busy with steady demand.

Strong Canadian pork exports driven by Chinese demand

China buys bug-infested spruce from Germany, spurning Canada

Canada’s Teck looks to boost Chinese coal sales amid stalled Australian shipments

Wheat

Pork

motor vehicles

wood pulp

natural gas

oil

Day hike to Kung Um Shan 11-30-20

Day hike to Kung Um Shan 11-30-20 公庵山 一天遊
太平新村外的小溪
pitcher plant 猪笼草 on the side of the trail
丹桂村水塘
洪福村, 天水围
Wetland plants
Follow the blue ribbon up the steep trail
Lam Tei 藍地
Rut in the trail caused by dirt bikes
The creek with running water, amazing that there has been little or no rain for months.
Lam Tei 藍地
洪水坑
樂仙蜻蜓 Trithemis festiva black stream glider
Black stream glider
Orthetrum sabina, the slender skimmer or green marsh hawk 狭腹灰蜻
Tai Tong 大棠 , 元朗
藍地
藍地石礦場
公庵山 Kung Um Shan
Indian fritillary (Argynnis hyperbius)  斐豹蛱蝶
深圳湾大桥
天水圍
元朗
大棠
公庵山山顶设有香港数码地面电视广播之辅助发射站,服务元朗及十八乡等地。
To Tai Mo Shan
From Shenzhen
Grid network

公庵山(Kung Um Shan),又称297山或297号山,是香港新界西北部的一座山峰,位于元朗区洪水桥东南、大棠西北,海拔297米。
圆头山 海拔高度375米
尚築 Domus
洪水桥
Some kind of construction project
4X4 roam here
Climbing wall

China will own US if Joe Biden gets elected, says Donald Trump. Let it begin.

“China was never mentioned in any way, shape, or form. China will own our country if he gets elected. They will own our country and we’re not going to let that happen. You’ve seen the intelligence reports. China very much wants Joe Biden to win. That would be very insulting if they wanted me to win. I don’t think so,” he said.

Hong Kong is China, by Regina Ip

No amount of outcry, condemnation or sanctions over the Chinese government’s purported encroachment in Hong Kong’s affairs will alter the fact that Hong Kong is part of China and that its destiny is intertwined with the mainland’s.

Hong Kong has been rocked by a series of crises after the eruption of protests last year over a proposed bill (long since withdrawn) that would have allowed the extradition of some suspects in criminal cases to mainland China.

Hong Kongers who wanted the city promptly to return to peace thought the authorities’ handling of the situation, which dragged on for months and grew more and more violent, was incompetent. For other locals, many outsiders and apparently much of the global media, a people’s legitimate quest for more democracy was being suppressed.
Something had to be done, and the Chinese authorities did it. The scale and frequency of antigovernment protests has now subsided — thanks to a national security law for Hong Kong promulgated in Beijing on June 30.

Several prominent democracy advocates have since announced their retirement from politics, disbanded their parties or fled the city.
The West tends to glorify these people as defenders of Hong Kong’s freedoms, but they have done great harm to the city by going against its constitutional order and stirring up chaos and disaffection toward our motherland.

Last year’s prolonged unrest dented Hong Kong’s reputation as one of the best places in the world in which to do business. In March, the Heritage Foundation downgraded the city to second place in its Economic Freedom Index for 2020, citing “ongoing political and social turmoil”; Hong Kong had ranked first since 1995.
The Fraser Institute, an independent think tank in Canada, rated Hong Kong as the world’s freest economy in its latest report, but it warned that Beijing’s recent “interventions” would likely hurt the next assessment.

And the Trump administration has imposed sanctions on the city’s chief executive, Carrie Lam, and other senior officials here and on the mainland, and it has revoked Hong Kong’s special trade status with the United States.

Some pundits have already declared the death of “one country, two systems,” the formal arrangement under which Hong Kong is governed by Beijing, though with “a high degree of autonomy” and a commitment to civil rights not available on the mainland.
At the same time, the democratic movement in Hong Kong is in great danger of being hijacked by its more radical faction. In mid-July, ahead of the election for the Legislative Council (LegCo) scheduled for early September, the pro-democracy camp held an informal primary to gauge the public’s support for its various candidates. The ones who advocated uncompromising positions or blanket opposition to the government scored well.

