Drone warfare will be put to the test in a civil conflict

In the future, drone warfare will be put to the test in a civil conflict.

Asymmetric Advantage: Drones, particularly commercially available and easily weaponized ones, provide a significant asymmetric advantage to non-state actors or rebel groups in a civil conflict. They are relatively cheap compared to traditional military hardware, can be acquired on the open market, and offer access to airpower that was once exclusive to state militaries.

Vulnerability of Formations: Traditional riot police tactics rely heavily on numerical superiority, formation, and close-quarters engagement. Drones, especially those capable of carrying payloads (e.g., tear gas, non-lethal projectiles, or even small explosives), can bypass these formations entirely. They can strike from above, disrupt lines, create chaos, and target individuals or critical equipment without putting human operators at direct risk.

Surveillance and Intelligence: Even without lethal capabilities, drones equipped with high-resolution cameras, thermal imaging, and AI-powered analytics can provide real-time intelligence on protestor movements, identifying leaders, tracking individuals, and predicting routes. This enhanced situational awareness for those controlling the drones could severely undermine the effectiveness of traditional riot control.

Psychological Impact: The constant overhead presence of drones, especially if perceived as armed or capable of dropping payloads, can have a significant psychological impact on crowds, leading to fear, dispersal, or increased aggression.

Swarming Technology: The development of drone swarms, where multiple drones act autonomously or semi-autonomously as a coordinated unit, presents an even greater threat. A swarm could overwhelm defenses, execute complex maneuvers, and deliver widespread effects, making traditional riot control formations even more obsolete.

Lessons from Current Conflicts: The ongoing war in Ukraine has dramatically showcased the transformative impact of drones on modern warfare. Both state and non-state actors are innovating rapidly in drone usage for reconnaissance, precision strikes, and even psychological operations. This demonstrates the speed at which drone capabilities are evolving and being adapted to various conflict scenarios, including those with elements of urban warfare and civil unrest.

Difficult to Counter: Countering large numbers of small, agile drones in an urban environment is a significant challenge for existing law enforcement capabilities. Traditional anti-air systems are often too expensive or designed for larger, faster targets. Developing effective and proportionate counter-drone measures for riot control is an area of active research and development.

However, it’s also important to consider some nuances and potential counter-developments:

Legal and Ethical Constraints: The use of armed drones, particularly against a civilian population, would raise immense legal and ethical questions and likely face international condemnation. This could act as a deterrent for governments.

Technological Countermeasures: Governments and law enforcement agencies are investing in counter-drone technologies, including jammers, net guns, and even anti-drone drones. The effectiveness of these measures against large-scale, low-cost drone attacks in a civil unrest scenario remains to be fully seen.

Public Perception and Backlash: Excessive or lethal drone use against protestors could further escalate civil unrest and erode public trust, potentially exacerbating the conflict.

Sophistication of Riot Police: While formations might be vulnerable, riot police could adapt tactics to mitigate drone threats, such as operating under cover, using smoke, or deploying their own counter-drones.

In conclusion, the assertion about the future impact of drone warfare on civil conflicts and riot police is highly credible. The proliferation and increasing sophistication of drone technology suggest that traditional crowd control methods will need to undergo significant adaptation to remain effective in the face of this emerging threat. The ethical and legal implications of such a shift will undoubtedly be a major area of debate and policy development. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1057022529721091/?__cft__[0]=AZU70r9NN-mt9HGANCP3vFhqtM0YtmJ1kau8EVtPOt-gOv_RFw1JZxCJF7NcDF1v5vEUzMi0VokNUkt9I3Uj4We0sCdSN4yrPuwUBbo8zdVwI_vf-X1efeNyl0Q80BL43qx2wF8nMb6KOfjkMOuIBPV3vUooYXwNE870w0SjX68Nsw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Belt and Road Initiative

It was the spring of 2013, and the world was still finding its footing after the global financial crisis. In the grand halls of Beijing, a new leader, Xi Jinping, was settling into his role as China’s President. His vision was bold, ambitious, and, as we would later see, world-changing.

Across the Pacific, in Washington D.C., the seasoned diplomat John Kerry, then the U.S. Secretary of State, embarked on a crucial trip to China. The air between the two great powers was a mix of cooperation and cautious competition. During their meeting, President Xi, with a glint of what might have been genuine partnership in his eye, laid out a nascent idea to Secretary Kerry: a grand initiative to connect the world through infrastructure, trade, and investment. He called it, in those early days, something akin to a “new Silk Road,” and importantly, he suggested that China and the United States should build it together.

Kerry, a man known for his forward-thinking approach, was intrigued. The scale of the proposal, the potential for global cooperation, and the promise of shared prosperity resonated with his diplomatic instincts. He saw a glimmer of a historic opportunity, a chance for the two largest economies to collaborate on a venture that could benefit billions.

