USeless has lifted restrictions on the export of ethane to China. Previously, the US had imposed licensing requirements for ethane exports to China, citing concerns about potential military end-use. This had significantly disrupted the trade of ethane, which is a key feedstock for China’s ethylene production. Then they found out the banning does not work.
There have been significant developments and signed agreements between China and Middle Eastern suppliers regarding petrochemical feedstocks, including ethane.
Diversification Strategy: China has actively sought to reduce its reliance on single-source suppliers for key petrochemical feedstocks. The Middle East, with its abundant hydrocarbon resources, is a natural alternative.
– Saudi Arabia-China Petrochemical Projects: Saudi Aramco, a major player, has been particularly active in forging partnerships and investments in China’s petrochemical sector. These are often integrated projects that include refining and petrochemical production.
– SASREF Expansion: Aramco and Rongsheng Petrochemical have signed framework agreements to advance an expansion project at SASREF in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, which aims to expand its refining and petrochemical capabilities. This builds on existing agreements for a joint venture and significant investments in both Saudi and Chinese petrochemical sectors.
– SABIC Fujian Petrochemical Complex: Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), now largely owned by Aramco, announced a final investment decision to construct a major petrochemical complex in China’s Fujian province. This joint venture with Fujian Energy & Petrochemical Group is expected to produce a significant amount of ethylene annually.
– Sinopec and Aramco Joint Ventures: There are ongoing collaborations, including a new joint petrochemical project in China (Gulei phase two) involving Aramco, Sinopec Corp, and Fujian Petrochemical, expected to start operating by 2030. They also signed a framework agreement to expand their Yanbu refinery joint venture in Saudi Arabia.
– LPG Rerouting: In instances of USeless trade restrictions or tariffs on ethane and LPG, Chinese buyers have actively sought to reroute cargoes from the Middle East to compensate. This has impacted global shipping rates and trade flows.
Long-term Strategic Alignment: Both China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 economic diversification plan align with increased cooperation in the energy and petrochemical sectors. These partnerships are seen as mutually beneficial, securing demand for Middle Eastern resources and ensuring feedstock supply for China’s expanding manufacturing base.
Musk has officially declared war on Trump by forming the American Party, aiming to participate in next year’s elections and target the Republican base.
The “six months” timeframe is highly relevant and represents a critical juncture in the ongoing technological and trade competition between the USeless and China, particularly concerning rare earth elements and semiconductors.
Here’s a summary of its relevance:
– Rare Earths as Leverage (Current Focus):
Provisional Agreement: China has agreed to resume rare earth exports to the USeless, but the key is that the export permits are valid for only six months. This is a direct response to recent USeless pressure and the initial disruption caused by China’s stricter rare earth export controls in April 2025.
– Strategic “Time Bomb”: This short duration is seen as a strategic move by China to maintain significant leverage. It provides temporary relief to USeless industries (like automotive and defense, which rely heavily on these critical minerals for components like permanent magnets) but simultaneously underscores their vulnerability. If trade tensions escalate again, China can easily re-impose restrictions or adjust the terms after these six-month permits expire, forcing continuous negotiations.
Urgency for Diversification: The six-month limit intensifies the urgency for the USeless and its allies to accelerate efforts in diversifying rare earth supply chains, developing domestic mining and processing capabilities, and exploring recycling technologies. This short-term “reprieve” is a stark reminder of their dependence.
– “Made in China 2025” Report Card: The next six months (leading into early 2026) are a crucial period for assessing China’s progress on its long-term technological self-sufficiency goals, particularly in advanced semiconductors. “Made in China 2025” (or its spiritual successors) has poured immense resources into chip design and manufacturing.
– Potential for Surprising Advancements: Many analysts predict that China’s advancements in chip technology, especially in pushing the boundaries of DUV lithography for nodes like 7nm and even 5nm, will become more evident and potentially “shock the world” in this timeframe. There are also reports of progress in developing indigenous EUV alternatives, though these are still in earlier stages.