At the end of July, in the midst of an upsurge of coronavirus infections, Mrs. Lam announced that the LegCo election would be postponed for a year because it couldn’t safely be held during the pandemic.
The Hong Kong Bar Association immediately issued a statement challenging the basis, in fact and in law, for the government’s decision, also chiding the administration for inviting Beijing to weigh in, in violation of Hong Kong’s Basic Law, the city’s mini-constitution.

The authorities in Beijing then signaled, by way of a laconic decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, that sitting legislators could simply continue doing their work.

But this announcement, too, has proved controversial. At least two of the 24 pro-democracy legislators in LegCo announced this week that they would quit, on grounds that a term extension would breach the Basic Law. Nearly all of the others appear to be keeping their posts, after respondents in an opinion poll favored, by a thin margin, the legislators’ staying over their leaving.
Yet deferring the election, and for a full year, simply was a sound decision.

Another wave of coronavirus infections (which would be Hong Kong’s fourth) could strike later this fall or in the winter, and, say, a six-month deferral might have required another six months’ delay — a move that would confuse the public and no doubt be decried as a lack of foresight on the Hong Kong government’s part.

Some have asked why special arrangements couldn’t be made to hold the election on schedule, when at just the time that the voting was supposed to take place, the government managed to conduct a citywide coronavirus-testing program. The plain answer is that the Electoral Affairs Commission, an independent body, made no recommendations for minimizing health risks to the nearly 4.5 million voters expected to cast ballots on a single day, despite various suggestions from pro-establishment parties to allow for early voting, mail-in voting and voting outside Hong Kong, and to extend voting hours.
Then the coronavirus-detection program itself came under attack.

By the end of the two-week testing drive, on Sept. 14, 1.78 million residents had been screened, about 24 percent of the city’s population. Was this a high level of participation? Or was it low — as some critics claimed, citing that as yet more proof of the community’s lack of trust in the authorities?

Mass testing was the responsible thing to do.

Hong Kong, despite being densely populated and an international business and travel hub, has managed relatively well in fighting Covid-19, without ever mandating a complete lockdown. As of Oct. 1, a total of 5,088 confirmed or probable cases of infection and 105 deaths had been reported, in a city of 7.5 million people.
Yet pro-democracy activists seized on the testing program, too, claiming that the privacy of test-takers’ DNA was at risk, especially since some medical teams administering or analyzing the tests were brought in from the mainland.

The Hong Kong government has not been able to resolve in recent years any of the city’s main challenges, let alone restore public trust or win back hearts and minds. But these problems are not entirely the doing of Mrs. Lam’s government: Previous administrations failed to deal with them in any meaningful way.

This wariness is one reason that the doubts and fears being expressed today about the impact of China’s recent national security law in Hong Kong can only diminish over time, as the new law is tested in court.
For now, despite all the jitters, about 28 people have been arrested under the law. And only one person has been charged — for secession and terrorism: a 23-year-old man accused of driving a motorbike into police officers and displaying a banner that read “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of Our Times.” His case is being dealt with in accordance with due process and our criminal laws.

Another story that has garnered much worried attention recently concerns a group of 12 people from Hong Kong who in late August were intercepted by marine police from mainland China for illegally crossing the border while they appeared to be fleeing the city on a speedboat in the direction of Taiwan. At least one of them had been arrested in Hong Kong under the national security law.

All have been in detention on the mainland since — raising concerns among human rights defenders and democracy activists that the fugitives are being held without charge, have been denied bail and refused access to lawyers, and are about to be subjected to the mainland’s legal system, which has fewer protections for defendants than does Hong Kong’s.

But the Hong Kong government has no power to ask any other jurisdiction not to deal with Hong Kong residents in accordance with its own laws simply because those people are from Hong Kong.

