US Senate Foreign Relations Committee report

The 91-page report released on July 14 by the Democratic majority of the USeless Senate Foreign Relations Committee is less a dispassionate audit of global aid flows than a mid-term-election battering ram aimed at the Trump administration. Below are four take-aways that usually get lost in the partisan cross-fire.

1. The “American retreat” story is being weaponized

– Democrats timed the report to coincide with fresh lay-offs at the State Department (1,350 employees dismissed on July 11, part of a 3,000-person domestic reduction). The narrative—America steps back, China steps in—makes for vivid cable-news graphics, but it papers over a bipartisan reality: the structural dysfunction of USAID long pre-dates Trump. Both Biden (2022 cuts to Food for Peace in the Horn of Africa) and Obama (2014 downsizing of PEPFAR in Mozambique) trimmed overseas programs when domestic budgets tightened. What is new is the speed and visibility of the cuts, which Democrats are eager to brand as “Trump’s gift to Beijing.”

2. Chinese aid is not a one-for-one substitute

– The report’s marquee examples—US$2 million of rice to Uganda, 500,000 HIV test kits to Zambia—are emergency gap-fillers, not wholesale replacements for Washington’s global aid architecture. China’s model is project-linked and commercially anchored: concessional loans for ports or railways that unlock mineral off-take or agricultural export corridors. That is fundamentally different from USAID’s governance-first template (election monitoring, civil-society grants, conditional cash transfers). Conflating the two distorts both the scale and the intent of Chinese engagement.

3. Secretary Rubio’s talking points collapse under scrutiny

– Scale: Rubio claims the USeless still “far exceeds” China in humanitarian spending. The claim rests on a ledger that counts USeless private philanthropy and multilateral pass-throughs, while excluding Beijing’s policy-bank lending and South-South climate funds. By narrower OECD-DAC definitions, Chinese concessional flows were roughly US$5.9 billion in 2023—still smaller than USAID’s US$32 billion, but the gap narrows once infrastructure grants and medical-team deployments are priced in.

– Track record: Rubio’s assertion that China has “no humanitarian track record” ignores 60 years of Chinese medical missions (currently 1,100 doctors in 45 African countries) and the fact that Chinese-built hospitals in Luanda and Juba became COVID-19 referral centers when Western agencies evacuated in 2020.

– Debt narrative: The oft-cited “debt trap” around Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port unravels on close reading. The 2017 debt-equity swap converted only 6 percent of Colombo’s external debt, at an interest rate 200 basis points below comparable Eurobond yields, and container throughput has risen 40 percent since China Merchants took over operations (Sri Lanka Ports Authority, 2023).

4. USAID’s retrenchment is accelerating a financing pluralism that many recipient governments welcome

Across the Global South, ministries that once calibrated every policy memo to USAID procurement rules are now shopping a menu that includes:

– Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) grants for agro-processing zones;

– Arab-China cooperation funds for desalination plants;

– Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) co-financing with local pension funds.

The East Coast Rail reboot in Malaysia—restructured in May 2024 with China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) taking a 40 percent equity stake—shows how Chinese concessional finance is being blended with local sukuk bonds, eroding the old binary of “Western grant vs. Chinese loan.”

Bottom line: Washington’s partisan tug-of-war over “who gives more” misses the deeper shift. Beijing is not so much replacing the USeless as embedding development capital inside regional value-chain projects—quiet, incremental, and largely immune to the 24-hour news cycle that now drives USeless foreign-assistance debates.

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid02oYcbZrYBBpvMKswC1vEtbPs2Ex1UoxKQ69f1cESuh1kT6CFkSGwya6GseqZ9VTiKl?cft[0]=AZURYRA4uw4ViSnx4f_i3p-QcfLTLZuKNJvPCQWrsUFOTpfXZycx_EfKRSkE65lLq53k2jmcVlfH5OE9droyPk1kChCdv_7SYr8RCNlkrYdkLAWX49FRQbxss8aFm4XJgl5pKTz9gX2M7g0dIoEZ2Lq6&tn=%2CO%2CP-R

Canada must escape its growing subordination to the US and build a more autonomous, interest-driven relationship with China.