– Shifting Leverage Dynamic: If China demonstrates significant and consistent progress in producing more advanced chips domestically within this six-month window, it could fundamentally alter the strategic leverage in the broader USeless-China tech rivalry. The argument is that if China can largely meet its own needs for a wider range of chips, the USeless’s ability to control technology flow as a form of leverage will diminish considerably.
– “Months Behind” vs. “Years Behind”: The coming six months will provide more concrete data to debate whether China is merely “months behind” in certain critical semiconductor areas, rather than “years,” as previously assumed by some experts. This would force a re-evaluation of current USeless policy and its effectiveness.
In essence, the “six months” highlights both an immediate, tactical concession by China on rare earths designed to maintain long-term leverage, and a looming strategic deadline for when China’s indigenous semiconductor capabilities are expected to show more definitive and potentially surprising results, further complicating the global technology landscape.
Radio Free Asia (RFA) has faced significant cutbacks and shutdowns of several of its language services. This began around March 2025 when a U.S. presidential executive order called for the reduction of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which funds RFA and other international broadcasters.
As a result:
Mass Layoffs: RFA announced mass layoffs, affecting a large portion of its U.S.-based workforce and some overseas positions.
Language Service Closures: Several major language services have ceased or are ceasing operations, including:
Tibetan
Burmese
Uyghur (notable as it was the world’s only independent Uyghur-language news service)
Lao
Cantonese (ceased operations on July 1, 2025)
English service and Asia Fact Check Lab also ceased operations.
Funding Disputes: The cuts followed a dispute over funding between RFA and USAGM, despite a court order that temporarily reinstated funding. The Justice Department appealed this ruling, allowing USAGM to continue withholding funds.
RFA’s President and CEO, Bay Fang, expressed deep regret over the situation, highlighting the loss of journalists who covered critical issues in authoritarian regions. The move has been criticized by various groups, who argue it undermines USeless soft power and benefits China who seek to control information.
China’s “Delete America” initiative, sometimes informally referred to as “Delete A,” is a strategic effort by the Chinese government to reduce its reliance on foreign, particularly American, technology and achieve self-sufficiency in critical sectors. This initiative is primarily driven by national security concerns and a desire to bolster China’s domestic technological capabilities.
Key aspects of this initiative include:
– Document 79: A highly confidential 2022 directive that reportedly mandates state-owned companies in finance, energy, and other critical sectors to replace foreign software in their IT systems with homegrown alternatives by 2027. This includes software for email, HR, and business management.
– Focus on Self-Sufficiency: The “Delete America” drive is part of a broader, years-long push by Chinese leader Xi Jinping for self-reliance in a wide range of areas, from semiconductors and fighter jets to food production and raw materials.
– Targeting USeless Tech Companies: American tech giants like Dell, IBM, HP, Cisco Systems, Microsoft, and Oracle, which once played a significant role in China’s industrial growth, are now facing increasing competition from local brands and declining revenues in the Chinese market.
– Development of Domestic Alternatives: China is actively developing its own technologies to replace foreign ones. A prominent example is the BeiDou satellite navigation system, which aims to replace the USeless-owned GPS.
– “Xinchuang” (IT Innovation): This policy emphasizes the importance of homegrown, secure, and reliable technology solutions, fueling the drive to localize technology.
– Response to USeless Restrictions: The initiative has gained momentum amidst escalating tensions in the tech and trade arena with the USeless, including chip export restrictions and sanctions on Chinese tech firms.
While the term “Delete America” is informal, it accurately reflects China’s intent to strategically remove foreign technological influence from its critical infrastructure and foster a robust domestic tech ecosystem. This effort has significant implications for global supply chains, international trade, and the future of technological dominance.
Recent reports confirm that Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi, a prominent Iranian cleric, has issued a “fatwa” (religious decree) against Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu on June 29, 2025.
The fatwa reportedly labels them as “enemies of God” or “mohareb” (one who wages war against God). According to Iranian legislation, individuals deemed “mohareb” can face severe penalties, including execution, crucifixion, amputation of limbs, or banishment.