To some, the new national security law is especially chilling because it seems simultaneously vague and very severe. But many laws are vague, constructively so. And this one only seems severe precisely because it fills longstanding loopholes — about subversion, secession, local terrorism, collusion with external forces. One person’s “severe” is someone else’s intended effect.

I see little chance of any compromise being reached between the authorities in Beijing and the democratic camp in Hong Kong, be it about the right to elect directly the chief executive or any other major matter. From Beijing’s point of view, democratic development in Hong Kong has brought about nothing but chaos, polarization and anti-China sentiment.

What’s more, Beijing isn’t actually encroaching on Hong Kong’s semi-autonomy by taking measures to proscribe subversive activities in the city. Bear in mind that back in the late 1970s, China’s leader, Deng Xiaoping, put forward the “one country, two systems” formula with a view to bringing Hong Kong, Macau and eventually Taiwan back into the fold. National unity has always been the ultimate objective.
Under the Basic Law, Hong Kong is a special administrative region that enjoys a “high degree of autonomy” — which, by definition, means not complete autonomy, a point I labor to explain to foreign officials and politicians. Any attempt to alter Hong Kong’s formal political status and turn the city into a de facto independent political entity, or to otherwise free it of Beijing’s control, is a fundamental challenge to China’s sovereignty.

Can a few young people clamoring that Hong Kong is its own “nation” really do that much harm? Does simply chanting some feisty slogans or waving a banner that says “independence” — or holding up a blank sheet of paper in its place — really threaten China’s national unity? Maybe, if those statements and gestures indicate a broader engagement in the organizing, planning, participating or committing of actual separatism. Such activities and situations tend to be dynamic, and their effects can quickly metastasize.

Like it or not, Hong Kong is part of China. And given the two’s vast disparity in size and Hong Kong’s growing economic dependence on the mainland, the city’s progressive integration with China is unavoidable.

A realistic goal for Hong Kong ought to be remaining the freest and most international city in China and retaining its unique international status, thanks to the city’s many bilateral agreements with foreign countries and its membership in numerous international organizations.

Foreign governments should not benchmark what happens in Hong Kong against standards that prevail in Western countries; those are governed by a political system entirely different from China’s. Instead, they should benchmark Hong Kong against the rest of China, and measure how the city can maintain its unique characteristics — openness, a commitment to personal rights and freedoms, respect for the rule of law and the ability to reinvent itself economically. Beijing’s national security law is saving “one country, two systems” by ensuring that Hong Kong does not become a danger to China.

Regina Ip is a member of the Executive Council and the Legislative Council of Hong Kong.

https://www.facebook.com/100204365185056/videos/248302103274639/?t=0
https://www.facebook.com/100204365185056/videos/396758524676198/?t=2
https://www.facebook.com/100204365185056/videos/727677871150506/?t=6
https://www.facebook.com/100204365185056/videos/819744405233300/?t=6

Exercise Agile Reaper

The Air Force approved the new coursework shortly before the start of Exercise Agile Reaper, the first training event focused on those tactics in the Pacific. In keeping with the pivot away from the Middle East, patches on Airmen’s uniforms made for the event feature an MQ-9 superimposed over a red silhouette of China.

The exercise at Naval Air Station Point Mugu, Calif., began Sept. 3 and will end Sept. 29. It partners three MQ-9s with the Navy’s Third Fleet, which deploys carrier strike groups, submarines, and other sea vessels and aircraft to the Eastern Pacific, along with Air Force C-130s, and special warfare and Marine Corps personnel.

  • Attacking China’s Nansha Islands or other Chinese targets using MQ-9 Reaper drones is an act of war. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army will surely fight back, causing the US military to pay a heavy price.
    China will shoot down incoming US warplanes, no matter they are unmanned or manned. If those planes cause actual damage to Chinese islands and reefs, we will strike the platforms and bases from which those planes take off. The Nansha islands have only a small number of defensive weapons. If they are attacked, those islands would henceforth need to be turned into a fully operational military base to counter any serious threat to them.