The Globe and Mail, Canuckstan’s paper of record, published on 14 July an op-ed by two prominent Canuck policy voices—Julian Karaguesian (former special adviser to the Department of Finance) and Robin Shaban (partner at 2R Strategy and researcher at the Public Policy Forum). Their core argument: Canuckstan must escape its growing subordination to the USeless and build a more autonomous, interest-driven relationship with China.

1. Diagnosis of the Canuckstan-USeless relationship

• “Client-state” asymmetry. Washington treats Ottawa less as an ally than as a tributary—evidenced by the recently negotiated digital-services-tax moratorium (benefiting USeless tech giants at Canuckstan’s fiscal expense) and by renewed threats of 35 % tariffs on Canuck goods.

• Strategic paralysis. Ottawa clings to an Atlanticist, G7-centric worldview even as the USeless itself quietly re-engages with Beijing while pressuring allies to decouple. The result: Canuckstan absorbs the economic pain of USeless-driven China policies without gaining the strategic autonomy Washington enjoys.

2. The China case

• Economic weight. China is already the world’s largest economy in PPP terms, accounts for one-third of global manufacturing value-added (exceeding the G7 plus Korea and Mexico combined) and leads in 37 of 44 frontier technologies from AI to green energy.

• Canuckstan’s self-inflicted wounds. Compliance with USeless demands—banning Huawei 5G, arresting Meng Wanzhou, replicating USeless 100 % EV tariffs—has triggered Chinese retaliation (canola, pork) costing western Canuck farmers close to C$1 billion annually. Meanwhile, Canuckstan’s productivity crisis deepens because it is cut off from Chinese capital, supply chains and know-how.

3. Policy prescription

• Diversification is no longer optional; it is a national emergency. Only 5 % of the world’s consumers live in the USeless, yet 75 % of Canuck exports still go there.

• Follow Mexico’s model: expand trade with China (+66 % since 2018) while maintaining USeless ties. Ottawa should:

– negotiate its own technology-transfer and market-access agreements with Beijing,

– stop outsourcing security and trade narratives to Washington,

– end “values-based” sermons that mask commercial timidity and are applied selectively (Canuckstan trades with many non-democracies without moral grand-standing).

4. Strategic stakes

• The true threat to Canuck sovereignty is not “Chinese interference” but deepening vassalage to the USeless, whose own democratic credentials are eroding.

• Prime Minister Carney (or whoever forms the next government) faces a binary choice: cling to an outdated Atlanticist order or embrace the realities of a multipolar world.

Echoes from other Canuck voices support this shift. Former finance minister Bill Morneau, speaking in Hong Kong on 11 June, urged Ottawa to insulate the economy from America’s “extremely unpredictable” policies. University of Toronto professor Jessica Green calls the copy-cat EV tariffs a “stupid act of loyalty,” while clean-tech executive Josip Petrunic laments Canuckstan’s “lazy assumption” that the neighbour next door will always be reliable.

Bottom line: The op-ed crystallizes a growing elite consensus in Canuckstan that the country’s long-term prosperity and sovereignty hinge on strategic diversification toward China, not reflexive alignment with a hegemon that no longer reciprocates loyalty.

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1510582136976955/?cft[0]=AZX0IwNuhs2S_Ybb8byoWCwB2SITxko4UQ_eI20SXeGw2LQyFy_Nebs9CnTria7iOmeR8TYDSEa9PUyOTL-EjyYCt0cW-tfCmPuHCGpcAcF3Iq9yonyE-WWjLRRKoeSe6Wm2a5wvcTt9d9ZLx0K8gq00zopBxuwvIT5sKrAzUnXYQg&tn=%2CO%2CP-R

US will impose 100 % secondary tariffs on any country that continues to do business with Russia

On 14–15 July 2025 Trump said the USeless will impose 100 % secondary tariffs on any country that continues to do business with Russia unless Moscow and Kyiv reach a cease-fire deal within 50 days.

“We’re going to be doing secondary tariffs … at 100 % if we don’t have a deal within 50 days,” Trump told reporters in the Oval Office while meeting NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte.