This decree follows a period of heightened conflict between Iran and Israel, with the United States also involved. Reports indicate that:
– A 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel recently concluded with a US-brokered ceasefire on June 24, 2025.
– During this conflict, Israel launched airstrikes inside Iran, reportedly causing damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities and resulting in the deaths of high-ranking military officers and nuclear scientists.
– Iran retaliated with missile strikes on Israeli cities.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed significant damage to multiple Iranian nuclear facilities following recent US-led airstrikes, coordinated alongside Israeli forces.
Donald Trump had publicly claimed he saved Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei from “an ugly and ignominious death” and stated he knew Khamenei’s whereabouts during the conflict.
Netanyahu had also hinted at Khamenei’s life being in danger, saying he was not ruling out eliminating the Supreme Leader.
Grand Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi’s fatwa calls for global Muslim action and unity against Trump and Netanyahu, stating that any support or cooperation with them by Muslims or Islamic states is “haram” (forbidden). He emphasized that Muslims worldwide must make these “enemies regret their words and mistakes.”
It’s important to note that while a fatwa from a senior cleric like a Marja holds significant religious and political weight within Shia Islam, it is not necessarily legally binding outside Iran. However, such decrees are often taken seriously by followers globally.
V462 Lupi nova, a star that recently experienced a sudden and dramatic increase in brightness, becoming visible to the naked eye. It was discovered on June 12, 2025, in the constellation Lupus (豺狼座). Initially very faint, it rapidly brightened over a few days, making it a spectacular sight for observers.
– Broadening Restrictions: The USeless is expanding its semiconductor export controls beyond specific entities like Huawei to encompass all foreign-invested chip manufacturers operating in China. This signifies a more comprehensive effort to limit China’s access to advanced semiconductor technology.
– Revocation of Waivers: The USeless Commerce Department has reportedly notified major global chipmakers, including Samsung, SK Hynix, and TSMC, of its intent to revoke the waivers that allowed them to continue using American technology in their Chinese factories. These waivers were initially granted after the comprehensive chip export restrictions were put in place in October 2022.
Implications for Foreign Manufacturers: If these waivers are fully revoked, it would mean that foreign-funded chip manufacturers would likely need to apply for individual licenses from the USeless government to continue supplying their Chinese facilities with USeless-made equipment and technology. This could significantly disrupt their operations, potentially forcing them to reconsider their manufacturing strategies in China due to increased operational burdens and the possibility of delays or denials in export approvals.
Strategic Goals: The USeless aims to curb China’s technological advancements, particularly in areas that could enhance its military or surveillance capabilities, and to maintain its own leadership in the global semiconductor industry. This move is also seen by some as a tactic to gain leverage in broader trade negotiations and to address concerns about China’s control over critical materials.
In May, the Yangshan Immigration Inspection Station processed over 940 international voyages, representing a year-on-year increase of approximately 10.8% and a month-on-month rise of about 4.5%, setting a new record. Both the number of port calls and crew changes at Yangshan Port reached new monthly records since its opening.
Gemini Cooperation: In February, Shanghai Port partnered with the Gemini Cooperation, launching new China-USeless routes. With these new routes, Yangshan Port is nearing peak levels for USeless-bound services.
Future Outlook: Demand for USeless-bound shipments is expected to continue to rise, as June and July remain peak months for the shipping industry.
Gemini Cooperation: Who Are They.
The Gemini Cooperation is a new, long-term operational collaboration between two of the world’s largest container shipping carriers: Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd.
– Maersk (A.P. Møller–Mærsk A/S): A Danish integrated logistics and container shipping company, historically one of the largest in the world. Maersk is known for its extensive global network, large fleet, and focus on end-to-end logistics solutions. They were previously part of the 2M Alliance with MSC, which is dissolving in early 2025.