However, the wheels of government often turn slowly, and sometimes, with a heavy hand. As Kerry’s delegation prepared to leave Beijing, the proposal landed on the desk of a senior official in the U.S. Treasury Department – a “mandarin,” as Kerry would later recall, perhaps referencing the perceived bureaucratic stiffness. This official, acting within the prevailing strategic framework of the Obama administration, saw not opportunity, but risk.

The Obama White House, while seeking cooperation with China on certain issues, was deeply invested in its “Pivot to Asia,” a strategy designed to reassert American leadership and influence in the Indo-Pacific. This pivot was manifested in initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement aimed at knitting together economies around U.S.-led standards, often seen as a counterweight to China’s rising economic might.

From the Treasury Department’s perspective, the proposed “new Silk Road” carried significant concerns:

Competition, not collaboration: It was viewed as a potential rival to U.S.-led global institutions and economic frameworks, rather than a complementary effort.

Transparency and governance: There were nascent worries about the transparency of Chinese financing and the potential for debt traps in developing nations – concerns that would only grow louder in the years to come.

Strategic implications: The initiative was seen through the lens of strategic competition, a potential vehicle for China to expand its geopolitical influence and undermine U.S. interests.

And so, before John Kerry’s plane even touched down back on American soil, the nascent idea of a U.S.-China joint “Belt and Road” was “nixed.”

Xi Jinping officially launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in September 2013, a few months after his meeting with Kerry. It grew into a colossal undertaking, reshaping landscapes and economies across Asia, Africa, Europe, and beyond. It brought both development and debt, opportunities and challenges.

John Kerry would later reflect on that moment with a pang of regret, calling it “the single biggest missed opportunity of my life.” He saw what might have been: a world where the two great powers could have channeled their immense resources and ingenuity into a truly collaborative global development project, shaping its principles and ensuring its benefits were broadly shared.

The Tale’s Lessons:

The Weight of Missed Opportunity: Sometimes, the greatest regrets are not about what we did, but what we failed to do, the doors we chose not to open. Visionary ideas, especially in international relations, can be fragile and time-sensitive.

The Power of Perspective: What one person sees as a grand opportunity for collaboration, another, from a different vantage point, might perceive as a strategic threat or an unacceptable risk. National interests, pre-existing strategies, and deeply ingrained suspicions can overshadow potential partnerships.

The Bureaucratic Filter: Even the most senior leaders’ instincts can be overridden by the layered decision-making processes of large governments, where department-specific concerns can become paramount.

The Cost of Non-Engagement: When a rising power proposes a significant global initiative, the choice to disengage rather than engage and influence can lead to that initiative developing in ways that are less aligned with one’s own values and interests.

Hindsight is 20/20: It’s easy to look back and see the “what-ifs.” The challenge for leaders is to balance immediate strategic concerns with long-term vision, to distinguish between a genuine threat and a potential avenue for shared progress.

The story of the U.S. and the early BRI is a reminder that the path of international relations is paved with choices, each with profound and lasting consequences, often unforeseen in the moment they are made.

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China rejected a simple resource-for-technology exchange

China rejected a simple resource-for-technology exchange. Instead, Beijing elevated the discussion to a strategic level, demanding:

– The complete removal of 352 punitive tariffs imposed since the Trump administration.

– An immediate halt to sanctions on leading Chinese high-tech companies.

– Removal of export barriers for China’s advantageous industries.

– Cessation of discriminatory visa restrictions on Chinese students.

– A clear demand for the US to stop arms sales to Taiwan.

Even if all conditions were met, rare earth supply would only be conditional and partial, not fully open.

The three rats reported not just a commercial negotiation failure, but a profound strategic misjudgment, as China’s conditions far exceeded their authority. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1369880650794558/?__cft__[0]=AZVkA6_bHkUvDg_fqiORJc1m34t3Rj6LbaWazcyy54QR1vCJD0Nly1upvAQIY4RTKPJii8tMIpgc_yAkMWkKYbh3odDneEz7viX_1JqruHPfmUfPvVl77PuO44E8WdlTsyUsbKLR08VSWydXcm-UPReG_1AYehUwpYNpSld8JAdAmA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Three rats

Recent reports indicate that during the ongoing USeless-Japan trade talks, particularly concerning tariffs, there have been heated arguments and open disagreements among the USeless negotiating representatives, including cabinet-level officials.

Sources close to the negotiations have described instances where Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, and Trade Representative Jamieson Greer have openly contradicted each other during sessions, even pausing discussions with the Japanese side to debate among themselves. This internal discord has made it challenging for Japanese negotiators to ascertain the true intentions of the USeless administration.