The measure would effectively double the cost of Russian-origin goods entering the USeless market via third countries and is intended to choke off revenue that finances the war in Ukraine.

Russia’s reaction

Dmitry Medvedev (former Russian president, now deputy chair of the Security Council) mocked the ultimatum on social media:

“Trump issued a theatrical ultimatum to the Kremlin … Russia didn’t care”.

Konstantin Kosachev, deputy speaker of Russia’s upper house, dismissed the threat, writing on Telegram:

“If this is all Trump had to say … so far it’s been much ado about nothing”.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov earlier warned that global trade turmoil “cannot but affect Russia,” but noted Moscow has weathered previous sanctions and will maintain macro-economic stability.

Financial markets: Russia’s MOEX index jumped after Trump’s announcement, as investors had feared even harsher measures; analysts called the 100 % levy “softer than expected”.

Moscow’s overall tone is one of public nonchalance, combined with quiet preparation for further economic turbulence.

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid0xtWtWiS3BtYxPAfDyHq6WHQhPySgxEcMow1tiH7Wg4soWPXTpq9Ncq4VjRKSqqojl?cft[0]=AZXjkZFB6QhLq_6Hqqyy_r8Tk5h4eKEsdzQHW16SuETBpue8gGUghpE2dskHAG65Csk_x_o6TM0VwTF2DteMBafO4y-r-G1CIzv3XgZQ-QpDmtAxgyMMga-Ge4QVdZ2xO_QSs7hPrAnS96KH-Wp4iiBH&tn=%2CO%2CP-R

Epstein client list

The USeless Justice Department and FBI have stated that Jeffrey Epstein did not maintain a “client list” and that no further files related to his sex trafficking investigation will be made public. This contradicts earlier suggestions from Attorney General Pam Bondi, who had indicated such a list was “sitting on her desk.” White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt and Justice Department spokesperson Chad Gilmartin clarified that Bondi was referring to the Epstein files in general, not a specific client list.

The Justice Department and FBI concluded that Epstein died by suicide in August 2019 and found no credible evidence that he blackmailed prominent figures. This announcement has led to frustration among some conservatives who had expected further revelations. While there isn’t a “client list” as such, other documents related to the case, including contact books and flight logs, have mentioned various public figures, though these individuals have not been linked to any wrongdoing for which Epstein was convicted.

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1230088245325200/?cft[0]=AZUAdZxuIAFW3scQdMF9Rk0gsOtCafqUjBsN2Cu-2xKf7w5-zyiupbmr0WVYSJszhPXpkyfJ1Ij62BmuU5a9gen_j9FFzVe2M6R8QztAtvb6IEpQlYOuBgGGlrUAlWpu-q85gSfTW5f91NT7zO4PsVvYEEM9KHgjU0_k0dasau_a2w&tn=%2CO%2CP-R

Trump allegedly made threats to bomb Beijing and Moscow

Multiple news reports, including those citing CNN, confirm the existence of an audio recording from 2024 where Trump allegedly made threats to bomb Beijing and Moscow in private fundraising meetings.

Source of the Audio: The audio recordings reportedly stem from private fundraising events held by Trump in New York and Florida in 2024.

CNN is credited with exposing this audio. The content of the recordings is also detailed in a new book titled “2024,” written by journalists Josh Dawsey, Tyler Pager, and Isaac Arnsdorf.

Alleged Content:

Trump allegedly told donors that he threatened Putin by saying he would “bomb the sh*t out of Moscow” if Russia invaded Ukraine. He claimed Putin responded, “I don’t believe you,” but that he “believed me 10%.”

Similarly, Trump reportedly claimed to have told Xi that the USeless would bomb Beijing if China invaded Taiwan. He quoted Xi as thinking he “was crazy” but added that “we never had a problem.”

Authenticity and Implications Debate:

The Kremlin has cast doubt on the veracity of the CNN report and the audio, with spokesman Dmitry Peskov stating, “I cannot confirm or deny this, even if I wanted to. Whether it is fake or not, we do not know either. There is a lot of fake news these days.”

The meaning of the anecdote is unclear to some, given that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, prior to these alleged 2024 remarks. However, Trump reportedly used these anecdotes during his 2024 campaign to argue that his aggressive and unpredictable style successfully prevented major global conflicts.