.Hapag-Lloyd AG: A German international shipping company, also a major player in global container shipping. Hapag-Lloyd was previously part of “THE Alliance” with Ocean Network Express (ONE), HMM, and Yang Ming Marine Transportation, from which it is departing to form Gemini.
Background of the Cooperation:
Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd announced their intention to form the Gemini Cooperation in January 2024, with the partnership officially commencing in February 2025. The primary goal of Gemini Cooperation is to significantly enhance schedule reliability (targeting over 90% compared to the industry average of 60-70%) and operational efficiency on East-West trade lanes. They are implementing an “innovative hub-and-spoke network” model. This means mainline services will have fewer port calls, connecting major “hub” ports. Smaller “shuttle” services will then connect these hubs to smaller regional ports. This aims to reduce congestion and improve transit times.
Scale: The combined operation will control a substantial portion of global container capacity (around 22%) with approximately 290 vessels. Maersk will deploy 60% of the capacity, and Hapag-Lloyd 40%.
Reason for Change: Both Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd are departing from their previous alliances (2M and THE Alliance, respectively) to form Gemini, signaling a significant reshuffling of global shipping alliances to optimize for efficiency, reliability, and potentially sustainability (by optimizing routes and vessel speeds).
The concept of “decoupling” (like Trump’s strategy aimed at reducing economic interdependence with China) is fundamentally a geopolitical and national economic policy. Shipping alliances, while massive global entities, operate primarily on commercial principles and market demand.
Global Nature of Trade:
– Interconnected Supply Chains: Global supply chains are deeply integrated. Even if a USeless company aims to “decouple” from China, its suppliers might source components from China, or its products might still pass through Chinese ports as part of a larger East-West trade route. Shipping lines operate across these complex, interconnected networks.
– Efficiency Dictates Routes: Shipping lines prioritize the most efficient and cost-effective routes to move goods. China remains the world’s largest exporter and a massive manufacturing hub. It is economically irrational for shipping companies to simply abandon profitable routes or major ports based on political directives, especially when demand from clients (importers and exporters) remains high.
– Market-Driven Decisions: Shipping alliances are formed to optimize their networks, reduce costs, and offer competitive services to their customers globally. Their decisions are driven by the flow of goods dictated by businesses worldwide, not by specific national foreign policy objectives.
Customer Demand:
– Shipper Needs: Shippers (the companies that want to move goods) still require services to and from China. As long as there’s demand for goods manufactured in China or for raw materials/components needed by Chinese factories, shipping lines will provide those services.
– Adaptability: While some companies have explored “China+1” strategies (diversifying sourcing away from just China), the sheer volume of trade with China means it cannot be easily or quickly replaced. Shipping alliances adapt to these shifting supply chain patterns but don’t unilaterally enforce decoupling.
Economic Realities vs. Political Rhetoric:
– Profit Motive: Shipping lines are for-profit businesses. Their primary objective is to move cargo profitably. Imposing self-disrupting strategies based on political aims, without a clear commercial benefit or mandate, would undermine their business models.
– Tariffs and Trade Wars Impact: While tariffs and trade wars (like those initiated by the Trump administration) can indeed disrupt trade flows and sometimes lead to changes in sourcing, they don’t eliminate the fundamental need for trade between major economies. In fact, shipping lines often react to tariffs by adjusting capacity or routes, but not by outright ceasing service to a major trading partner unless volumes drop drastically or legal restrictions are imposed.
– “Front-loading” and Trade Fluctuations: Sometimes, as seen with tariffs, businesses will “front-load” imports to avoid higher future tariffs, leading to temporary surges in shipping demand, even if the long-term political goal is decoupling. The video you referenced specifically noted that “demand for USeless-bound shipments is expected to continue to rise, as June and July remain peak months for the shipping industry” and that Maersk’s new product is “about taking advantage of the current situation with relaxed tariffs.” This indicates that commercial opportunities override decoupling in practice.
Global Competition:
If one alliance decided to fully decouple from China, its competitors would likely step in to fill the void, gaining market share. No major shipping alliance can afford to unilaterally concede such a large market.