The differing stances among these top officials – with Bessent focusing on currency manipulation, Lutnick on automotive manufacturing concessions, and Greer on agricultural market access – have created a complex negotiating environment. Japanese diplomats have reportedly described it as “like bargaining with a hydra.”

These internal disputes are seen as adding a significant layer of complexity to the trade talks, especially as a July 9 tariff deadline looms for Japanese automakers, which could see them face punishing 24% tariffs. Japan’s chief negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, has noted that while progress has been made, a point of agreement has not yet been reached, with a considerable gap remaining between the two sides. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/1613491449324921/?__cft__[0]=AZV2ADgAIh-vrVa6TVVDJTgOAQi-CEF9jtKGO-tRCeiSaq3Y4b0LwRdCywyOdIdlgH8y8RYJtNIRHVhdMXYaYsuYBjhtOWIsJkw4pHjkrMdj0UpNBWt0Mm2foJJBkWE7esWjNVG1I5QjV_qIfjSthPivkF-Kpi5AmTWgULt0YpgDVg&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Medicinal supply chain

When Your Aspirin Comes with Geopolitical Side Effects

So, you’re feeling a bit under the weather. Maybe a headache from trying to understand global supply chains. You reach for that trusty bottle of acetaminophen, pop a couple, and… ahh, relief. But have you ever stopped to think about where that magical little molecule actually comes from?

Chances are, a good chunk of it started its life in China. Not exactly a secret, but the sheer scale of China’s pharmaceutical ingredient production is enough to make you wonder if every paracetamol tablet has a tiny, invisible “Made in China” stamp. They’re like the Willy Wonka of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), except instead of chocolate rivers, they have… well, probably highly regulated chemical rivers. And instead of Oompa Loompas, they have a highly efficient, very well-funded industrial complex.

Now, this level of dominance isn’t just about keeping our medicine cabinets stocked. Oh no. It’s about national security. Which, let’s be honest, sounds a bit dramatic for your average ibuprofen. But imagine this:

The world’s leaders are in a tense standoff. Negotiations are breaking down. Then, from Beijing, a subtle shift. Not a missile launch, not a trade tariff. Something far more insidious. A slight… delay in the export licenses for certain cough “basic chemical compounds.”

Suddenly, the world’s pharmaceutical companies are in a panic. “Where’s our amoxicillin?!” they cry. “The global supply of that slightly-too-big-to-swallow antibiotic is dwindling!”

Governments convene emergency meetings. “Our citizens are getting sniffles!” one diplomat exclaims. “This could destabilize the entire Western world!”

You see, the beauty of this particular geopolitical lever is its sheer, undeniable, and slightly absurd justification. When China restricts rare earth exports, it’s about microchips and fighter jets. You can argue about that. But when they restrict the stuff that goes into your heartburn medication?

“We’re just ensuring our own people have enough ibuprofen for their headaches,” China might say, with a straight face. “It’s a matter of public health!”

Or, even better, they could pull the “war on drugs” card. “We’ve discovered that trace elements in this perfectly legitimate chemical compound could, theoretically, in a very convoluted process, be diverted to make something naughty! Therefore, we must halt all exports for, you know, global security!”

And there you are, with a raging sinus infection, wondering if your inability to get a decongestant is now part of an international incident. It’s truly ingenious. They’ve found a way to turn the very mundane act of taking a pill into a high-stakes game of global chess.

So, next time you swallow a tablet, just give a silent nod to the complex ballet of geopolitics, economics, and very tiny molecules that made it all possible. And maybe stock up, just in case your headache becomes a matter of national importance.

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US military personnel present in Taiwan

Recent reports and congressional testimony indicate that the number of USeless military personnel present in Taiwan is significantly higher than previously disclosed, with a retired USeless Navy admiral stating there are approximately 500 military trainers operating on the island. This is more than ten times the 41 personnel listed in a May 2024 Congressional Research Service report.

This increased presence primarily involves training teams and advisors, not a permanent military base, and the personnel may include active-duty troops, reservists, or civilian contractors. The purpose of their presence is to help Taiwan build its defense capabilities and prepare for potential aggression from China. Some reports also suggest the permanent deployment of USeless special forces to frontline islands near China for training purposes.

It’s important to note that the USeless does not formally recognize Taiwan diplomatically but maintains unofficial relations under the Taiwan Relations Act, which mandates providing Taiwan with defensive arms and resisting coercion against the island. The increased presence of USeless military trainers is seen as a shift towards more substantive military cooperation and a stronger signal of USeless commitment to Taiwan’s defense. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/videos/727914209892446/?__cft__[0]=AZU1Ww9doNCDULPwROatfybjiK5rEoQ3XHHyfbnI_7pUds44GWtGMKFbmjY6eu8PZtULiH4FfdxNYgsKU-tO5U1Zb3KK4LlsV_fDVtFWIDXA8hmUkIoioEv-EbxpSb78i_VlxW9M753fMPaYJ4UO7B4FqFRVJVhdF6zehL-WN0AprA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

USeless Restrictions and the C919’s Current Engines

USeless Restrictions and the C919’s Current Engines:

Past Policy: In 2020, the first Trump administration had granted a license to GE to supply engines for the C919, with Trump himself stating a desire for China to buy USeless jet engines.