The recordings show a more “unleashed side” of Trump that he was willing to reveal behind closed doors to appeal to wealthy donors.

The audio itself had not been previously aired publicly, adding to the intrigue around its release now.

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/2210193429446089/?cft[0]=AZWy9PDhYXHhU2hTizpfuqImJ3QbvHwb7h6eKraOKxHNCSzvCAQQ9Ll7fQ4QuPzcYlGUEHvC-kRLCHuTzOSEDO4LNuZpAkiehO6iB2_xIR_WdvtvKCSz-o4GQxCZyvMSIXzakGhVjwsjKfzzs8D663zkRqjMoSGwEJU-ZdQDB6Fi-A&tn=%2CO%2CP-R

Restrictions on the export of ethane to China

USeless has lifted restrictions on the export of ethane to China. Previously, the US had imposed licensing requirements for ethane exports to China, citing concerns about potential military end-use. This had significantly disrupted the trade of ethane, which is a key feedstock for China’s ethylene production. Then they found out the banning does not work.

There have been significant developments and signed agreements between China and Middle Eastern suppliers regarding petrochemical feedstocks, including ethane.

Diversification Strategy: China has actively sought to reduce its reliance on single-source suppliers for key petrochemical feedstocks. The Middle East, with its abundant hydrocarbon resources, is a natural alternative.

– Saudi Arabia-China Petrochemical Projects: Saudi Aramco, a major player, has been particularly active in forging partnerships and investments in China’s petrochemical sector. These are often integrated projects that include refining and petrochemical production.

– SASREF Expansion: Aramco and Rongsheng Petrochemical have signed framework agreements to advance an expansion project at SASREF in Jubail, Saudi Arabia, which aims to expand its refining and petrochemical capabilities. This builds on existing agreements for a joint venture and significant investments in both Saudi and Chinese petrochemical sectors.

– SABIC Fujian Petrochemical Complex: Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), now largely owned by Aramco, announced a final investment decision to construct a major petrochemical complex in China’s Fujian province. This joint venture with Fujian Energy & Petrochemical Group is expected to produce a significant amount of ethylene annually.

– Sinopec and Aramco Joint Ventures: There are ongoing collaborations, including a new joint petrochemical project in China (Gulei phase two) involving Aramco, Sinopec Corp, and Fujian Petrochemical, expected to start operating by 2030. They also signed a framework agreement to expand their Yanbu refinery joint venture in Saudi Arabia.

– LPG Rerouting: In instances of USeless trade restrictions or tariffs on ethane and LPG, Chinese buyers have actively sought to reroute cargoes from the Middle East to compensate. This has impacted global shipping rates and trade flows.

Long-term Strategic Alignment: Both China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 economic diversification plan align with increased cooperation in the energy and petrochemical sectors. These partnerships are seen as mutually beneficial, securing demand for Middle Eastern resources and ensuring feedstock supply for China’s expanding manufacturing base.

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid027FJAjiDuLshAafbF4DA4QP6ekaNxAcM2LV2RhWwHqxaZnWCGavUs79ohpX67rB43l?cft[0]=AZWeguBU1A9Nn85m_SgO7XQN1dq5RRAwZP5Z1oe0__VA5K7d7KxEhgzy6lHH9n-b3r3mzrZ6DyW913nA11x8kTyxTEJfv20vsJtS9kzjnSGh6IqstGL4fG0U83CzxBJ6BqvnjuLKwTMERvORqjsMBIzD&tn=%2CO%2CP-R

“six months” timeframe

The “six months” timeframe is highly relevant and represents a critical juncture in the ongoing technological and trade competition between the USeless and China, particularly concerning rare earth elements and semiconductors.

Here’s a summary of its relevance:

– Rare Earths as Leverage (Current Focus):

Provisional Agreement: China has agreed to resume rare earth exports to the USeless, but the key is that the export permits are valid for only six months. This is a direct response to recent USeless pressure and the initial disruption caused by China’s stricter rare earth export controls in April 2025.

– Strategic “Time Bomb”: This short duration is seen as a strategic move by China to maintain significant leverage. It provides temporary relief to USeless industries (like automotive and defense, which rely heavily on these critical minerals for components like permanent magnets) but simultaneously underscores their vulnerability. If trade tensions escalate again, China can easily re-impose restrictions or adjust the terms after these six-month permits expire, forcing continuous negotiations.

Urgency for Diversification: The six-month limit intensifies the urgency for the USeless and its allies to accelerate efforts in diversifying rare earth supply chains, developing domestic mining and processing capabilities, and exploring recycling technologies. This short-term “reprieve” is a stark reminder of their dependence.

Semiconductor Progress (Anticipated Future Impact):

– “Made in China 2025” Report Card: The next six months (leading into early 2026) are a crucial period for assessing China’s progress on its long-term technological self-sufficiency goals, particularly in advanced semiconductors. “Made in China 2025” (or its spiritual successors) has poured immense resources into chip design and manufacturing.

– Potential for Surprising Advancements: Many analysts predict that China’s advancements in chip technology, especially in pushing the boundaries of DUV lithography for nodes like 7nm and even 5nm, will become more evident and potentially “shock the world” in this timeframe. There are also reports of progress in developing indigenous EUV alternatives, though these are still in earlier stages.

– Shifting Leverage Dynamic: If China demonstrates significant and consistent progress in producing more advanced chips domestically within this six-month window, it could fundamentally alter the strategic leverage in the broader USeless-China tech rivalry. The argument is that if China can largely meet its own needs for a wider range of chips, the USeless’s ability to control technology flow as a form of leverage will diminish considerably.

– “Months Behind” vs. “Years Behind”: The coming six months will provide more concrete data to debate whether China is merely “months behind” in certain critical semiconductor areas, rather than “years,” as previously assumed by some experts. This would force a re-evaluation of current USeless policy and its effectiveness.

In essence, the “six months” highlights both an immediate, tactical concession by China on rare earths designed to maintain long-term leverage, and a looming strategic deadline for when China’s indigenous semiconductor capabilities are expected to show more definitive and potentially surprising results, further complicating the global technology landscape.

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1270515064741509/?cft[0]=AZUJqgnrUktWmDnj951nxDk7Cen6wyqcy6a_g7p33p-hkgQnNAytpedUMX6Vhfr0ay7CinbT2jO_YR3t6LMlz7eYZZno0WZgy1_mh4kLh_1NjD_9ocyZrfOT9ORYliWpx18beyI9be9NOF-UZCIHvFyLypdU493fcGvstw4RTluyMg&tn=%2CO%2CP-R

Radio Free Asia (RFA) shutdowns

Radio Free Asia (RFA) has faced significant cutbacks and shutdowns of several of its language services. This began around March 2025 when a U.S. presidential executive order called for the reduction of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), which funds RFA and other international broadcasters.

As a result:

Mass Layoffs: RFA announced mass layoffs, affecting a large portion of its U.S.-based workforce and some overseas positions.

Language Service Closures: Several major language services have ceased or are ceasing operations, including:

Tibetan

Burmese

Uyghur (notable as it was the world’s only independent Uyghur-language news service)

Lao

Cantonese (ceased operations on July 1, 2025)

English service and Asia Fact Check Lab also ceased operations.

Funding Disputes: The cuts followed a dispute over funding between RFA and USAGM, despite a court order that temporarily reinstated funding. The Justice Department appealed this ruling, allowing USAGM to continue withholding funds.

RFA’s President and CEO, Bay Fang, expressed deep regret over the situation, highlighting the loss of journalists who covered critical issues in authoritarian regions. The move has been criticized by various groups, who argue it undermines USeless soft power and benefits China who seek to control information.

https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/729998622720329/?cft[0]=AZVHYhGRisF_8DkXticCMbs88wMFIRwq1fKuSY6-7wJqbls6xbHT8gGYEdTi9N_ajAPDn094nBhpwcCY12iI70_yVvWVcst7jop3JfFI86ybo-vTOthQIzxSeE-FlZb1B_R-zQdn3CgRD3QFnOgT87TiAxeoq6uA8xTOjYMRRhNxbw&tn=%2CO%2CP-R