Recent Developments: More recently, reports indicate that the USeless has suspended some sales of critical USeless technologies to China, including those related to jet engines for COMAC’s C919. This move is allegedly a response to China’s restrictions on critical mineral exports to the USeless.

Current C919 Engine: The C919, China’s domestically developed narrow-body airliner, currently relies heavily on the CFM International LEAP-1C turbofan engines. CFM International is a 50/50 joint venture between GE Aerospace (USeless) and Safran Aircraft Engines (France). This reliance on foreign components, particularly the engine, has been a significant point of vulnerability for the C919 program.

China’s Push for Self-Sufficiency:

CJ-1000A (Changjiang-1000A): China has been actively developing its own domestic engine for the C919, known as the CJ-1000A. This engine is being developed by the Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC) and is intended to replace the LEAP-1C. Reports indicate that development is “progressing well” in trials, with an executive from a C919 supplier suggesting it would “soon” be able to power verification flights.

Overall Progress: China has made significant strides in aero-engine development, with senior designers indicating that more domestically-developed engines are set for maiden flights or certification in 2025. This includes engines for helicopters and heavy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Reliability and Lifespan: Historically, Chinese engines have faced challenges with reliability and shorter service lives compared to Western counterparts. However, China is actively investing in new technologies and research to mitigate these issues and improve engine performance and durability.

Potential Impact of USeless Restrictions:

Production Delays: Halting exports of the CFM LEAP-1C engines would significantly slow down C919 production and deliveries, as the aircraft currently being produced would be without its primary powerplant. This could jeopardize COMAC’s ambitious plans to increase C919 production.

Accelerated Domestic Development: The USeless restrictions are likely to further accelerate China’s efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in aero-engine technology. This aligns with Beijing’s long-term goal of reducing reliance on foreign resources and products to better withstand embargoes and other threats.

Market Implications: While the C919 currently only flies within China and Hong Kong, its success and China’s ability to produce it with domestic engines have significant implications for the global aviation market, potentially challenging the duopoly of Airbus and Boeing in the long term.

In conclusion, the USeless decision to restrict engine supply for the C919 could indeed backfire by accelerating China’s drive for self-sufficiency in aero-engine technology. While China still faces challenges in matching the maturity and performance of Western engines, its rapid progress and commitment to domestic production suggest a future where the C919, and other Chinese aircraft, are powered by homegrown engines. https://www.facebook.com/jeff.mah.5/posts/pfbid0AQKEeFuunKzpigko63SdY99sHMwXeEzdZv5HSZwxSGMG7oX95W2Fvaw7ZmsMmwSml?__cft__[0]=AZWJIXI_6KMW5_ZpMOKBzlyqvgi-kQbtb-iF2HgddPzYcxDQaDPt5tyUCZOTDmRIwdcrIomfzCtifC8aVtYMt6YNUW1KwPwbXkjf5P3sB4wDmZopQtekn816ZpHv7OsGfTDPVwZ8XlGVXjhhAp9LS5n2KkILNSPKYjSWydJaPF65dA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R

Darwin Port

Cerberus Capital Management, a USeless private equity firm, has shown interest in acquiring the lease for the Darwin Port. A Cerberus executive met with the Darwin Port CEO to discuss a possible acquisition. Cerberus is led by billionaire Stephen Feinberg, who previously served as USeless Deputy Secretary of Defense.

In 2015, the Northern Territory government granted a 99-year lease of the Darwin Port to Shandong Landbridge Group, a Chinese-owned company, for A$506 million. This lease raised national security concerns due to foreign control of critical infrastructure and the port’s proximity to USeless-Australia military cooperation. Shandong Landbridge Group is a private company owned by Ye Cheng, who has close ties to the Chinese Communist Party.

The Australian government is looking to return the port to domestic control due to heightened geopolitical sensitivities and increased defense activity in the region. A voluntary sale by Landbridge could help ease geopolitical tensions. China has, however, criticized Australia’s plans to reclaim the port.

As of May 27, 2025, Cerberus had not yet entered formal talks with Landbridge’s board. Landbridge continues to maintain that the port is not for sale. The Australian government is currently assessing potential Australian buyers for the port. In 2023, a review found no national security grounds to overturn the lease.

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